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42 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1928–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sedillo v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2015See Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (combined appeal and orig. proceeding). 2014Sedillo v. Campbell, 5 S.W.3d 824, 826 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (appeal and orig. proceeding). | 14 | 14 |
Brown v. Andersongreen2 sentences2008Southwind Group, Inc., 188 S.W.3d at 735 ; Brown v. Anderson, 102 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). [8] Northwest acknowledges that requests for admissions and interrogatories are not available under the applicable rules except "in extraordinary cases when the demands of justice require it." However, Northwest contends that all of the information included in those forms of discovery would be nevertheless discoverable in arbitration via other forms of discovery. 2008Southwind Group, Inc., 188 S.W.3d at 735 ; Brown v. Anderson, 102 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). . | 10 | 10 |
Holmes, Woods & Diggs, v. Laurie Gentrygreen2 sentences2020See Holmes, Woods & Diggs v. Gentry, 333 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). 2019See Holmes, Woods & Diggs v. Gentry, 333 S.W.3d 650, 654 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). | 5 | 5 |
Southwind Group, Inc. v. Landwehrgreen2 sentences2010See Southwind Group, Inc. v. Landwehr, 188 S.W.3d 730, 735 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2006, orig. proceeding). 2008Southwind Group, Inc., 188 S.W.3d at 735 ; Brown v. Anderson, 102 S.W.3d 245, 250 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2003, pet. denied). [8] Northwest acknowledges that requests for admissions and interrogatories are not available under the applicable rules except "in extraordinary cases when the demands of justice require it." However, Northwest contends that all of the information included in those forms of discovery would be nevertheless discoverable in arbitration via other forms of discovery. | 3 | 7 |
In Re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc.green2 sentences2003See In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574-75 (Tex.1999) (waiver under federal act); see also Turford v. Underwood, 952 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding) (waiver under Texas law); Pepe Int'l Dev. 2003See In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574-75 (Tex.1999) (waiver under federal act); see also Turford v. Underwood, 952 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding) (waiver under Texas law); Pepe Int’l Dev. | 3 | 3 |
In Re Global Construction Co.green2 sentences2008Co., 166 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting writ of mandamus after holding, based on Howsam , that arbitrator rather than trial court should decide waiver issue in FAA-controlled case). [7] The standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitrate is the same under the TGAA and the FAA. 2008Co. , 166 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, orig. proceeding) (conditionally granting writ of mandamus after holding, based on Howsam , that arbitrator rather than trial court should decide waiver issue in FAA-controlled case). 7: The standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitrate is the same under the TGAA and the FAA. | 2 | 2 |
Christiansen v. Prezelskigreen2 sentences2003Christiansen v. Prezelski , 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990). 2003Christiansen v. Prezelski, 782 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1990). | 2 | 2 |
Turford v. Underwoodgreen2 sentences2003See In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574-75 (Tex.1999) (waiver under federal act); see also Turford v. Underwood, 952 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding) (waiver under Texas law); Pepe Int'l Dev. 2003See In re Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 571, 574-75 (Tex.1999) (waiver under federal act); see also Turford v. Underwood, 952 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1997, orig. proceeding) (waiver under Texas law); Pepe Int’l Dev. | 2 | 2 |
Upchurch v. Stategreen2 sentences1994Upchurch v. State, 703 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (“When the unnecessary matter in the charging instrument describes an essential element of the offense, the unnecessary matter must be proven at trial.”) Rogers v. State, 756 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (“The determining test of the State’s burden to prove unnecessary allegations in the indictment is whether the challenged language describes an essential element of the offense charged.”) Borrego v. State, 800 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (“Unnecessary words or allegations 1988Wray, 711 S.W.2d at 633 ; Upchurch, 703 S.W.2d at 640 . | 1 | 2 |
Small v. SPECIALTY CONTRACTORS, INC.green1 sentence2013See Small, 310 S.W.3d at 645 . | 1 | 1 |
In Re Vesta Insurance Group, Inc.green1 sentence2008Group, 192 S.W.3d at 764 (holding, in FAA-controlled case, “We agree that allowing a party to conduct full discovery, file motions going to the merits, and seek arbitration only on the eve of trial defeats the FAA’s goal of resolving disputes without the delay and expense of litigation.”).7 The evidence here shows that during the approximately nineteen months from the time it filed its answer in the suit to the time it filed its motion to 7 The standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitrate is the same under the TGAA and the FAA. | 1 | 1 |
Guaranty County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Reynagreen1 sentence2006Co. v. Reyna , 709 S.W.2d 647, 648 (Tex. 1986)). 4: The standard for determining waiver of the right to arbitrate is the same under the Texas General Arbitration Act and the Federal Arbitration Act. | 1 | 1 |
Galvan v. Stategreen1 sentence1994The elements of the offense of failure to stop and render aid are “(1) a driver of a vehicle, (2) involved in an accident, (3) resulting in injury or death of any person, (4) intentionally and knowingly, (5) fails to stop and render reasonable assistance.” Galvan v. State, 846 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) quoting Steen v. State, 640 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1 |
Borrego v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Upchurch v. State, 703 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (“When the unnecessary matter in the charging instrument describes an essential element of the offense, the unnecessary matter must be proven at trial.”) Rogers v. State, 756 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (“The determining test of the State’s burden to prove unnecessary allegations in the indictment is whether the challenged language describes an essential element of the offense charged.”) Borrego v. State, 800 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (“Unnecessary words or allegations | 1 | 1 |
Rogers v. Stategreen1 sentence1994Upchurch v. State, 703 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.Cr.App.1985) (“When the unnecessary matter in the charging instrument describes an essential element of the offense, the unnecessary matter must be proven at trial.”) Rogers v. State, 756 S.W.2d 332, 335 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd) (“The determining test of the State’s burden to prove unnecessary allegations in the indictment is whether the challenged language describes an essential element of the offense charged.”) Borrego v. State, 800 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref'd) (“Unnecessary words or allegations | 1 | 1 |
Steen v. Stategreen1 sentence1994The elements of the offense of failure to stop and render aid are “(1) a driver of a vehicle, (2) involved in an accident, (3) resulting in injury or death of any person, (4) intentionally and knowingly, (5) fails to stop and render reasonable assistance.” Galvan v. State, 846 S.W.2d 161, 164 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, no pet.) quoting Steen v. State, 640 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex.Cr. | 1 | 1 |
Witherspoon v. Illinoisgreen2 sentences1980Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether “a venireman is improperly excluded,” and if so, “any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand].” See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22 , wherein the Supreme Court stated: "... [W]e think it clear, .. . that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined ‘the very integrity of the ... process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate, 1980Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether “a venireman is improperly excluded,” and if so, “any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand].” See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22 , wherein the Supreme Court stated: "... [W]e think it clear, .. . that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined ‘the very integrity of the ... process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Carmona v. State
green
1 sentence2015Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Wray v. State
green
1 sentence1988Wray, 711 S.W.2d at 633 ; Upchurch, 703 S.W.2d at 640 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Almanza v. State
green
2 sentences1986Moreover, under the standard for determining if error in a jury charge requires reversal, as set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (on Motion for Rehearing), appellant has failed to demonstrate any harm resulting from submission of the allegedly improper charge. 1986Moreover, under the standard for determining if error in a jury charge requires reversal, as set out in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (on Motion for Rehearing), appellant has failed to demonstrate any harm resulting from submission of the allegedly improper charge. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Davis v. Georgia
green
2 sentences1980Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether “a venireman is improperly excluded,” and if so, “any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand].” See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22 , wherein the Supreme Court stated: "... [W]e think it clear, .. . that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined ‘the very integrity of the ... process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate, 1980Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether “a venireman is improperly excluded,” and if so, “any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand].” See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22 , wherein the Supreme Court stated: "... [W]e think it clear, .. . that the jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined ‘the very integrity of the ... process’ that decided the petitioner’s fate, | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Davis v. State
green
2 sentences1980In Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804 , 225 S.E.2d 241 , the objection was found "insufficient," but still the voir dire examination was held constitutionally inadequate, id. 225 S.E.2d at 244 . [13] Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether "a venireman is improperly excluded," and if so, "any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand]." See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22, wherein the Supreme 1980In Davis v. State, 236 Ga. 804 , 225 S.E.2d 241 , the objection was found "insufficient," but still the voir dire examination was held constitutionally inadequate, id. 225 S.E.2d at 244 . [13] Davis v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 122 , 97 S.Ct. 399 , 50 L.Ed.2d 339 (1976) [holding that the lack of systematic, intentional exclusion of a qualified group of jurors is not the determining test, but rather, whether "a venireman is improperly excluded," and if so, "any subsequently imposed death penalty cannot stand]." See also Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 523, n. 22 , 88 S.Ct. at 1777, n. 22, wherein the Supreme | 1 | 1980–1980 |
City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission
green
1 sentence1974We here pause to remark that conditions as they existed at the time the Commission acted are the determining factors.” As restated in City of San Antonio v. Texas Water Commission, 407 SW. 2d 752 (Tex. 1966), the orders of the Commission are presumed to be legal and valid, and the burden is on the party appealing from the Commissioner's order to show that the orders are not reasonably supported by substantial evidence. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Ruffier v. Womack
green
1 sentence1928Huffier v. Womack, supra. By its second proposition under fourth assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the determining test of whether an instrument is a mortgage or a conditional sale is whether or not there was an existing debt to be secured. | 1 | 1928–1928 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.