determining factors in California

2019If such failure does not clearly and unmistakably appear, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion, and his decision should be affirmed' "].) "In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, ' "the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law." ' " ( Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 , 1413, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Whether a mistake is excusable is a fact question as are the determining factors of "the reasonableness of the misconception and the justif

2019If such failure does not clearly and unmistakably appear, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion, and his decision should be affirmed' "].) "In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, ' "the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law." ' " ( Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 , 1413, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Whether a mistake is excusable is a fact question as are the determining factors of "the reasonableness of the misconception and the justif

2025The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 , italics added; see also McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 428, fn. 18 [“[i]n seeking discretionary relief, clients who represent themselves are held to the same standard of excusable neglect as litigants who

2016The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.]' [Citation.] '[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief.' " (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School District (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in Scott Co. of California v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Company (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 197, 208 , disapproved on other grounds in LeFrancois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094

1987A different rationale, explained by the Supreme Court in Estate of Abdale, supra, 28 Cal.2d at page 590 applies: "After reviewing the history of sections 228 and 229, in Estate of Rattray, [ supra, 13 Cal.2d 702 ], this court stated: `"It is apparent from the history of these code provisions and the various changes therein that ever since the amendment in 1905 [Stats. 1905, *1016 p. 608], wherein the origin or source of the property was first set up as one of the determining factors in the descent and distribution of the estate of a decedent dying intestate without issue, that there has been a

1987A different rationale, explained by the Supreme Court in Estate of Abdale, supra, 28 Cal.2d at page 590 applies: “After reviewing the history of sections 228 and 229, in Estate of Rattray, [supra, 13 Cal.2d 702 ], this court stated: ‘ “It is apparent from the history of these code provisions and the various changes therein that ever since the amendment in 1905 [Stats. 1905, p. 608], wherein the origin or source of the property was first set up as one of the determining factors in the descent and distribution of the estate of a decedent dying intestate without issue, that there has been a consi

1970(Security Truck Line v. City of Monterey (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 441, 445 [ 256 P.2d 366 , 257 P.2d 755 ].) The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.

1967(Security Truck Line v. City of Monterey (1953) 117 Cal.App.2d 441, 445 [ 256 P.2d 366 , 257 P.2d 755 ].) The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.

2011Moore Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “ ‘ “the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” ’ ” (Torbitt v. State of California (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 860, 866 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 1 ], quoting Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Here Gens identifies no affirmative “misconception,” so the sufficiency of his showing depends on whether he established a sufficient j

2011Moore Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “ ‘ “the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” ’ ” (Torbitt v. State of California (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 860, 866 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 1 ], quoting Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Here Gens identifies no affirmative “misconception,” so the sufficiency of his showing depends on whether he established a sufficient j

1968It is now settled “that the underlying principle of sections 228 and 229 is that the origin or source of acquisition of the property should and does control its distribution.” (Estate of Allie (1958) 50 Cal.2d 794, 797-798 [ 329 P.2d 903 ] ; see Estate of Reizian (1951) 36 Cal.2d 746, 749 [ 227 P.2d 249 ] ; Estate of Abdale (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587, 590-591 [ 170 P.2d 918 ] ; Estate of Rattray (1939) 13 Cal.2d 702, 713-714 [ 91 P.2d 1042 ] ; Estate of Putnam (1933) 219 Cal. 608, 611 [ 28 P.2d 27 ].) Referring to these sections in Rattray, we said: “ It is apparent from the history of these code pr

1968It is now settled “that the underlying principle of sections 228 and 229 is that the origin or source of acquisition of the property should and does control its distribution.” (Estate of Allie (1958) 50 Cal.2d 794, 797-798 [ 329 P.2d 903 ] ; see Estate of Reizian (1951) 36 Cal.2d 746, 749 [ 227 P.2d 249 ] ; Estate of Abdale (1946) 28 Cal.2d 587, 590-591 [ 170 P.2d 918 ] ; Estate of Rattray (1939) 13 Cal.2d 702, 713-714 [ 91 P.2d 1042 ] ; Estate of Putnam (1933) 219 Cal. 608, 611 [ 28 P.2d 27 ].) Referring to these sections in Rattray, we said: “ It is apparent from the history of these code pr

2022(See Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1146 [when evaluating a section 473(b) motion based on a claim of mistake, “[w]e must ask ‘“whether ‘a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances’ might have made the same error”’”]; cf. Hopkins, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [“[i]n considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “‘the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law”’”].) 12 There is similarly no merit to Mayank’s argument his failure to appear was

2022(See Hopkins & Carley v. Gens, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1412–1413 [if a mistake of law is claimed, the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law].) Furthermore, in choosing to represent himself, rather than hiring legal counsel more knowledgeable in real estate law, Carter may not take advantage of that situation by later claiming ignorance of relevant law.

1987A different rationale, explained by the Supreme Court in Estate of Abdale, supra, 28 Cal.2d at page 590 applies: "After reviewing the history of sections 228 and 229, in Estate of Rattray, [ supra, 13 Cal.2d 702 ], this court stated: `"It is apparent from the history of these code provisions and the various changes therein that ever since the amendment in 1905 [Stats. 1905, *1016 p. 608], wherein the origin or source of the property was first set up as one of the determining factors in the descent and distribution of the estate of a decedent dying intestate without issue, that there has been a

1987A different rationale, explained by the Supreme Court in Estate of Abdale, supra, 28 Cal.2d at page 590 applies: “After reviewing the history of sections 228 and 229, in Estate of Rattray, [supra, 13 Cal.2d 702 ], this court stated: ‘ “It is apparent from the history of these code provisions and the various changes therein that ever since the amendment in 1905 [Stats. 1905, p. 608], wherein the origin or source of the property was first set up as one of the determining factors in the descent and distribution of the estate of a decedent dying intestate without issue, that there has been a consi

2020The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” (Brochtrup v. Intep (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 323, 329 .) 15 The law pertaining to defaults provides, in relevant part: “[I]f the defendant has been served, . . . and no answer, demurrer, notice of motion to strike . . . , notice of motion to transfer . . . , notice of motion to dismiss . . . , notice of motion to quash service of summons or to stay or dismiss the action . . . or notice of the filing of a petition for writ of mandate . . . has been filed with the

2020(See Brochtrup v. Intep, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 329 [“The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law”].) In sum, Rossell’s claimed mistake of law was unreasonable and he provided no reasonable justification for his ignorance of the law.

2019Arnoff Co. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313 , 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335 , 346, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 466 P.2d 693 ; Toho-Towa, Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096 , 1111, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 .) In reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding excuse and diligence, we defer to the trial court's assessments of credibility and the weight of the evidence and do not interfere with its determinations of these matters. ( Coordinated Const., Inc. , at p. 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney

2019Arnoff Co. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313 , 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335 , 346, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 466 P.2d 693 ; Toho-Towa, Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096 , 1111, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 .) In reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding excuse and diligence, we defer to the trial court's assessments of credibility and the weight of the evidence and do not interfere with its determinations of these matters. ( Coordinated Const., Inc. , at p. 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney

2019If such failure does not clearly and unmistakably appear, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion, and his decision should be affirmed' "].) "In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, ' "the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law." ' " ( Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 , 1413, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Whether a mistake is excusable is a fact question as are the determining factors of "the reasonableness of the misconception and the justif

2019If such failure does not clearly and unmistakably appear, it cannot be said that the trial judge abused his discretion, and his decision should be affirmed' "].) "In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, ' "the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law." ' " ( Hopkins & Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401 , 1413, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 .) Whether a mistake is excusable is a fact question as are the determining factors of "the reasonableness of the misconception and the justif

2011Moore Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “ ‘ “the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” ’ ” (Torbitt v. State of California (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 860, 866 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 1 ], quoting Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Here Gens identifies no affirmative “misconception,” so the sufficiency of his showing depends on whether he established a sufficient j

2011Moore Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 592 ].) In considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “ ‘ “the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” ’ ” (Torbitt v. State of California (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 860, 866 [ 208 Cal.Rptr. 1 ], quoting Tammen v. County of San Diego (1967) 66 Cal.2d 468, 476 [ 58 Cal.Rptr. 249 , 426 P.2d 753 ].) Here Gens identifies no affirmative “misconception,” so the sufficiency of his showing depends on whether he established a sufficient j

1984Moore Co. [1960] 184 Cal.App.2d 617, 620 , ... the court said: ‘However, a mistake as to law does not require relief from default as a matter of law. [Citation.] The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.’ Excusable neglect is ‘that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person under the same circumstances.’ (Ald erman v. Jacobs [1954] 128 Cal.App.2d 273, 276 . . . . [¶] Applying the foregoi

1967(Citation.) The issue of which mistakes of law constitute excusable neglect presents a fact question; the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law.” Excusable neglect is “that neglect which might have been the act of a reasonably prudent person' under the same circumstances.” (Alderman v. Jacobs, 128 Cal.App.2d 273, 276 [5] [ 274 P.2d 930 ].) Applying the foregoing rules to the facts of the present ease, the court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Mrs. Tammen was not entitled to relief because

2025(Cf. People v. Young (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 729, 734 [trial court erred by finding aggravating circumstance of “extreme serious nature” of defendant’s offense when he was convicted of assault with a firearm, which “merely states the obvious”].) VI Section 654 Huerta contends, and the People concede, that the trial court erred by imposing sentences for both counts 2 and 3 in violation of section 654.

2025The determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[I]gnorance of the law coupled with negligence in ascertaining it will certainly sustain a finding denying relief. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 319 , italics added; see also McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 428, fn. 18 [“[i]n seeking discretionary relief, clients who represent themselves are held to the same standard of excusable neglect as litigants who

2022(See Younessi v. Woolf (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1137, 1146 [when evaluating a section 473(b) motion based on a claim of mistake, “[w]e must ask ‘“whether ‘a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances’ might have made the same error”’”]; cf. Hopkins, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413 [“[i]n considering whether a mistake of law furnishes grounds for relief, “‘the determining factors are the reasonableness of the misconception and the justifiability of lack of determination of the correct law”’”].) 12 There is similarly no merit to Mayank’s argument his failure to appear was

2019Arnoff Co. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313 , 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335 , 346, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 466 P.2d 693 ; Toho-Towa, Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096 , 1111, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 .) In reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding excuse and diligence, we defer to the trial court's assessments of credibility and the weight of the evidence and do not interfere with its determinations of these matters. ( Coordinated Const., Inc. , at p. 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney

2019Arnoff Co. (1965) 238 Cal.App.2d 313 , 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, City of Ontario v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 335 , 346, 85 Cal.Rptr. 149 , 466 P.2d 693 ; Toho-Towa, Ltd. v. Morgan Creek Productions, Inc. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1096 , 1111, 159 Cal.Rptr.3d 469 .) In reviewing the trial court's factual findings regarding excuse and diligence, we defer to the trial court's assessments of credibility and the weight of the evidence and do not interfere with its determinations of these matters. ( Coordinated Const., Inc. , at p. 319, 47 Cal.Rptr. 749 ; accord, Johnson v. Pratt & Whitney

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not

2017But even accepting Parrish and Fitzgibbons's premise for the sake of argument, we reject their invitation to create an exception to the interim adverse judgment rule for cases in which litigants or their lawyers inadvertently submit "materially false facts" of this sort in support of their claims. 5 We have made clear that a court determining whether a claim was supported by probable cause should rely on "the facts known to the [litigant]" accused of malicious prosecution. ( Sheldon Appel , supra , 47 Cal.3d at p. 878 , 254 Cal.Rptr. 336 , 765 P.2d 498 .) Litigants, we have explained, need not