determining factors in Pennsylvania

1987Judge Colins of this court has articulated the true nature of spot zoning in Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township Planning Commission, 89 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 468 , 492 A.2d 818 (1985), pointing out that, properly understood, it is more than just discriminatory or “island” zoning—the land area involved being only one of the determining factors—r-in that: Futhermore, our Supreme Court has cautioned us that we should not limit our inquiry to the mere physical aspect and characteristics of the land, but we should also consider how the rezoning affects the public health, safety, morals, and gener

1987Judge Colins of this court has articulated the true nature of spot zoning in Pace Resources v. Shrewsbury Township Planning Commission, 89 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 468 , 492 A.2d 818 (1985), pointing out that, properly understood, it is more than just discriminatory or “island” zoning—the land area involved being only one of the determining factors—r-in that: Futhermore, our Supreme Court has cautioned us that we should not limit our inquiry to the mere physical aspect and characteristics of the land, but we should also consider how the rezoning affects the public health, safety, morals, and gener

2020Our Supreme Court has stated that the “size of the property is only one of the determining factors[,]” Mulac, 210 A.2d at 276 , and that “the large size of [a] tract is not determinative.” In re Realen, 838 A.2d at 730 .

2018"Thus, a violation of Rule 600 may result in dismissal of charges even where a court would not otherwise find a constitutional violation under the Barker factors." Commonwealth v. Bradford , 616 Pa. 122 , 46 A.3d 693 , 701 (2012).

2014Although we ultimately remanded the case because of an incomplete record, we nonetheless held that the determining factors were whether the expenditures were for the children’s benefit and whether they were reasonable.3 Id. at 1202 .

2005In Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545 , 751 A.2d 1153 (2000), our Supreme Court set forth the determining factors to test the propriety of an investigative detention: [An appellate court’s] inquiry is a dual one — whether the offieer[’s] action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

2005In Commonwealth v. Zhahir, 561 Pa. 545 , 751 A.2d 1153 (2000), our Supreme Court set forth the determining factors to test the propriety of an investigative detention: [An appellate court’s] inquiry is a dual one — whether the offieer[’s] action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.

2000One without the other is insufficient to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle." [6] See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (preventing the prosecution of a lessee who refused to submit to a warrantless search). [1] Neil Hochreiter (Hochreiter), an enforcement officer for the Department, described his duty to limit fuel tax evasion and explained that the only diesel fuel approved for use on the roads of the Commonwealth is a clear fuel which is taxed and that dyed fuel is only permitted for home heating,

2000One without the other is insufficient to justify the warrantless search of a vehicle." [6] See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 , 87 S.Ct. 1727 , 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967) (preventing the prosecution of a lessee who refused to submit to a warrantless search). [1] Neil Hochreiter (Hochreiter), an enforcement officer for the Department, described his duty to limit fuel tax evasion and explained that the only diesel fuel approved for use on the roads of the Commonwealth is a clear fuel which is taxed and that dyed fuel is only permitted for home heating,

1996In Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 200 , 531 A.2d 49, 57 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 622 , 554 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1748 , 104 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989), Judge Craig defined illegal spot zoning as, “zoning provisions adopted to control the use of a specific area of land without regard to the relationship of those land use controls to the overall plan and the general welfare of the community.” Spot zoning is more than an “island” of discriminatory zoning, the land area involved being only one of the determining factors.

1996In Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 200 , 531 A.2d 49, 57 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 622 , 554 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1748 , 104 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989), Judge Craig defined illegal spot zoning as, “zoning provisions adopted to control the use of a specific area of land without regard to the relationship of those land use controls to the overall plan and the general welfare of the community.” Spot zoning is more than an “island” of discriminatory zoning, the land area involved being only one of the determining factors.

1996In Township of Plymouth v. County of Montgomery, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 200 , 531 A.2d 49, 57 (1987), appeal denied, 520 Pa. 622 , 554 A.2d 513 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1021 , 109 S.Ct. 1748 , 104 L.Ed.2d 184 (1989), Judge Craig defined illegal spot zoning as, “zoning provisions adopted to control the use of a specific area of land without regard to the relationship of those land use controls to the overall plan and the general welfare of the community.” Spot zoning is more than an “island” of discriminatory zoning, the land area involved being only one of the determining factors.

1994See Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Dreisbach, 26 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 201, 363 A.2d 870 (1976); Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Doyle, 103 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 490, 520 A.2d 917 (1987). .

1990Modern Cooler Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Driscoll), 18 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 22, 333 A.2d 811 (1975).

1983Concurring Opinion by Judge Doyle : I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I ¡agree with the position asserted by DEB. that the standard for determining immunity from suit of a public official was established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540 , 393 A.2d 293 (1978), filed on October 6,1978, and that the actions of each township supervisor must be individually examined under that standard. ¡Such an examination here might very well establish that the immunity defense is ¡applicable to several supervisors because their particular participation, i

1983Concurring Opinion by Judge Doyle : I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I ¡agree with the position asserted by DEB. that the standard for determining immunity from suit of a public official was established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in DuBree v. Commonwealth, 481 Pa. 540 , 393 A.2d 293 (1978), filed on October 6,1978, and that the actions of each township supervisor must be individually examined under that standard. ¡Such an examination here might very well establish that the immunity defense is ¡applicable to several supervisors because their particular participation, i

1982Harmony Building Assn. v. Berger, 99 Pa. 320 (1882), Harrisburg Electric Light Co. v. B. & E.

1981Claimant now asks this Court to remand 2 her case for further proceedings to explore the facts of the harassment, and application of the “Colduvell standard.” In Colduvell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 185 , 408 A.2d 1207 (1979), which involved an allegation of sexual harassment as necessitous cause for voluntarily-terminating employment, this Court stated that [F]or purposes of unemployment compensation benefits, the law is clear: the claimant must sustain the burden of proving a reasonable attempt to stay on the job.

1981Claimant now asks this Court to remand 2 her case for further proceedings to explore the facts of the harassment, and application of the “Colduvell standard.” In Colduvell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 185 , 408 A.2d 1207 (1979), which involved an allegation of sexual harassment as necessitous cause for voluntarily-terminating employment, this Court stated that [F]or purposes of unemployment compensation benefits, the law is clear: the claimant must sustain the burden of proving a reasonable attempt to stay on the job.

1979The court in determining the waiver question reasoned that petitioner’s attorney was ineffective not because he failed to heed the petitioner’s instructions or because the issue sought to be raised was not waived, but rather because his advice not to appeal, as well as his failure to perfect a direct appeal was erroneous in view of the holding in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198 , 316 A.2d 77 (1974).

1979The court in determining the waiver question reasoned that petitioner’s attorney was ineffective not because he failed to heed the petitioner’s instructions or because the issue sought to be raised was not waived, but rather because his advice not to appeal, as well as his failure to perfect a direct appeal was erroneous in view of the holding in Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198 , 316 A.2d 77 (1974).

1948Mr. Justice Moschziskhr graphically expressed the pertinent rule in Virgilio v. Walker & Brehm, 254 Pa. 241, 244-245 , 98 A. 815 , where, speaking for this Court, he said that, — “In a case of this character [trespass for damages for personal injury], a nonsuit can be entered only when it is inconceivable, on any reasonable hypothesis, that a mind desiring solely to reach a just and proper conclusion in accordance with the relevant governing principles of law, after viewing the evidence in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff, could determine in his favor the controlling issues involve

1948Mr. Justice Moschziskhr graphically expressed the pertinent rule in Virgilio v. Walker & Brehm, 254 Pa. 241, 244-245 , 98 A. 815 , where, speaking for this Court, he said that, — “In a case of this character [trespass for damages for personal injury], a nonsuit can be entered only when it is inconceivable, on any reasonable hypothesis, that a mind desiring solely to reach a just and proper conclusion in accordance with the relevant governing principles of law, after viewing the evidence in the light most advantageous to the plaintiff, could determine in his favor the controlling issues involve

1940Com. v. Ronello, 242 Pa. 381 , 89 A. 553 .

1940Com. v. Ronello, 242 Pa. 381 , 89 A. 553 .

1934Obviously the line in applying the determining rule of whether it is a present or past fact being testified to often becomes very uncertain, and as was hinted in Ilyus v. Buch, supra, a certain latitude or discretion should be allowed the trial judge, taking into consideration all the circumstances, parties, their credibility, and the weight of associated evidence.

1922The determining inquiry then seems to be whether a transaction, which in its practical conception, possesses every characteristic of interstate commerce so defined, loses that interstate character because the title to the pipe line and contents south of the state line is in one company, and north of the state line is in another, both companies being controlled by a third, the contents of the pipe being in process of interstate transportation “in a continuous route or journey.” Certainly both the West Virginia vendor and the Pennsylvania vendee, the appellant, together are engaged in interstate