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19 North Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by North Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive 2017Court of City of Los Angeles , 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947). [¶23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was dri | 1 | 2 |
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissionergreen1 sentence2019Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285, 290 (N.D. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Skarsgardgreen2 sentences2018See also State v. Skarsgard , 2008 ND 31 , ¶¶ 8-10, 745 N.W.2d 358 ; State v. Schroeder , 524 N.W.2d 837 , 839 (N.D. 1994) ; State v. Valgren , 411 N.W.2d 390 , 392-94 (N.D. 1987). 2018See also State v. Skarsgard , 2008 ND 31 , ¶¶ 8-10, 745 N.W.2d 358 ; State v. Schroeder , 524 N.W.2d 837 , 839 (N.D. 1994) ; State v. Valgren , 411 N.W.2d 390 , 392-94 (N.D. 1987). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences2018Smith , at 87-88 (citations and quotations omitted). [¶ 12] Under Smith , the failure to charge Taylor with refusing to submit to an onsite screening test is irrelevant to the validity of the stop, which instead turns on whether the officer had an articulable and reasonable suspicion Taylor was violating the law. 2018In State v. Smith , 452 N.W.2d 86 , 87 (N.D. 1990), we considered an analogous claim in the context of a conviction for possession of firearms by a convicted felon after a law enforcement officer initially stopped a vehicle for violation of an open-bottle law. | 1 | 1 |
Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angelesgreen2 sentences2017Court of City of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 , 67 S.Ct. 1409 , 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947). [¶ 23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. —, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶ 24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a drive 2017Court of City of Los Angeles , 331 U.S. 549, 568-69 (1947). [¶23] In Birchfield v. North Dakota , 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016), the United States Supreme Court left unresolved the constitutional question of whether pre-arrest a driver can be legally required to take an onsite screening test on the basis of reasonable suspicion rather than the greater requirement of probable cause. [¶24] The majority, on the basis of its constitutional interpretation, says, “We conclude a law enforcement officer may request an onsite screening test of a driver’s breath based on reasonable suspicion the driver was dri | 1 | 1 |
State v. Guttormsongreen2 sentences2017See Guttormson, 2015 ND 235, ¶¶ 28-29 , 869 N.W.2d 737 (McEvers, Justice, concurring specially). *776 [¶ 19] Section 39-08-01(1)(e)(3), N.D.C.C., says a person may not drive upon a highway of this state and refuse to submit to an onsite screening test of the individual’s breath “upon the request of a law enforcement officer under section 39-20-14.” An individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway in this state and refuses to submit to a test required under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 is guilty of an offense. 2017See Guttormson, 2015 ND 235, ¶¶ 28-29 , 869 N.W.2d 737 (McEvers, Justice, concurring specially). *776 [¶ 19] Section 39-08-01(1)(e)(3), N.D.C.C., says a person may not drive upon a highway of this state and refuse to submit to an onsite screening test of the individual’s breath “upon the request of a law enforcement officer under section 39-20-14.” An individual who operates a motor vehicle on a highway in this state and refuses to submit to a test required under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 is guilty of an offense. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smudagreen1 sentence2017Kruckenberg, at ¶ 15; State v. Smuda, 419 N.W.2d 166, 168 (N.D. 1988). [¶ 9] Here, the general jury verdict and instructions authorized the jury to find Webster guilty of driving under the influence if the jury found he drove on a highway and was either under the influence of intoxicating liquor, or refused to submit to the onsite screening test, or refused to submit to a blood test after arrest. | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Cal. United Statesgreen2 sentences2017See Birchfield, 136 S.Ct. at 2173 . [¶ 66] Traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis “assess[es], on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Riley v. California, — U.S.-, 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 , 189 L.Ed.2d 430 (2014) (citation omitted). 2017See Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2173 . [¶66] Traditional Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis “assess[es], on the one hand, the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” Riley v. California , 134 S.Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014) (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Boehmgreen2 sentences2017See State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, ¶ 10 , 849 N.W.2d 239 (describing statutory standard for requesting preliminary breath test and stating traffic stop for speeding and individual’s admission of alcohol consumption meets statutory requirements). [¶ 15] The charges against Webster involved an incident in 2014, and under the operative statute, a person who operated a motor vehicle on a highway of this state who refused to submit to an onsite screening test upon the request of an officer under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 was guilty of an offense under N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01(1)(e)(3) and 39-08-01(2)(a). 2 The 2017See State v. Boehm, 2014 ND 154, ¶ 10 , 849 N.W.2d 239 (describing statutory standard for requesting preliminary breath test and stating traffic stop for speeding and individual’s admission of alcohol consumption meets statutory requirements). [¶ 15] The charges against Webster involved an incident in 2014, and under the operative statute, a person who operated a motor vehicle on a highway of this state who refused to submit to an onsite screening test upon the request of an officer under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14 was guilty of an offense under N.D.C.C. §§ 39-08-01(1)(e)(3) and 39-08-01(2)(a). 2 The | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Pitmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Olmstead v. First Interstate Bank of Fargo, N.A.green | 1 | 1 |
| Mayo v. Mooregreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Bismarck v. Hoffnergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nichols v. Backesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Woytassekgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in North Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Parizek
green
2 sentences2017Because a limited Terry search based on reasonable suspicion is constitutionally permissible, see, e.g. , State v. Parizek , 2004 ND 78, ¶ 17 , 678 N.W.2d 154 , the deputy’s request that Baxter submit to an onsite screening test did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. 2017Because a limited Terry search based on reasonable suspicion is constitutionally permissible, see, e.g. , State v. Parizek , 2004 ND 78, ¶ 17 , 678 N.W.2d 154 , the deputy’s request that Baxter submit to an onsite screening test did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
State v. Birchfield
green
2 sentences2017As in Beylund [v. Levi] , 2015 ND 18, ¶ 24 , 859 N.W.2d 403 , and in Birchfield , 2015 ND 6, ¶ 15 , 858 N.W.2d 302 , Baxter points to nothing in the implied consent laws that would require him to submit to an onsite screening test in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2017As in Beylund [v. Levi] , 2015 ND 18, ¶ 24 , 859 N.W.2d 403 , and in Birchfield , 2015 ND 6, ¶ 15 , 858 N.W.2d 302 , Baxter points to nothing in the implied consent laws that would require him to submit to an onsite screening test in violation of the Fourth Amendment. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
Beylund v. Levi
green
2 sentences2017As in Beylund [v. Levi] , 2015 ND 18, ¶ 24 , 859 N.W.2d 403 , and in Birchfield , 2015 ND 6, ¶ 15 , 858 N.W.2d 302 , Baxter points to nothing in the implied consent laws that would require him to submit to an onsite screening test in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 2017As in Beylund [v. Levi] , 2015 ND 18, ¶ 24 , 859 N.W.2d 403 , and in Birchfield , 2015 ND 6, ¶ 15 , 858 N.W.2d 302 , Baxter points to nothing in the implied consent laws that would require him to submit to an onsite screening test in violation of the Fourth Amendment. | 3 | 2015–2017 |
State v. Baxter
green
2 sentences2017We now consider that issue in the context of an administrative license revocation proceeding. [¶12] Section 39-20-14(1), N.D.C.C., provides that a law enforcement officer may request a preliminary onsite screening test of an individual’s breath when the officer “has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual’s body contains alcohol.” Section 39-20-04(1), N.D.C.C., p 2017We now consider that issue in the context of an administrative license revocation proceeding. [¶12] Section 39-20-14(1), N.D.C.C., provides that a law enforcement officer may request a preliminary onsite screening test of an individual’s breath when the officer “has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual’s body contains alcohol.” Section 39-20-04(1), N.D.C.C., p | 3 | 2017–2017 |
Brewer v. Ziegler
green
2 sentences2013Because Officer Helgeson is not certified, YellowBird argues, she lacked the authority to request the test, making YellowBird’s refusal irrelevant. [¶ 10] Our disposition of this case turns on the interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, entitled “[sjcreening tests.” 1 “The sole purpose of an onsite screening test is to assist a law enforcement officer in deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to arrest an individual.” Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207, ¶ 25 , 743 N.W.2d 391 (citation omitted). 2013Because Officer Helgeson is not certified, YellowBird argues, she lacked the authority to request the test, making YellowBird’s refusal irrelevant. [¶ 10] Our disposition of this case turns on the interpretation of N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, entitled “[sjcreening tests.” 1 “The sole purpose of an onsite screening test is to assist a law enforcement officer in deciding whether there are reasonable grounds to arrest an individual.” Brewer v. Ziegler, 2007 ND 207, ¶ 25 , 743 N.W.2d 391 (citation omitted). | 2 | 2013–2015 |
City of Mandan v. Leno
neutral
2 sentences2019Any individual who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have given consent to submit to an onsite screening test or tests of the individual’s breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration in the individual’s breath upon the request of a law enforcement officer who has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual 2019Any individual who operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways of this state is deemed to have given consent to submit to an onsite screening test or tests of the individual’s breath for the purpose of estimating the alcohol concentration in the individual’s breath upon the request of a law enforcement officer who has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2019"An affirmative refusal to submit to a chemical test must be clear and unequivocal." State v. Johnson , 2009 ND 167 , ¶ 10, 772 N.W.2d 591 . 2019"An affirmative refusal to submit to a chemical test must be clear and unequivocal." State v. Johnson , 2009 ND 167 , ¶ 10, 772 N.W.2d 591 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Roberts v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences2019Roberts v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 2015 ND 137, ¶ 6 , 863 N.W.2d 529 . 2019Roberts v. North Dakota Dept. of Transp., 2015 ND 137, ¶ 6 , 863 N.W.2d 529 . | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. O'Connor
green
2 sentences2018The majority relies on State v. O'Connor , where an officer recited a complete implied consent advisory prior to the onsite screening test but only read the defendant a partial implied consent advisory prior to the chemical test, which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence. 2016 ND 72 , ¶¶ 2-3, 877 N.W.2d 312 . 2018The majority relies on State v. O'Connor , where an officer recited a complete implied consent advisory prior to the onsite screening test but only read the defendant a partial implied consent advisory prior to the chemical test, which failed to inform him that refusal to take a chemical test is a crime punishable in the same manner as driving under the influence. 2016 ND 72 , ¶¶ 2-3, 877 N.W.2d 312 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Valgren
green
1 sentence2018See also State v. Skarsgard , 2008 ND 31 , ¶¶ 8-10, 745 N.W.2d 358 ; State v. Schroeder , 524 N.W.2d 837 , 839 (N.D. 1994) ; State v. Valgren , 411 N.W.2d 390 , 392-94 (N.D. 1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
City of Wahpeton v. Roles
green
1 sentence2018N.D.C.C. §§ 39-10-01.1 and 39-10-24 ; City of Wahpeton v. Roles , 524 N.W.2d 598 , 600-01 (N.D. 1994). [¶ 13] As we explained in Webster, 2017 ND 75 , ¶¶ 22-23, 891 N.W.2d 769 , the requirements for an officer's request for an onsite screening test are not an essential element of the crime of refusing that test, and a defendant's failure to raise an issue that an officer did not have an articulable reason to initially stop a defendant's vehicle in an appropriate pretrial motion constitutes a waiver of that issue under N.D.R.Crim.P. 12. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Schroeder
green
1 sentence2018See also State v. Skarsgard , 2008 ND 31 , ¶¶ 8-10, 745 N.W.2d 358 ; State v. Schroeder , 524 N.W.2d 837 , 839 (N.D. 1994) ; State v. Valgren , 411 N.W.2d 390 , 392-94 (N.D. 1987). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Webster
green
2 sentences2018According to Taylor, he stopped at the stop sign and he claims a video from the officer's vehicle would show he stopped, which would establish the officer lacked any justification for the initial traffic stop and for any tests for intoxication. [¶ 9] In State v. Webster , 2017 ND 75 , ¶¶ 10-24, 891 N.W.2d 769 , we addressed an issue about a defendant's request for a jury instruction under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1) to a charge of refusing to submit to an onsite screening test under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(e)(3). 1 We said the issue was whether the essential elements of a criminal charge under N.D.C 2018According to Taylor, he stopped at the stop sign and he claims a video from the officer's vehicle would show he stopped, which would establish the officer lacked any justification for the initial traffic stop and for any tests for intoxication. [¶ 9] In State v. Webster , 2017 ND 75 , ¶¶ 10-24, 891 N.W.2d 769 , we addressed an issue about a defendant's request for a jury instruction under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14(1) to a charge of refusing to submit to an onsite screening test under N.D.C.C. § 39-08-01(1)(e)(3). 1 We said the issue was whether the essential elements of a criminal charge under N.D.C | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dawson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2017Dep’t of Transp. , 2013 ND 62, ¶ 23 , 830 N.W.2d 221 . 2017Dep’t of Transp., 2013 ND 62, ¶ 23 , 830 N.W.2d 221 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2017State v. Stewart , 2006 ND 39, ¶ 6 , 710 N.W.2d 403 . 2017State v. Stewart , 2006 ND 39, ¶ 6 , 710 N.W.2d 403 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Dawson v. N.D. Dep't of Transportation
neutral
2 sentences2017Dep’t of Transp. , 2013 ND 62, ¶ 23 , 830 N.W.2d 221 . 2017Dep’t of Transp., 2013 ND 62, ¶ 23 , 830 N.W.2d 221 . | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Birchfield
neutral
2 sentences2017I do agree the remedies available for an unconstitutional search differs in each proceeding because the exclusionary rule applies to the criminal proceeding, State v. Birchfield , 2016 ND 182, ¶ 3 , 885 N.W.2d 62 , but exclusion does not apply to administrative proceedings. 2017I do agree the remedies available for an unconstitutional search differs in each proceeding because the exclusionary rule applies to the criminal proceeding, State v. Birchfield , 2016 ND 182, ¶ 3 , 885 N.W.2d 62 , but exclusion does not apply to administrative proceedings. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Baxter
neutral
2 sentences2017As a result of Birchfield , I would overrule State v. Baxter , 2015 ND 107 , 863 N.W.2d 208 , State v. Baxter , 2016 ND 181 , 885 N.W.2d 64 , and hold the onsite screening test cannot be demanded under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, absent probable cause or a DUI-related arrest. (footnote: 2) The Long Answer [¶45] The United States Supreme Court’s holdings in DUI enforcement cases are inconsistent and unclear. 2017As a result of Birchfield , I would overrule State v. Baxter , 2015 ND 107 , 863 N.W.2d 208 , State v. Baxter , 2016 ND 181 , 885 N.W.2d 64 , and hold the onsite screening test cannot be demanded under N.D.C.C. § 39-20-14, absent probable cause or a DUI-related arrest. (footnote: 2) The Long Answer [¶45] The United States Supreme Court’s holdings in DUI enforcement cases are inconsistent and unclear. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Barrios-Flores v. Levi
green
2 sentences2017The Department’s Report and Notice form was admitted without an objection on hearsay grounds and provides sufficient evidence to support the request for an onsite screening test. [¶11] Section 39-20-14(1), N.D.C.C., authorizes law enforcement to request an onsite screening test if the officer “has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual’s body contains alcohol.” 2017The Department’s Report and Notice form was admitted without an objection on hearsay grounds and provides sufficient evidence to support the request for an onsite screening test. [¶ 11] Section 39-20-14(1), N.D.C.C., authorizes law enforcement to request an onsite screening- test if the officer “has reason to believe that the individual committed a moving traffic violation or was involved in a traffic accident as a driver, and in conjunction with- the violation or the accident the officer has, through the officer’s observations, formulated an opinion that the individual’s body contains alcohol | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Sauby v. City of Fargo
green
2 sentences2016Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, ¶8 , 747 N.W.2d 65 . 2016Sauby v. City of Fargo, 2008 ND 60, ¶8 , 747 N.W.2d 65 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Salter
green
2 sentences2016Because O’Connor indicated he recalled the advisory given before the onsite screening test, the State argues this advisory was sufficient under State v. Salter, 2008 ND 230 , 758 N.W.2d 702 . [f 10] In Salter , the officer, prior to giving a preliminary breath test, read the defendant the implied consent advisory informing him' that if he refused to submit to testing his driving privileges could be revoked for up to four years. 2008 ND 230, ¶ 2 , 758 N.W.2d 702 . 2016Because O’Connor indicated he recalled the advisory given before the onsite screening test, the State argues this advisory was sufficient under State v. Salter, 2008 ND 230 , 758 N.W.2d 702 . [f 10] In Salter , the officer, prior to giving a preliminary breath test, read the defendant the implied consent advisory informing him' that if he refused to submit to testing his driving privileges could be revoked for up to four years. 2008 ND 230, ¶ 2 , 758 N.W.2d 702 . | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Goeman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Steinbach green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Dailey neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Blue green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Fargo v. Salsman green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Yellowbird v. North Dakota Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Nagel neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| City of Fargo v. Wonder green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Torkelsen green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Hoover v. Director, North Dakota Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| Asbridge v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| State v. Schimmel green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.