19 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1934–2024 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Mull v. Zeta Consumer Productsgreen2 sentences2024He further relies on Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, asserting the employer's removal of a safety device combined with other factors, such as ignoring safety complaints and OSHA citations, was sufficient to satisfy both prongs of the substantial certainty test. 176 N.J. 385, 392-93 (2003). 2003See Mull v. Zeta Consumer Products, 176 N.J. 385, 389 , 823 A. 2d 782, 784 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Eckert v. Rumsey Park Associatesgreen2 sentences2021Eckert v. Rumsey Park Assocs., 294 N.J. 2019Eckert v. Rumsey Park A-3580-16T2 9 Assocs., 294 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Laidlow v. Hariton MacH. Co., Inc.green2 sentences2023Therefore, "if the substantial certainty standard presents a jury question and if the court concludes that the employee's allegations, if proved, would meet the context prong, the employer's motion for summary judgment should be denied; if not, it should be granted." Ibid. 2003Reports of prior accidents and "close-calls," are merely evidence "that may be considered in the substantial certainty analysis." Id. at 621-22, 790 A. 2d 884 . | 1 | 7 |
Millison v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences2024In adopting the substantial certainty standard, the Court acknowledged "that every undertaking, particularly certain business judgments, involve some risk, but that willful employer misconduct was not meant to go undeterred." Id. at 178 . 2002We therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants fraudulently concealed knowledge of already-contracted diseases are sufficient to state a cause of action for aggravation of plaintiffs’ illnesses, as distinct from any claim for the existence of the initial disease, which is cognizable only under the Compensation Act. [Id. at 181-82, 501 A.2d 505 (emphasis added).] The dissent in Millison asserted that the majority ruled on the facts of the case without any “focused attention to the details of plaintiffs allegations or explication of the substantial certainty standard.” Id. at | 1 | 6 |
Mabee v. Borden, Inc.green1 sentence2024Plaintiff next argues under Mabee v. Borden, Inc., that an affirmative act by an employer is not required to show an intentional wrong when, as was the case here, the injury was caused by the absence of a safety guard. 316 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Giammares v. Allemannia Fire Insurance
neutral
2 sentences1959Eq. 209 , said: "Courts of equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation upon a probability, or even upon a mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon a certainty of error." The same rule was enunciated in Giammares v. Allemannia Fire Insurance Co., 91 N.J. 1950Eq. 209 , said: `Courts of equity do not grant the high remedy of reformation upon a probability, or even upon a mere preponderance of evidence, but only upon a certainty of error.' The same rule was enunciated in Giammares v. Allemannia Fire Insurance Co., 91 N.J. | 3 | 1934–1959 |
Universal Security Co. v. American Pipe & Construction Co.
neutral
2 sentences1959Eq. 114 . `"The demonstration of mistake must be clear and satisfactory, such as produces a strong conviction of the truth." Universal Security Co. v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 95 N.J. 1950Eq. 114 . *294 "`The demonstration of mistake must be clear and satisfactory, such as produces a strong conviction of the truth.' Universal Security Co. v. American Pipe and Construction Co., 95 N.J. | 2 | 1950–1959 |
Bustamante v. Tuliano
green
2 sentences1991In addressing this issue, the court analyzed the substantial certainty test advanced in Millison and concluded that the Workers' Compensation bar "will fall only in the face of proof of a subjective intent to injure or a substantial certainty that injury will occur." Bustamante, 248 N.J. 1991Super. at 501 , 591 A. 2d 694 (emphasis added). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.