certainty instruction in California

2026(Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 666 [The certainty instruction “raises particular concerns in a case like this one, where the conviction was based almost entirely on the testimony of a single witness who expressed certainty in her identification and had no prior relationship with the defendant.”].) Further, Anderson did not express unmitigated certainty but rather claimed at trial that she did not see defendant shoot the victim, contrary to her prior statements.

2025Analysis In Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th 644 , our Supreme Court evaluated CALCRIM No. 315 and expressed concern that allowing jurors to consider the eyewitness’s level of certainty reinforced a common misconception that an “identification is more likely to be reliable when the witness has expressed certainty.” (Lemcke, at p. 647.) Consequently, the court concluded a “reevaluation of the certainty instruction [in CALCRIM No. 315] is warranted,” citing to the “near unanimity in the empirical research that ‘eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy.’ ” (Lemcke, at p. 64

2024In People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411 (Sánchez), our Supreme Court addressed this same issue regarding the certainty instruction appearing in CALJIC No. 2.92.

2022In People v. Sánchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 411 (Sánchez), our Supreme Court addressed this same issue regarding the certainty instruction appearing in CALJIC No. 2.92.

2023As Watson Bowman Acme Corp. v. RGW Construction, Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 279 (Watson) tells us, under subdivision (a), “the trial court has no discretion—it must award prejudgment interest from the first day there exists both a breach and a liquidated claim.” (Watson, at p. 293.) Watson explains: “From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or can calculate the amount owed and does not pay.

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2024(Id. at pp. 647-648.) Following Lemcke, our high court in People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419 (Wright) again addressed the concerns associated with a certainty instruction.

2022(Lemcke, at pp. 646-647, 661; see People v. Wright (2021) 12 Cal.5th 419 , 452-453 [applying Lemcke and rejecting due process challenge to analogous instruction, CALJIC No. 2.92].) Although it found no due process violation, the Lemcke court concluded that reevaluation of “the certainty instruction” was warranted, because empirical research shows that “ ‘eyewitness confidence is generally an unreliable indicator of accuracy.’ ” (Lemcke, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 647 .) The court referred the issue to the Judicial Council and its Advisory Committee on Criminal Jury Instructions “to evaluate wheth

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2016(Chesapeake, supra, 149 Cal.App.3d at p. 906 .) In Chesapeake, the court *294 acknowledged the tension between compensating the plaintiff’s loss and fairness to the defendant, stating: “These competing policy considerations have led the courts to focus on the defendant’s knowledge about the amount of the plaintiff’s claim.

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2023Co. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1017, 1038 ; see Glassman v. Safeco Insurance Company of America (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1281 , 1316 [“‘damages are unascertainable if the amount . . . depends on disputed facts or the available factual information is insufficient to determine the amount; and damages are ascertainable if the only impediment to the determination of the amount is a legal dispute concerning liability or the measure of damages.’”].) “‘From the defendant’s perspective, the certainty requirement promotes equity because liability for prejudgment interest occurs only when the defendant knows or

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for constitutional errors]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [reasonable probability standard for state law errors].) Beltran argues that the certainty instruction would have influenced the jury with respect to identifications by Briones and the investigating officer, but the certainty instruction did not apply to the testimony on which he relies.

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for constitutional errors]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [reasonable probability standard for state law errors].) Beltran argues that the certainty instruction would have influenced the jury with respect to identifications by Briones and the investigating officer, but the certainty instruction did not apply to the testimony on which he relies.

2021(See Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at pp. 912– 913; Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at pp. 721-723; Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at pp. 704-705; Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 898-899.) Rudd contends that the certainty instruction set forth in CALCRIM No. 315 implies just the opposite, effectively causing jurors to “equat[e] certainty with accuracy” and to “place more value than merited on the eyewitness’s confidence.” In Rudd’s view, if a trial court elects to instruct a jury on witness certainty, “[d]ue process requires that the [instruction be] accompanied by information reflecting scientific research.” “T

2021(See Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 677 [“ ‘not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation’ ”]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [“even if . . . the trial court’s instruction created ambiguity, it did not infringe on defendant’s due process rights”]; People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 445 (Engelman) [although instruction regarding jury misconduct was “inadvisable and unnecessary” because it might mislead jurors, the instruction did not violate any constitutional right]; Cupp, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 147 .)

2021(See Gomes, supra, 22 N.E.3d at pp. 912– 913; Guilbert, supra, 49 A.3d at pp. 721-723; Lawson, supra, 291 P.3d at pp. 704-705; Henderson, supra, 27 A.3d at pp. 898-899.) Rudd contends that the certainty instruction set forth in CALCRIM No. 315 implies just the opposite, effectively causing jurors to “equat[e] certainty with accuracy” and to “place more value than merited on the eyewitness’s confidence.” In Rudd’s view, if a trial court elects to instruct a jury on witness certainty, “[d]ue process requires that the [instruction be] accompanied by information reflecting scientific research.” “T

2021(See Mills, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 677 [“ ‘not every ambiguity, inconsistency, or deficiency in a jury instruction rises to the level of a due process violation’ ”]; People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 192 [“even if . . . the trial court’s instruction created ambiguity, it did not infringe on defendant’s due process rights”]; People v. Engelman (2002) 28 Cal.4th 436, 445 (Engelman) [although instruction regarding jury misconduct was “inadvisable and unnecessary” because it might mislead jurors, the instruction did not violate any constitutional right]; Cupp, supra, 414 U.S. at p. 147 .)

2021(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [“harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” standard for constitutional errors]; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 [reasonable probability standard for state law errors].) Beltran argues that the certainty instruction would have influenced the jury with respect to identifications by Briones and the investigating officer, but the certainty instruction did not apply to the testimony on which he relies.