certainty requirement in Illinois

1995App. 3d 211 , 630 N.E.2d 166 , also relied on the holding in Copass, stating: "We believe, like the Copass court, that use of the substantial certainty standard would be unduly difficult to employ in distinguishing between accidental and nonaccidental injuries and that adoption of the substantial certainty test would upset the Act’s balance of interest.” (Bercaw, 258 Ill.

1995App. 3d 211 , 630 N.E.2d 166 , also relied on the holding in Copass, stating: "We believe, like the Copass court, that use of the substantial certainty standard would be unduly difficult to employ in distinguishing between accidental and nonaccidental injuries and that adoption of the substantial certainty test would upset the Act’s balance of interest.” (Bercaw, 258 Ill.

1994Copass, 211 Ill.

1994Copass, 211 Ill.

1994App. 3d 908, 910 ; Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462 .) We believe, like the Copass court, that use of the substantial certainty standard would be unduly difficult to employ in distinguishing between accidental and nonaccidental injuries and that adoption of the substantial certainty test would upset the Act’s balance of interests.

1994App. 3d 908, 910 ; Meerbrey, 139 Ill. 2d at 462 .) We believe, like the Copass court, that use of the substantial certainty standard would be unduly difficult to employ in distinguishing between accidental and nonaccidental injuries and that adoption of the substantial certainty test would upset the Act’s balance of interests.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Spitzer v. County of La Salle (1960), 20 Ill.2d 18, 27 , 169 N.E.2d 521 .) A regulation is not unconstitutionally vague merely because the mind can conjure up hypothetical situations in which the meaning of some terms may be in question. ( Scott v. Department of Commerce & Community Affairs (1981), 84 Ill.2d 42, 50 , *726 48 Ill.Dec. 560 , 416 N.E.2d 1082 , quoting Schiller Park Colonial Inn, Inc. v. Berz (1976), 63 Ill.2d 499, 513 , 349 N.E.2d 61 .) Moreover, the fact that the regulation is susceptible to misapplication will not necessarily render it unconstitutional.

1993Ed. 2d 222, 228-29 , 92 S. Ct. 2294, 2300 .) Where the words and phrases of the rule have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by the regulated community, the certainty requirement is satisfied.

1993It must, however, be borne in mind that "we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." ( Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-29 .) Where the words and phrases of the rule have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by the regulated community, the certainty requirement is satisfied. ( Pre-School Owners Association of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family Services (1988), 119 Ill.2d 268, 285 , 116 Ill.Dec. 197 , 518 N.E.2d 1018 ; People ex rel.

1993It must, however, be borne in mind that "we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." ( Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-29 .) Where the words and phrases of the rule have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by the regulated community, the certainty requirement is satisfied. ( Pre-School Owners Association of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family Services (1988), 119 Ill.2d 268, 285 , 116 Ill.Dec. 197 , 518 N.E.2d 1018 ; People ex rel.

1993It must, however, be borne in mind that "we can never expect mathematical certainty from our language." ( Grayned v. City of Rockford (1972), 408 U.S. 104, 110 , 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2300 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-29 .) Where the words and phrases of the rule have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by the regulated community, the certainty requirement is satisfied. ( Pre-School Owners Association of Illinois, Inc. v. Department of Children & Family Services (1988), 119 Ill.2d 268, 285 , 116 Ill.Dec. 197 , 518 N.E.2d 1018 ; People ex rel.

1991The true intentional tort standard [should] keep the distinction clear.” (Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. (1986), 427 Mich. 1, 24-25 , 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 .) While the Beauchamp court adopted the substantial-certainty standard, despite the reservations quoted above, that decision was later legislatively overruled and replaced by the specific-intent-to-injure standard.

1991The true intentional tort standard [should] keep the distinction clear.” (Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. (1986), 427 Mich. 1, 24-25 , 398 N.W.2d 882, 893 .) While the Beauchamp court adopted the substantial-certainty standard, despite the reservations quoted above, that decision was later legislatively overruled and replaced by the specific-intent-to-injure standard.

1988“Where the words and phrases have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by those subject to the rule, the certainty requirement is satisfied.” (Northern Illinois Automobile Wreckers & Rebuilders Association v. Dixon (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 53, 58 .) It may be anticipated that a licensee or applicant will seek guidance from the Department regarding the meaning of a particular phrase or term used in the regulations.

1984(See La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law secs. 28, 59 (1972).) Historically, the crime of attempted murder roughly corresponded to an incomplete murder, and the intent required for attempted murder was “that wanton and reckless disregard of human life that denotes malice.” (Weaver v. People (1890), 132 Ill. 536, 540 , 24 N.E. 571 ; People v. Shields (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 200, 206 , 127 N.E.2d 440 .) As a corollary to this theory, it was thought proper to instruct juries as to the elements of attempt and the elements of murder.

1984(See La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law secs. 28, 59 (1972).) Historically, the crime of attempted murder roughly corresponded to an incomplete murder, and the intent required for attempted murder was “that wanton and reckless disregard of human life that denotes malice.” (Weaver v. People (1890), 132 Ill. 536, 540 , 24 N.E. 571 ; People v. Shields (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 200, 206 , 127 N.E.2d 440 .) As a corollary to this theory, it was thought proper to instruct juries as to the elements of attempt and the elements of murder.

1984(See La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law secs. 28, 59 (1972).) Historically, the crime of attempted murder roughly corresponded to an incomplete murder, and the intent required for attempted murder was “that wanton and reckless disregard of human life that denotes malice.” (Weaver v. People (1890), 132 Ill. 536, 540 , 24 N.E. 571 ; People v. Shields (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 200, 206 , 127 N.E.2d 440 .) As a corollary to this theory, it was thought proper to instruct juries as to the elements of attempt and the elements of murder.

1984(See La Fave & Scott, Criminal Law secs. 28, 59 (1972).) Historically, the crime of attempted murder roughly corresponded to an incomplete murder, and the intent required for attempted murder was “that wanton and reckless disregard of human life that denotes malice.” (Weaver v. People (1890), 132 Ill. 536, 540 , 24 N.E. 571 ; People v. Shields (1955), 6 Ill. 2d 200, 206 , 127 N.E.2d 440 .) As a corollary to this theory, it was thought proper to instruct juries as to the elements of attempt and the elements of murder.

1984(People v. Harris (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 16 , 377 N.E .2d 28.) However, the certainty of this rule suffers from the variety of mental states ascribed to the word “intent,” as a legal term and in common usage.

1981In People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 332 , 291 N.E.2d 648 , appealed on other grounds (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 70 , 397 N.E.2d 1362 , the supreme court considered the sufficiency of an indictment which charged a violation of section 3(1) (a).

1981In People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 332 , 291 N.E.2d 648 , appealed on other grounds (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 70 , 397 N.E.2d 1362 , the supreme court considered the sufficiency of an indictment which charged a violation of section 3(1) (a).

1981In People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 332 , 291 N.E.2d 648 , appealed on other grounds (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 70 , 397 N.E.2d 1362 , the supreme court considered the sufficiency of an indictment which charged a violation of section 3(1) (a).

1981In People v. Crawford Distributing Co. (1972), 53 Ill. 2d 332 , 291 N.E.2d 648 , appealed on other grounds (1979), 78 Ill. 2d 70 , 397 N.E.2d 1362 , the supreme court considered the sufficiency of an indictment which charged a violation of section 3(1) (a).

1979Duffy v. Hurley (1949), 402 Ill. 562, 567 .) Where the words and phrases have a technical or special meaning commonly understood by those subject to the rule, the certainty requirement is satisfied.