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37 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1993–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.green2 sentences2020Our Supreme Court ‘‘elaborated on the contours of this substantial certainty standard as an alternative method of proving intent in Suarez I and [Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 , 698 A.2d 838 (1997) (Suarez II)], which arose from amputation injur- ies suffered by an employee who claimed that his fore- man had forced him to clean out plastic molding machines while those machines were still running, and forbade him and other employees from using safer cleaning methods under threat of termination of their employment, despite the risk of injury to their hands.’’ Lucenti v. Lavier 2020Our Supreme Court ‘‘elaborated on the contours of this substantial certainty standard as an alternative method of proving intent in Suarez I and [Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 242 Conn. 255 , 698 A.2d 838 (1997) (Suarez II)], which arose from amputation injur- ies suffered by an employee who claimed that his fore- man had forced him to clean out plastic molding machines while those machines were still running, and forbade him and other employees from using safer cleaning methods under threat of termination of their employment, despite the risk of injury to their hands.’’ Lucenti v. Lavier | 3 | 13 |
Robert John Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, a Nevada Corporation, Gregory Steele v. Crown Zellerbach Corporation, a Nevada Corporationgreen2 sentences2002“The substantial certainty test provides for the intent to injure exception to be strictly construed and still allows for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 109 -10, quoting Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195, 197 (9th Cir. 1989). 2002"The substantial certainty test provides for the intent to injure exception to be strictly construed and still allows for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action against an employer where the evidence is sufficient to support an inference that the employer deliberately instructed an employee to injure himself." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., supra, 229 Conn. 109 -10, quoting Gulden v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 890 F.2d 195 , 197 (9th Cir. 1989). | 2 | 3 |
Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp.green2 sentences2018The plaintiff emphasizes that requiring more evidence than these warnings to Laviero by Quick and the plaintiff will make the substantial certainty exception meaningless, as it would mean that *7 "[o]nly in the unimaginable case, when an employer admits that he intended an injury, could a plaintiff survive summary judgment." To this end, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court's analysis has "functionally overruled" this court's decision in Suarez I , supra, 229 Conn. at 111 , 639 A.2d 507 , insofar as that decision allows the fact finder to infer "the subjective intent of the employer 2018The plaintiff emphasizes that requiring more evidence than these warnings to Laviero by Quick and the plaintiff will make the substantial certainty exception meaningless, as it would mean that *7 "[o]nly in the unimaginable case, when an employer admits that he intended an injury, could a plaintiff survive summary judgment." To this end, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court's analysis has "functionally overruled" this court's decision in Suarez I , supra, 229 Conn. at 111 , 639 A.2d 507 , insofar as that decision allows the fact finder to infer "the subjective intent of the employer | 1 | 13 |
Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc.green2 sentences2018To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory scheme and purpose of the workers' compensation law and usurp legislative prerogative." (Citations omitted.) Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , 101 Conn. App. 796 , 801, 924 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 934 A.2d 246 (2007) ; see also Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ("To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, a plaintiff must show more than that [a] defendant exhibited a lackadaisical or even cavalier attitude **800 toward worker safety .... 2018To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory scheme and purpose of the workers' compensation law and usurp legislative prerogative." (Citations omitted.) Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , 101 Conn. App. 796 , 801, 924 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 934 A.2d 246 (2007) ; see also Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ("To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, a plaintiff must show more than that [a] defendant exhibited a lackadaisical or even cavalier attitude **800 toward worker safety .... | 1 | 6 |
Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp.green2 sentences2018We acknowledge that, in Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp. , supra, 79 Conn. App. at 455 -56 , 830 A.2d 372 , the Appellate Court appeared to use an objective standard to determine entitlement to the substantial certainty exception, rather than a subjective test, stating that "to satisfy the substantial certainty test, the employee must show that a reasonable person in the position of the employer would have known that the injury or death suffered by the employee was substantially certain to follow from the employer's actions." (Emphasis added.) We rely on Sorban solely to demonstrate our bo 2018We acknowledge that, in Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp. , supra, 79 Conn. App. at 455 -56 , 830 A.2d 372 , the Appellate Court appeared to use an objective standard to determine entitlement to the substantial certainty exception, rather than a subjective test, stating that "to satisfy the substantial certainty test, the employee must show that a reasonable person in the position of the employer would have known that the injury or death suffered by the employee was substantially certain to follow from the employer's actions." (Emphasis added.) We rely on Sorban solely to demonstrate our bo | 1 | 5 |
Bard v. Commissioner of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( 2006Although the plaintiff s complaint does assert that the defendants “intentionally” failed to correct several dangerous conditions on the premises, this assertion, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty test because, as the trial court correctly stated, “failure to take effective remedial action does not translate to an affirmative intent to create an injury causing situation.” Cf. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 101 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (“a high risk or probability of harm is not equivalent to the substantial certainty without which an actor cannot be said | 1 | 5 |
Millison v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co.green2 sentences2018Applying that state's leading decision articulating the substantial certainty test, Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 101 N.J. 161 , 178-79, 501 A.2d 505 (1985), New Jersey courts "engage in a *12 [two step] analysis. 2018Applying that state's leading decision articulating the substantial certainty test, Millison v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. , 101 N.J. 161 , 178-79, 501 A.2d 505 (1985), New Jersey courts "engage in a *12 [two step] analysis. | 1 | 3 |
Sorban v. Sterling Engineering Corp.green2 sentences2007All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation." [3] Here, the plaintiff relies on the substanti 2007All rights and claims between an employer who complies with the requirements of subsection (b) of this section and employees, or any representatives or dependents of such employees, arising out of personal injury or death sustained in the course of employment are abolished other than rights and claims given by this chapter, provided nothing in this section shall prohibit any employee from securing, by agreement with his employer, additional compensation from his employer for the injury or from enforcing any agreement for additional compensation." [3] Here, the plaintiff relies on the substanti | 1 | 3 |
Turner v. PCR, INC.green2 sentences2018Compare Turner v. PCR, Inc. , 754 So.2d 683 , 691 (Fla. 2000) (genuine issue of material fact existed regarding substantial certainty exception where employer had been informed of explosion risk in writing, knew of highly explosive nature of chemical but did not disclose that to employees, and "knew of prior similar explosions with the same and similar chemicals involved in the explosion at issue"), superseded in part by Fla. Stat. § 440.11 (2009), and Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 203 P.3d 962 , 974-75 (Utah 2009) (trial court improperly dismissed claim by employee who was rendered ill durin 2003In Turner v. PCR, Inc., 754 So. 2d 683 , 687 n.4 (Fla. 2000), for example, the court stated: “We recognize that some courts have elevated the standard . . . from ‘substantial certainty’ to ‘virtual certainty.’ . . . | 1 | 2 |
Motzer v. Haberligreen2 sentences2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( 2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( | 1 | 1 |
| Bye v. Cianbro Corp.green | 1 | 1 |
Fryer v. Kranzgreen1 sentence2018Compare Turner v. PCR, Inc. , 754 So.2d 683 , 691 (Fla. 2000) (genuine issue of material fact existed regarding substantial certainty exception where employer had been informed of explosion risk in writing, knew of highly explosive nature of chemical but did not disclose that to employees, and "knew of prior similar explosions with the same and similar chemicals involved in the explosion at issue"), superseded in part by Fla. Stat. § 440.11 (2009), and Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 203 P.3d 962 , 974-75 (Utah 2009) (trial court improperly dismissed claim by employee who was rendered ill durin | 1 | 1 |
| McMillin v. Muellergreen | 1 | 1 |
Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co.green2 sentences2018Compare id., at 472-73 , 45 A.3d 965 (conduct prong was not satisfied, despite intentional violation of federal safety regulations pertaining to work in trenches at construction site, where "on-site supervisor made a quick but extremely poor decision, candidly admitted to having been made 'out of frustration' with unfolding circumstances that morning"), Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co. , 176 N.J. 366 , 376-77, 823 A.2d 769 (2003) (conduct prong was not satisfied where employer was "grossly negligent" and deactivated safety stop lever on snow blower and placed electrical tape over it 2018Compare id., at 472-73 , 45 A.3d 965 (conduct prong was not satisfied, despite intentional violation of federal safety regulations pertaining to work in trenches at construction site, where "on-site supervisor made a quick but extremely poor decision, candidly admitted to having been made 'out of frustration' with unfolding circumstances that morning"), Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co. , 176 N.J. 366 , 376-77, 823 A.2d 769 (2003) (conduct prong was not satisfied where employer was "grossly negligent" and deactivated safety stop lever on snow blower and placed electrical tape over it | 1 | 1 |
Van Dunk v. Reckson Associates Realty Corp.green2 sentences2018Compare id., at 472-73 , 45 A.3d 965 (conduct prong was not satisfied, despite intentional violation of federal safety regulations pertaining to work in trenches at construction site, where "on-site supervisor made a quick but extremely poor decision, candidly admitted to having been made 'out of frustration' with unfolding circumstances that morning"), Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co. , 176 N.J. 366 , 376-77, 823 A.2d 769 (2003) (conduct prong was not satisfied where employer was "grossly negligent" and deactivated safety stop lever on snow blower and placed electrical tape over it 2018Compare id., at 472-73 , 45 A.3d 965 (conduct prong was not satisfied, despite intentional violation of federal safety regulations pertaining to work in trenches at construction site, where "on-site supervisor made a quick but extremely poor decision, candidly admitted to having been made 'out of frustration' with unfolding circumstances that morning"), Tomeo v. Thomas Whitesell Construction Co. , 176 N.J. 366 , 376-77, 823 A.2d 769 (2003) (conduct prong was not satisfied where employer was "grossly negligent" and deactivated safety stop lever on snow blower and placed electrical tape over it | 1 | 1 |
Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2018Compare Turner v. PCR, Inc. , 754 So.2d 683 , 691 (Fla. 2000) (genuine issue of material fact existed regarding substantial certainty exception where employer had been informed of explosion risk in writing, knew of highly explosive nature of chemical but did not disclose that to employees, and "knew of prior similar explosions with the same and similar chemicals involved in the explosion at issue"), superseded in part by Fla. Stat. § 440.11 (2009), and Helf v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. , 203 P.3d 962 , 974-75 (Utah 2009) (trial court improperly dismissed claim by employee who was rendered ill durin | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Billingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Salmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Salmondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Connecticut. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ramos v. Town of Branford
green
2 sentences2007Whereas the intentional tort test requires that both the act producing the injury and the specific injury to the employee must be intentional . . . the substantial certainty standard requires a showing that the act producing the injury was intentional or deliberate and the resulting injury, from the standpoint of the employer, was substantially certain to result from the employer’s acts or conduct.” (Citations omitted.) Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn. App. 671, 679-80 , 778 A.2d 972 (2001). 2007Whereas the intentional tort test requires that both the act producing the injury and the specific injury to the employee must be intentional . . . the substantial certainty standard requires a showing that the act producing the injury was intentional or deliberate and the resulting injury, from the standpoint of the employer, was substantially certain to result from the employer’s acts or conduct.” (Citations omitted.) Ramos v. Branford, 63 Conn. App. 671, 679-80 , 778 A.2d 972 (2001). | 10 | 2002–2018 |
Melanson v. Town of West Hartford
green
2 sentences2006Although the plaintiff s complaint does assert that the defendants “intentionally” failed to correct several dangerous conditions on the premises, this assertion, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty test because, as the trial court correctly stated, “failure to take effective remedial action does not translate to an affirmative intent to create an injury causing situation.” Cf. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 101 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (“a high risk or probability of harm is not equivalent to the substantial certainty without which an actor cannot be said 2006Although the plaintiff s complaint does assert that the defendants “intentionally” failed to correct several dangerous conditions on the premises, this assertion, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty test because, as the trial court correctly stated, “failure to take effective remedial action does not translate to an affirmative intent to create an injury causing situation.” Cf. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 101 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (“a high risk or probability of harm is not equivalent to the substantial certainty without which an actor cannot be said | 9 | 2002–2018 |
Mingachos v. CBS, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018The plaintiff emphasizes that requiring more evidence than these warnings to Laviero by Quick and the plaintiff will make the substantial certainty exception meaningless, as it would mean that *7 "[o]nly in the unimaginable case, when an employer admits that he intended an injury, could a plaintiff survive summary judgment." To this end, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court's analysis has "functionally overruled" this court's decision in Suarez I , supra, 229 Conn. at 111 , 639 A.2d 507 , insofar as that decision allows the fact finder to infer "the subjective intent of the employer 2018The plaintiff emphasizes that requiring more evidence than these warnings to Laviero by Quick and the plaintiff will make the substantial certainty exception meaningless, as it would mean that *7 "[o]nly in the unimaginable case, when an employer admits that he intended an injury, could a plaintiff survive summary judgment." To this end, the plaintiff contends that the Appellate Court's analysis has "functionally overruled" this court's decision in Suarez I , supra, 229 Conn. at 111 , 639 A.2d 507 , insofar as that decision allows the fact finder to infer "the subjective intent of the employer | 5 | 2006–2020 |
Ginsburg v. Cadle Co.
green
2 sentences2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( 2006Although the plaintiff s complaint does assert that the defendants “intentionally” failed to correct several dangerous conditions on the premises, this assertion, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy the substantial certainty test because, as the trial court correctly stated, “failure to take effective remedial action does not translate to an affirmative intent to create an injury causing situation.” Cf. Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 101 , 491 A.2d 368 (1985) (“a high risk or probability of harm is not equivalent to the substantial certainty without which an actor cannot be said | 5 | 2002–2018 |
Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018In particular, the defendants rely heavily on Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , 263 Conn. 231 , 234, 819 A.2d 287 (2003), and Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 , and argue that the substantial certainty exception requires evidence that the employer subjectively intended to engage in conduct that was substantially certain to injure the employees. 4 The defendants assert that there is no evidence in the record of an intent to injure the plaintiff through use of the "rigged" excavator, as demonstrated by the fact that Laviero expressly d 2018In particular, the defendants rely heavily on Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , 263 Conn. 231 , 234, 819 A.2d 287 (2003), and Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 , and argue that the substantial certainty exception requires evidence that the employer subjectively intended to engage in conduct that was substantially certain to injure the employees. 4 The defendants assert that there is no evidence in the record of an intent to injure the plaintiff through use of the "rigged" excavator, as demonstrated by the fact that Laviero expressly d | 4 | 2006–2018 |
Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co.
green
2 sentences2017Even if we were to accept the plaintiff's conclusion that FedEx purposely eliminated certain safety precautions, however, this court held in Morocco , supra, 72 Conn.App. at 527 , 805 A.2d 168 , that " intentional , wilful or reckless" safety violations by the employer do not rise to the level of intent required under the substantial certainty standard. 2017Even if we were to accept the plaintiff's conclusion that FedEx purposely eliminated certain safety precautions, however, this court held in Morocco , supra, 72 Conn.App. at 527 , 805 A.2d 168 , that " intentional , wilful or reckless" safety violations by the employer do not rise to the level of intent required under the substantial certainty standard. | 4 | 2003–2018 |
Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences1999Our court referred to the language of these cases which reasoned that the problem with the true or actual intent test is that it "allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only worker's compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the worker", Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. , 398 N.W.2d 882 , 893 (1986). 1995The problem with the intentional tort test, i.e., whether the employer intended the specific injury, "appears to be that it allows employers to injure and even kill employees and suffer only workers' compensation damages so long as the employer did not specifically intend to hurt the worker." Beauchamp v. Dow Chemical Co. , 427 Mich. 1 , 25 , 398 N.W.2d 882 (1986). | 3 | 1994–1999 |
Jett v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences2018This represents a drastic undermining of the purpose of the act, which this court-and many others throughout the United States-have understood "to limit common-law tort actions for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and to satisfy as many claims as possible under the ... act." Jett v. Dunlap , supra, 179 Conn. at 222 , 425 A.2d 1263 . 2018This represents a drastic undermining of the purpose of the act, which this court-and many others throughout the United States-have understood "to limit common-law tort actions for injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and to satisfy as many claims as possible under the ... act." Jett v. Dunlap , supra, 179 Conn. at 222 , 425 A.2d 1263 . | 2 | 2002–2018 |
Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co.
green
2 sentences2018In particular, the defendants rely heavily on Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , 263 Conn. 231 , 234, 819 A.2d 287 (2003), and Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 , and argue that the substantial certainty exception requires evidence that the employer subjectively intended to engage in conduct that was substantially certain to injure the employees. 4 The defendants assert that there is no evidence in the record of an intent to injure the plaintiff through use of the "rigged" excavator, as demonstrated by the fact that Laviero expressly d 2018In particular, the defendants rely heavily on Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , 263 Conn. 231 , 234, 819 A.2d 287 (2003), and Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 , and argue that the substantial certainty exception requires evidence that the employer subjectively intended to engage in conduct that was substantially certain to injure the employees. 4 The defendants assert that there is no evidence in the record of an intent to injure the plaintiff through use of the "rigged" excavator, as demonstrated by the fact that Laviero expressly d | 2 | 2016–2018 |
U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Eichten
green
2 sentences2020E.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727 , 782–83, 196 A.3d 328 (2018). ‘‘Although it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonethe- less, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent to injure on the part of the defendant. . . . 2020E.g., U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Eichten, 184 Conn. App. 727 , 782–83, 196 A.3d 328 (2018). ‘‘Although it is less demanding than the actual intent standard, the substantial certainty standard is, nonethe- less, an intentional tort claim requiring an appropriate showing of intent to injure on the part of the defendant. . . . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc.
green
1 sentence2020The court discussed the evolution of the substantial certainty doc- trine in Suarez I; Suarez II; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc., supra, 47 Conn. Supp. 638 ; Sorban v. Sterling Engi- neering Corp., supra, 79 Conn. App. 444 ; Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra, 196 Conn. 91 ; and noted the factual distinctions and similarities between those cases and the facts of the present case. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
DaGraca v. KOWALSKY BROTHERS, INC.
green
2 sentences2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( 2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Martinez v. SOUTHINGTON METAL FABRICATING COMPANY
green
1 sentence2018To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory scheme and purpose of the workers' compensation law and usurp legislative prerogative." (Citations omitted.) Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , 101 Conn. App. 796 , 801, 924 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 934 A.2d 246 (2007) ; see also Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ("To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, a plaintiff must show more than that [a] defendant exhibited a lackadaisical or even cavalier attitude **800 toward worker safety .... | 1 | 2018–2018 |
EMBALMERS'SUPPLY COMPANY v. Giannitti
green
1 sentence2018To hold otherwise would undermine the statutory scheme and purpose of the workers' compensation law and usurp legislative prerogative." (Citations omitted.) Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , 101 Conn. App. 796 , 801, 924 A.2d 150 , cert. denied, 284 Conn. 930 , 934 A.2d 246 (2007) ; see also Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ("To satisfy the substantial certainty standard, a plaintiff must show more than that [a] defendant exhibited a lackadaisical or even cavalier attitude **800 toward worker safety .... | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Lucenti v. Laviero
neutral
2 sentences2018Thus, we agree with the Appellate Court that "[a] careful reading of the [trial] court's memorandum of decision ... demonstrates that the court was not modifying the substantial certainty standard; rather, it was merely suggesting that it would be logical to conclude that because Laviero was willing to use the excavator before and after the incident thereby potentially exposing himself to harm, the plaintiff cannot show that the defendants had the requisite intent required to overcome the exclusivity provision of the act." Lucenti v. Laviero , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 440 , 139 A.3d 752 . 2018Thus, we agree with the Appellate Court that "[a] careful reading of the [trial] court's memorandum of decision ... demonstrates that the court was not modifying the substantial certainty standard; rather, it was merely suggesting that it would be logical to conclude that because Laviero was willing to use the excavator before and after the incident thereby potentially exposing himself to harm, the plaintiff cannot show that the defendants had the requisite intent required to overcome the exclusivity provision of the act." Lucenti v. Laviero , supra, 165 Conn. App. at 440 , 139 A.3d 752 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
DaGraca v. Kowalsky Bros., Inc.
green
2 sentences2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( 2018See Motzer v. Haberli , 300 Conn. 733 , 744-46, 15 A.3d 1084 (2011) ; Sullivan v. Lake Compounce Theme Park, Inc. , 277 Conn. 113 , 118-20, 889 A.2d 810 (2006) ; Stebbins v. Doncasters, Inc. , supra, 263 Conn. at 234 , 819 A.2d 287 ; Martinez v. Southington Metal Fabricating Co. , supra, 101 Conn. App. at 802 -804 , 924 A.2d 150 ; DaGraca v. Kowalsky Brothers, Inc. , 100 Conn. App. 781 , 788-89, 919 A.2d 525 , cert. denied, 283 Conn. 904 , 927 A.2d 917 (2007) ; Morocco v. Rex Lumber Co. , 72 Conn. App. 516 , 528, 805 A.2d 168 (2002) ; Ramos v. Branford , 63 Conn. App. 671 , 680, 778 A.2d 972 ( | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| McCoy v. City of New Haven green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mazzuca v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Mazzuca v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Kennison green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Biro v. Hirsch green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Wiggins v. Pelikan, Inc. green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Gazo v. City of Stamford green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Recalde v. Emhart Industries, Inc., No. Cv96 0053222s (Feb. 4, 1999) green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Multi-Service Contractors, Inc. v. Town of Vernon green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Gorra Realty, Inc. v. Jetmore green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Connell v. Colwell green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Pendergrass v. Card Care, Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Bazley v. Tortorich green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Van Fossen v. Babcock & Wilcox Co. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| King v. Schuylkill Metals Corp. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp. green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Asherman v. State green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.