generalized claim in Pennsylvania

2025Payes II, 79 A.3d at 552 (citing RAG (Cyprus) Emerald Res., 912 A.2d at 1288 ).

2014RAG (Cyprus) Emerald Resources, L.P. v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hopton), 590 Pa. 413 , 912 A.2d 1278, 1288 (2007).

2026Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 363 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).4 As noted above, Leisure filed the petition underlying this appeal before resolution of his 2024 petition was completed.

2026However, review of the one-page supplemental brief reveals no specific issue; rather, he states only that his appeal “has been repeatedly resolved on technical grounds without consideration of a discrete legal error that goes to the integrity of the proceedings.” This generalized claim does not overcome the fact that Leisure’s third PCRA petition is clearly untimely. -4- J-A28015-25 an earlier PCRA petition, his or her “only option is raise it within a [subsequent] PCRA petition within [60] days of the date of the order that finally resolves the [pending] PCRA petition[.]” Commonwealth v. Stee

2025See In re Estate of Daubert, 757 A.2d 962, 963 (Pa. Super. 2000).

2019Id. at 480 n.2 ; see also id. at 494 n.2 (Baer, J. concurring) ("this case involves only a generalized challenge to the Dragonetti Act as applied to attorneys").

2019Id. at 480 n.2 ; see also id. at 494 n.2 (Baer, J. concurring) ("this case involves only a generalized challenge to the Dragonetti Act as applied to attorneys").

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis RCJ - 3 added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining th

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3

2016Rae, 602 Pa. at 69, 977 A.2d at 1124.

2016Rae, 602 Pa. at 69, 977 A.2d at 1124.

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis RCJ - 3 added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining th

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis RCJ - 3 added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1998) (explaining th

2016Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 516 , 113 S.Ct. 2742 , 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993) (explaining the pretext stage analysis as “turn[ing] from the few generalized factors that establish a prima facie case to [assessing] the specific proofs and rebuttals of discriminatory motivation the parties have introduced”) (emphasis added); Kroptavich, 795 A.2d at 1059 (stating that “inferences acceptable at the prima facie stage may not satisfy the higher level of specificity usually required at the pretext stage”) (emphasis added); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 646 (3

2016Rae, 602 Pa. at 69, 977 A.2d at 1124.

2016Rae, 602 Pa. at 69, 977 A.2d at 1124.

2015See Commonwealth v. Veon, 109 A.3d 754, 775 (Pa. Super. 2015).

2014We also conclude that the court gave due consideration to these asserted mitigating factors, (e.g., deferring the date to report for sentence), and did not abuse its discretion in Finally, we note that while Appellant makes a generalized claim that victims and 12),5 court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable Glass, supra at 727 (citation omitted).

2013We are, however, equally mindful that "direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by." Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 284 , 744 A.2d 717, 732 (2000) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). .

2013We are, however, equally mindful that "direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by." Commonwealth v. Basemore, 560 Pa. 258, 284 , 744 A.2d 717, 732 (2000) (quoting Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 , 109 S.Ct. 1775 , 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). .

1983Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, [3] recognized that language taken from the Court's earlier opinions "would seem to broaden the test [for determining a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause] from one of intent to provoke a motion for a mistrial to a more generalized standard of `bad faith conduct' or `harassment' on the part of the judge or prosecutor." (Emphasis in original) Id. at 674 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 ("earlier opinions" referred to by the Court consisted of United States v. Dinitz, supra , and United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)).

1983Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, [3] recognized that language taken from the Court's earlier opinions "would seem to broaden the test [for determining a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause] from one of intent to provoke a motion for a mistrial to a more generalized standard of `bad faith conduct' or `harassment' on the part of the judge or prosecutor." (Emphasis in original) Id. at 674 , 102 S.Ct. at 2089 ("earlier opinions" referred to by the Court consisted of United States v. Dinitz, supra , and United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 , 91 S.Ct. 547 , 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)).