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22 California opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2026 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2023(See People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 668 [federal court of appeal decisions are not binding on California courts].) 17 question is whether the disparate treatment can be justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest.” (Ibid.) Here, Avakian’s equal protection argument necessarily fails because individuals seeking an exception to the firearms prohibition based on their employment are not similarly situated with individuals who present a generalized claim of the need to protect themselves with a firearm. 2023(See People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 668 [federal court of appeal decisions are not binding on California courts].) 17 question is whether the disparate treatment can be justified by a constitutionally sufficient state interest.” (Ibid.) Here, Teri A.’s equal protection argument necessarily fails because individuals seeking an exception to the firearms prohibition based on their employment are not similarly situated with individuals who present a generalized claim of the need to protect themselves with a firearm. | 2 | 2 |
Independent Energy Producers Association v. McPhersongreen2 sentences2023(McPherson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1044, fn. 9 .) The court’s generalized instruction to resolve such challenges “through application of the relevant constitutional provision or provisions to the terms of the specific legislation at issue” did not imply that the principles it had enunciated and applied in McPherson would have no bearing on such challenges. 2023(McPherson, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1044, fn. 9 .) The court’s generalized instruction to resolve such challenges “through application of the relevant constitutional provision or provisions to the terms of the specific legislation at issue” did not imply that the principles it had enunciated and applied in McPherson would have no bearing on such challenges. | 2 | 2 |
Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafifgreen2 sentences2015(Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 286 .) And, in demonstrating the illegality, “the plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying action. [Citation.] This requirement of identifying a specific statute . . . prevents a plaintiff from advancing a generalized claim that a defendant’s conduct was illegal” and “provides notice to both the defendant and the court about the particular statute or statutes the defendant is alleged to have violated as a matter of law so as to allow the defendant to intelligibly respond to, and 2015(Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 286.) And, in demonstrating the illegality, “the plaintiff must identify with particularity the statute or statutes violated by the filing and maintenance of the underlying action. [Citation.] This requirement of identifying a specific statute . . . prevents a plaintiff from advancing a generalized claim that a defendant’s conduct was illegal . . .” and “provides notice to both the defendant and the court about the particular statute or statutes the defendant is alleged to have violated as a matter of law so as to allow the defendant to intelligibly respond to, | 1 | 2 |
Voris v. Lampertgreen1 sentence2020(Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1150 (Voris).) Flannery’s cause of action for conversion pled that beginning on February 26, 2010, Murray had converted his “share of rents and fees generated by the horse boarding business in a sum according to proof, but at least $300,000.00,” and that in addition, Murray had “converted [his] share of the good will and equipment of the horse boarding business in the estimated value of $550,000.00.” The trial court properly dismissed Flannery’s claim for conversion because it asserted a generalized claim for money that allegedly was misappropriated ove | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. Californiagreen2 sentences2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. 2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. | 1 | 1 |
Ham v. South Carolinagreen2 sentences1991(Ham v. South Carolina, supra, 409 U.S. at p. 527 [ 35 L.Ed.2d at p. 50 ]— either of the general questions were sufficient to focus the attention of the prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain; Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 594-595 [47 L.Ed.2d at pp. 262-264]—the demands of due process were satisfied by the court’s generalized inquiry, *863 “ ‘If any of you ... is sensible of any bias or prejudice, you should make it known to the court at this time.’ ” (Ristaino at pp. 592, fn. 3, 598 [47 L.Ed.2d at pp. 262, 265].) Accordingly, defendant was not denied his co 1991(Ham v. South Carolina, supra, 409 U.S. at p. 527 [ 35 L.Ed.2d at p. 50 ]— either of the general questions were sufficient to focus the attention of the prospective jurors on any racial prejudice they might entertain; Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at pp. 594-595 [47 L.Ed.2d at pp. 262-264]—the demands of due process were satisfied by the court’s generalized inquiry, *863 “ ‘If any of you ... is sensible of any bias or prejudice, you should make it known to the court at this time.’ ” (Ristaino at pp. 592, fn. 3, 598 [47 L.Ed.2d at pp. 262, 265].) Accordingly, defendant was not denied his co | 1 | 1 |
Ristaino v. Rossgreen2 sentences1991(Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 598 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 265 ].) The court noted, however, although questioning directed to racial prejudice is not constitutionally required in all cases where race is an issue, “the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 597, fn. 9 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 265 .) Under Ristaino , the court’s voir dire on the issue of racial bias in the present case was constitutionally sufficient. 1991(Ristaino v. Ross, supra, 424 U.S. at p. 598 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 265 ].) The court noted, however, although questioning directed to racial prejudice is not constitutionally required in all cases where race is an issue, “the wiser course generally is to propound appropriate questions designed to identify racial prejudice if requested by the defendant.” (Id. at p. 597, fn. 9 [ 47 L.Ed.2d at p. 265 .) Under Ristaino , the court’s voir dire on the issue of racial bias in the present case was constitutionally sufficient. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Vu v. California Commerce Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences2015(Vu v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 229, 235 ; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 703, pp. 1026-1027.) 27 In Fischer v. Machado (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1069 , liability for conversion was held proper, where two agents had failed to turn over a definite sum to their principals, after it was received for the principals' account. 2013Any amounts the club may have taken . . . also were not identified.” ( Vu, supra, 58 Cal.App.4th 229, 235 .) The facts of that case are not analogous to the facts of the present case. | 2 | 2013–2015 |
Falcone v. Fyke
green
2 sentences2014(Eisenberg et al., Civil Appeals and 53 Writs, supra, ¶ 9:21, pp. 9-6 to 9-7 [“appellate court can treat as waived, forfeited or meritless any issue that, although raised in the briefs, is not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument or proper citation of authority”]; e.g., In re Marriage of Falcone and Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004 ].) Only in appellants’ reply brief do they describe a single alternative suggested by Goodman as to which the FEIR is alleged to have inadequately responded—Goodman’s “Tower Demolition” alternative.20 Raising the issue in this manner is not suff 2014(Eisenberg et al., Civil Appeals and 53 Writs, supra, ¶ 9:21, pp. 9-6 to 9-7 [“appellate court can treat as waived, forfeited or meritless any issue that, although raised in the briefs, is not supported by pertinent or cognizable legal argument or proper citation of authority”]; e.g., In re Marriage of Falcone and Fyke (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 964, 1004 ].) Only in appellants’ reply brief do they describe a single alternative suggested by Goodman as to which the FEIR is alleged to have inadequately responded—Goodman’s “Tower Demolition” alternative.20 Raising the issue in this manner is not suff | 2 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Gaul-Alexander
green
1 sentence2026(Lucero, at pp. 407-408.) The same is true of forgery, which is established by showing: (1) “a writing or other subject of forgery,” (2) “the false making of the writing,” and (3) the “intent to defraud.” (People v. Gaul-Alexander (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 735, 741 .) Clearly, not all instances of false presentation of evidence also result in a forgery given that the former only requires “a fraudulent or deceitful purpose” while that latter requires a specific “intent to defraud.” (Compare § 134 with § 470.) Accordingly, we conclude that because section 134 is not one of the specifically enumerate | 1 | 2026–2026 |
New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen
green
1 sentence2023That two-part test, rejected by the Supreme Court, was as follows: First, the government would attempt to justify a regulation by establishing it regulated activity falling outside the scope of the Second Amendment right based on its historical meaning, and, if the government failed to do so, then second, the court would engage in what the Supreme Court called a means-end scrutiny test. ( Bruen, supra, ___U.S. at pp.___ [213 L.Ed.2d at pp. 405-406].) This means-end scrutiny test refers to familiar tests employing standards including strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Coshow v. City of Escondido
green
1 sentence2020The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Voris, which held that nonpayment of wages does not give rise to a claim for conversion (7 Cal.5th at pp. 1144– 1145), is instructive. 831, fn. 18.) Further, notwithstanding its prior ruling overruling the demurrer, the trial court had the inherent power to dismiss the challenged causes of action when the motion in limine showed that, “ ‘ “even if the plaintiff's allegations were proved, they would not establish a cause of action.” ’ ” (Coshow, supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 701 .) 18 In discussing the applicability of the conversion tort to a claim for mon | 1 | 2020–2020 |
South Dakota v. Opperman
green
2 sentences2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. 2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Colorado v. Bertine
green
2 sentences2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. 2019(See Colorado v. Bertine (1987) 479 U.S. 367 , 374-376, 107 S.Ct. 738 , 93 L.Ed.2d 739 ( Bertine ); South Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364 , 367-376, 96 S.Ct. 3092 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 ( Opperman ); see also Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58 , 60-62, 87 S.Ct. 788 , 17 L.Ed.2d 730 .) Cady and its progeny did not create a generalized exception to the warrant requirement for nonemergency community caretaking functions, much less apply such an exception to the search of homes. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, Miller, Fink, Jacobs, Glaser, Weil & Shapiro
green
1 sentence2016That rendered the generalized claim for money not actionable as conversion.’ (Id. at p. 235.)” ( PCO, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 396-397.) Here, Flannery’s cause of action for conversion alleged, without specificity, that Murray embezzled “funds from the horse boarding business and its bank account and selling and transacting with the Chatsworth Ranch’s assets and fixtures” and that he was 15 “harmed in an amount according to proof.” The claim for conversion of money was not well pled because it failed to identify a discrete sum that allegedly was converted. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re Andrew L.
green
1 sentence2015(In re Andrew L., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 190 .) Although petitioner made a generalized claim that parent-child relationships are very important, he presented absolutely no evidence—much less new evidence—that it would be in the best interests of C.S. to visit 6 with him and for him to receive reunification services. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Fischer v. MacHado
green
1 sentence2015(Vu v. California Commerce Club, Inc. (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 229, 235 ; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 703, pp. 1026-1027.) 27 In Fischer v. Machado (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1069 , liability for conversion was held proper, where two agents had failed to turn over a definite sum to their principals, after it was received for the principals' account. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
General Acceptance Corp. v. Robinson
green
1 sentence2013In the latter case, section 395.5 applies. 4 Indeed, the holding in General Acceptance was that “the agreement between the parties to the contract upon which this action was brought was void.” (General Acceptance, supra, 207 Cal. at p. 289 , italics added.) There is no broader pronouncement of a generalized rule in General Acceptance. 5 The Alexander opinion dealt with two underlying cases, filed by the same plaintiff, against different defendants, pertaining to the same contract. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Alexander v. Superior Court
green
1 sentence2013(Alexander, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 725 .) 6 In Alexander , it appears that the parties selected a proper county for venue, under the legislative scheme. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Haigler v. Donnelly
green
1 sentence2007That rendered the generalized claim for money not actionable as conversion.” (Id. at p. 235.) In this case, plaintiffs may have stated a cause of action for conversion by alleging, in effect, an amount of cash “capable of identification.” (Haigler v. Donnelly, supra, 18 Cal.2d at p. 681 .) Plaintiffs alleged a conversion of 10 duffel bags, each containing $500,000. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Brochtrup v. Intep
green
1 sentence1988In Brochtrup v. INTEP, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d 323 , the court faced a situation much like that presented here. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
1 sentence1987The broader tests adopted by the Oregon and Arizona Supreme Courts and suggested by the minority in Oregon v. Kennedy, supra, 456 U.S. 667 , encompass a more generalized test that has variously been characterized as “bad faith conduct” or “harassment” or “overreaching.” Besides being so *738 broad as to be essentially standardless, the tests display a basic naivete of courtroom dynamics and trial strategy in an adversarial system. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Aguilar
green
2 sentences1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. 1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Grant
green
2 sentences1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. 1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
People v. Govea
green
2 sentences1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. 1977For example, in People v. Grant (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 563 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 812 ], People v. Aguilar (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 502 [ 49 Cal.Rptr. 584 ], and People v. Govea (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 285 [ 45 Cal.Rptr. 253 ], the affidavits allege prior narcotics sales at night, thus implying that the contraband might not be there the next morning. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.