defendant argues instruction in Tennessee

2003The comment to the latter section explains why, at the time of the 1995 printing of the fourth edition of the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions, 4 there were alternative instructions as to “reasonable doubt”: The Committee is of the opinion that the use of the term “moral certainty” in the jury charge on reasonable doubt may be reversible error under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).

2003The comment to the latter section explains why, at the time of the 1995 printing of the fourth edition of the Tennessee Pattern Jury Instructions, 4 there were alternative instructions as to “reasonable doubt”: The Committee is of the opinion that the use of the term “moral certainty” in the jury charge on reasonable doubt may be reversible error under Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990).

2017The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that “[q]uestions concerning the instructions are generally deemed to be waived in the absence of objection or special request, unless they contain plain error.” Cravens, 764 S.W.2d at 757 .

2015The Defendant argues that this error “renders the warrant itself invalid.” The State responds that the requirements of Rule 41(c) were met and the “extraneously listed dates” contained in the warrant “do not cause the warrant to be fatally deficient or outside the technical requirements of 41(c).” The State further contends that “any error in the introduction of the box of [bullets] and shotgun constitutes harmless error as the overwhelming amount of evidence against the [D]efendant in this matter made the introduction of the Fiocchi [box of bullets] and shotgun minor evidentiary pieces.” Our

2015Under this standard, “a trial court’s findings of fact in a suppression hearing will be upheld unless the evidence preponderates otherwise.” Id. at 23 .

2013Analysis In the order granting this appeal, we stated the issue as “[wjhether, in analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence in light of State v. White, 362 S.W.3d 559 (Tenn.2012), the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in holding that the jury was correctly instructed and that the [Defendant’s] due process rights were not violated.” While the Defendant argues error and further contends that if the instruction set out in White had been given the jury would not have convicted him of false imprisonment, the State concedes that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred by holding that the trial court corre

2010App. 1990); and Sum erall v. State , 580 S.W.2d 794 (Tenn. Crim.

2010Douglas in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 850 , 93 S.Ct. 2357 , 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) (Douglas, J„ dissenting): “[t]he use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of the crime is indeed treacherous, for it allows men to go to jail without any evidence on one essential ingredient of the offense.

2010Douglas in Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 837, 850 , 93 S.Ct. 2357 , 37 L.Ed.2d 380 (1973) (Douglas, J„ dissenting): “[t]he use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of the crime is indeed treacherous, for it allows men to go to jail without any evidence on one essential ingredient of the offense.

2010Next, the defendant argues it was error to allow the victim to testify she had told a friend about the rapes two years after they occurred because two years is “well beyond any parameters established by any Tennessee case regarding fresh complaint.” 2 Throu ghout the rema inder of his argum ents, the d efenda nt does provide fo ur citations ---to T.C.A . § 24-1-2 07; T.C .A. § 63-2 3-107; State v. Lew is, 803 S.W.2d 260 (Tenn. Crim.

2006As a companion issue, the defendant argues that the standard enunciated in State v. Smith, 893 S.W.2d 908 (Tenn. 1994), conflicts with prevailing mental retardation standards as utilized by the mental health community. -13- The issue arose when the defendant filed a Motion to Strike the State’s Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty.

1999The defendant argues that the instruction is error under Farris v. State, 535 S.W.2d 608 (Tenn. 1976).

1999Relying upon the analysis delineated in Howell, supra, the defendant argues that the error is not harmless.

1999Relying upon the analysis delineated in Howell, supra , the defendant argues that the error is not harmless.

1997The instruction in Naughten, like the instruction in this case, informed the jury "to consider the manner of the witness, the nature of the testimony, and any other matter relating to the witness' possible motivation to speak falsely. [The jury] thus remained free to exercise its collective judgment to reject what it did not find trustworthy or plausible." 414 U.S. at 419 , 94 S. Ct. at 401 .

1997The instruction in Naughten, like the instruction in this case, informed the jury "to consider the manner of the witness, the nature of the testimony, and any other matter relating to the witness' possible motivation to speak falsely. [The jury] thus remained free to exercise its collective judgment to reject what it did not find trustworthy or plausible." 414 U.S. at 419 , 94 S. Ct. at 401 .

1992Once again, this argument was recently addressed and rejected in State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn.1990), where we found that the statute clearly outlines where the burden of proof lies and does not impose a presumption of death upon the finding of one aggravating circumstance.

1992Once again, this argument was recently addressed and rejected in State v. Boyd, 797 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1990), where we found that the statute clearly outlines where the burden of proof lies and does not impose a presumption of death upon the finding of one aggravating circumstance.