defendant argues instruction in New Hampshire

2020See Gagnon, 107 N.H. at 509 .

2013See State v. Bird, 161 N.H. 31, 35 (2010).

2010The defendant argues that the test results are testimonial under the recent United States Supreme Court case of Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009), and contends that they were inadmissible absent the testimony of the analyst who performed the tests.

2010The State counters that Melendez-Diaz applies only to “formalized testimonial materials, such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions.” Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. at 2543 (Thomas, J., concurring).

2009He argues that the circumstances here are similar to those in Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 735 (1963), thus requiring reversal.

1999When reviewing jury instructions, we evaluate allegations of error “by interpreting the disputed instructions in their entirety, as a reasonable juror .would have understood them, and in light of all the evidence in the case.” State v. Frost, 141 N.H. 493, 496 , 686 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1996) (quotation omitted).

1999When reviewing jury instructions, we evaluate allegations of error “by interpreting the disputed instructions in their entirety, as a reasonable juror .would have understood them, and in light of all the evidence in the case.” State v. Frost, 141 N.H. 493, 496 , 686 A.2d 1172, 1175 (1996) (quotation omitted).

1997We will not reverse a jury verdict if the disputed charge “fully communicates the relevant applicable law and standards to be followed by the jury.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 613 , 467 A.2d 202, 230 (1983).

1997We will not reverse a jury verdict if the disputed charge “fully communicates the relevant applicable law and standards to be followed by the jury.” State v. Sands, 123 N.H. 570, 613 , 467 A.2d 202, 230 (1983).

1997The defendant argues that this instruction violated his right to due process of law under the New Hampshire Constitution because it “did not fairly and properly advise the jury as to the proper use of evidence of a refusal . . . and improperly shifted the burden of proof.” “We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Bundy, 130 N.H. 382, 383 , 539 A.2d 713, 713 (1988); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).

1997The defendant argues that this instruction violated his right to due process of law under the New Hampshire Constitution because it “did not fairly and properly advise the jury as to the proper use of evidence of a refusal . . . and improperly shifted the burden of proof.” “We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Bundy, 130 N.H. 382, 383 , 539 A.2d 713, 713 (1988); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).

1997The defendant argues that this instruction violated his right to due process of law under the New Hampshire Constitution because it “did not fairly and properly advise the jury as to the proper use of evidence of a refusal . . . and improperly shifted the burden of proof.” “We have long recognized the rule that a claim of an erroneous jury charge must be evaluated by reading the alleged offending portion in the context of the trial court’s whole charge.” State v. Bundy, 130 N.H. 382, 383 , 539 A.2d 713, 713 (1988); see also Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47 (1973).

1996Next, the defendant argues that his defense theory attacking the complainant’s credibility was undermined by the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that “[i]t is not unusual for an alleged wrongful act to give rise to both a criminal prosecution and a related civil lawsuit.” Specifically, he argues that the instruction “invade[d] the jurors’ province by diverting them from [a] reasonable line of factual analysis they might otherwise have pursued.” State v. Prisby, 131 N.H. 57, 59 , 550 A.2d 89, 90 (1988).

1996Next, the defendant argues that his defense theory attacking the complainant’s credibility was undermined by the trial judge’s instruction to the jury that “[i]t is not unusual for an alleged wrongful act to give rise to both a criminal prosecution and a related civil lawsuit.” Specifically, he argues that the instruction “invade[d] the jurors’ province by diverting them from [a] reasonable line of factual analysis they might otherwise have pursued.” State v. Prisby, 131 N.H. 57, 59 , 550 A.2d 89, 90 (1988).

1983The trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but that “[i]t is not necessary that each fact relied on by the State be established for you beyond a reasonable doubt.” The defendant argues that this instruction constitutes an addition to our model charge on reasonable doubt, in violation of State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 , 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

1983The trial judge instructed the jury that the State must prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, but that “[i]t is not necessary that each fact relied on by the State be established for you beyond a reasonable doubt.” The defendant argues that this instruction constitutes an addition to our model charge on reasonable doubt, in violation of State v. Wentworth, 118 N.H. 832, 838-39 , 395 A.2d 858, 862-63 (1978).

1982Although we are of the opinion that this may be an instruction best given only when it is requested by a defendant or when the nature of a particular case otherwise warrants it, in State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 89-90 , 427 A.2d 3, 7 (1981), we upheld an identical jury instruction, noting specifically that “[j]ury nullification is an historical prerogative of the jury. ...” Id. at 89 , 427 A.2d at 7 (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.

1982Although we are of the opinion that this may be an instruction best given only when it is requested by a defendant or when the nature of a particular case otherwise warrants it, in State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 89-90 , 427 A.2d 3, 7 (1981), we upheld an identical jury instruction, noting specifically that “[j]ury nullification is an historical prerogative of the jury. ...” Id. at 89 , 427 A.2d at 7 (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.

1982Although we are of the opinion that this may be an instruction best given only when it is requested by a defendant or when the nature of a particular case otherwise warrants it, in State v. Weitzman, 121 N.H. 83, 89-90 , 427 A.2d 3, 7 (1981), we upheld an identical jury instruction, noting specifically that “[j]ury nullification is an historical prerogative of the jury. ...” Id. at 89 , 427 A.2d at 7 (citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1130-37 (D.C.

1981Physician Serv. v. Durkin, 113 N.H. 717, 720-21 , 313 A.2d 416, 419 (1973), and in Slayton v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 206, 208 , 371 A.2d 1159, 1161 (1977).

1981Physician Serv. v. Durkin, 113 N.H. 717, 720-21 , 313 A.2d 416, 419 (1973), and in Slayton v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 206, 208 , 371 A.2d 1159, 1161 (1977).

1981Physician Serv. v. Durkin, 113 N.H. 717, 720-21 , 313 A.2d 416, 419 (1973), and in Slayton v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 206, 208 , 371 A.2d 1159, 1161 (1977).

1981Physician Serv. v. Durkin, 113 N.H. 717, 720-21 , 313 A.2d 416, 419 (1973), and in Slayton v. Personnel Comm’n, 117 N.H. 206, 208 , 371 A.2d 1159, 1161 (1977).