defendant argues claim in Connecticut

2019His claim does not necessarily focus on the propriety of the court’s Chip Smith instruction, but he contends that, in the present case, ‘‘the court’s response to the deadlock note created pressure and exacerbated existing pressures on the jury, particularly the minority view juror(s), and that all the coercive circumstances denied [him of] his right to a fair jury trial.’’ The defendant argues that the claim is reviewable pursuant to the bypass doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188

2019His claim does not necessarily focus on the propriety of the court’s Chip Smith instruction, but he contends that, in the present case, ‘‘the court’s response to the deadlock note created pressure and exacerbated existing pressures on the jury, particularly the minority view juror(s), and that all the coercive circumstances denied [him of] his right to a fair jury trial.’’ The defendant argues that the claim is reviewable pursuant to the bypass doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233 , 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773 , 781, 120 A.3d 1188

2012On appeal, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable (1) because he has a constitutionally protected right to review of any and all claims on appeal; (2) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989); (3) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973); (4) under the plain error doctrine codified in Practice Book § 60-5; and (5) under the exercise of this court’s inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice.

2012On appeal, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable (1) because he has a constitutionally protected right to review of any and all claims on appeal; (2) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239-40 , 567 A.2d 823 (1989); (3) under the doctrine set forth in State v. Evans, 165 Conn. 61, 70 , 327 A.2d 576 (1973); (4) under the plain error doctrine codified in Practice Book § 60-5; and (5) under the exercise of this court’s inherent supervisory authority over the administration of justice.

1995So you need not deal with that element and you need not make that finding.” The defendant argues that this instruction violated the Sandstrom doctrine against a mandatory presumption; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517-24 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

1995So you need not deal with that element and you need not make that finding.” The defendant argues that this instruction violated the Sandstrom doctrine against a mandatory presumption; Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517-24 , 99 S. Ct. 2450 , 61 L.

2000In support of this, it cites Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 240 Conn. 671 (1997).

2000In support of this, it cites Doe v. Statewide Grievance Committee , 240 Conn. 671 (1997).

1996In support of this argument, the defendant cites O'Leary v. Waterbury Title Co., 117 Conn. 39 , 166 A. 673 (1933), for the proposition that "[a] judgment in an action begun and prosecuted against a defendant who is dead when it was begun, is null and void and may be attacked collaterally as well as directly." Id., 43 .

1996In support of this argument, the defendant cites O'Leary v. Waterbury Title Co., 117 Conn. 39 , 166 A. 673 (1933), for the proposition that "[a] judgment in an action begun and prosecuted against a defendant who is dead when it was begun, is null and void and may be attacked collaterally as well as directly." Id., 43 .

1995Ed. 2d 39 (1979); 3 thereby render ing “irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have relied upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence.” Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 , 103 S. Ct. 969 , 74 L.

1995Ed. 2d 39 (1979); 3 thereby render ing “irrelevant the evidence on the issue because the jury may have relied upon the presumption rather than upon that evidence.” Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 85 , 103 S. Ct. 969 , 74 L.

2022We agree with the defendant. ‘‘[O]ur rules of practice permit criminal defendants to preserve claims of instructional error by filing a timely written request to charge.’’ State v. Ramon A. G., 336 Conn. 386, 396 , 246 A.3d 481 (2020); see also Practice Book § 42-16.13 ‘‘[A] party may preserve for appeal a claim that an instruction . . . was . . . defective either by: (1) submitting a written request to charge covering the matter; or (2) taking an exception to the charge as given.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. King, 289 Conn. 496, 505 , 958 A.2d 731 (2008). ‘‘Under either meth

2022We agree with the defendant. ‘‘[O]ur rules of practice permit criminal defendants to preserve claims of instructional error by filing a timely written request to charge.’’ State v. Ramon A. G., 336 Conn. 386, 396 , 246 A.3d 481 (2020); see also Practice Book § 42-16.13 ‘‘[A] party may preserve for appeal a claim that an instruction . . . was . . . defective either by: (1) submitting a written request to charge covering the matter; or (2) taking an exception to the charge as given.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. King, 289 Conn. 496, 505 , 958 A.2d 731 (2008). ‘‘Under either meth

2022We agree with the defendant. ‘‘[O]ur rules of practice permit criminal defendants to preserve claims of instructional error by filing a timely written request to charge.’’ State v. Ramon A. G., 336 Conn. 386, 396 , 246 A.3d 481 (2020); see also Practice Book § 42-16.13 ‘‘[A] party may preserve for appeal a claim that an instruction . . . was . . . defective either by: (1) submitting a written request to charge covering the matter; or (2) taking an exception to the charge as given.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. King, 289 Conn. 496, 505 , 958 A.2d 731 (2008). ‘‘Under either meth

2022State v. Belt, [ 285 Kan. 949 , 179 P.3d 443 (2008)], which rejected the John Doe warrant in that case because it had only two loci [that were] present in one in 500 people,’’ and the trial court distinguished that case in its memorandum of decision.

2022State v. Belt, [ 285 Kan. 949 , 179 P.3d 443 (2008)], which rejected the John Doe warrant in that case because it had only two loci [that were] present in one in 500 people,’’ and the trial court distinguished that case in its memorandum of decision.

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2020On appeal, the defendant argues that his claim is preserved because he ‘‘objected to the inclusion of the instruction’’ and that the ‘‘trial court noted the defen- dant’s objection.’’ The state responds that the defen- dant’s argument ‘‘misunderstands the law regarding preservation of claims.’’ The state, citing to Practice Book § 42-1617 and State v. Tierinni, 165 Conn. App. 839 , 854–55, 140 A.3d 377 (2016), aff’d, 329 Conn. 289 , 185 A.3d 591 (2018), contends that ‘‘in order to obtain appellate review, our rules not only require a timely objection, but they require the appellate claim to be

2020On appeal, the defendant argues that his claim is preserved because he ‘‘objected to the inclusion of the instruction’’ and that the ‘‘trial court noted the defen- dant’s objection.’’ The state responds that the defen- dant’s argument ‘‘misunderstands the law regarding preservation of claims.’’ The state, citing to Practice Book § 42-1617 and State v. Tierinni, 165 Conn. App. 839 , 854–55, 140 A.3d 377 (2016), aff’d, 329 Conn. 289 , 185 A.3d 591 (2018), contends that ‘‘in order to obtain appellate review, our rules not only require a timely objection, but they require the appellate claim to be

2020On appeal, the defendant argues that his claim is preserved because he ‘‘objected to the inclusion of the instruction’’ and that the ‘‘trial court noted the defen- dant’s objection.’’ The state responds that the defen- dant’s argument ‘‘misunderstands the law regarding preservation of claims.’’ The state, citing to Practice Book § 42-1617 and State v. Tierinni, 165 Conn. App. 839 , 854–55, 140 A.3d 377 (2016), aff’d, 329 Conn. 289 , 185 A.3d 591 (2018), contends that ‘‘in order to obtain appellate review, our rules not only require a timely objection, but they require the appellate claim to be

2020On appeal, the defendant argues that his claim is preserved because he ‘‘objected to the inclusion of the instruction’’ and that the ‘‘trial court noted the defen- dant’s objection.’’ The state responds that the defen- dant’s argument ‘‘misunderstands the law regarding preservation of claims.’’ The state, citing to Practice Book § 42-1617 and State v. Tierinni, 165 Conn. App. 839 , 854–55, 140 A.3d 377 (2016), aff’d, 329 Conn. 289 , 185 A.3d 591 (2018), contends that ‘‘in order to obtain appellate review, our rules not only require a timely objection, but they require the appellate claim to be

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2020Specifically, the defendant argues that an exception to the general inapplicability of the exclusionary rule in probation revocation hearings is warranted under the state constitution when officers conduct a search of a probationer after learning of that individual’s probation status.5 In support of this argument, the defendant cites Payne v. Robinson, 207 Conn. 565 , 541 A.2d 504 , cert. denied, 488 U.S. 898 , 109 S. Ct. 242 , 102 L.

2016This argument, however, is simply another way to phrase a claim of inconsistency, and our Supreme Court in Arroyo specifically rejected the argument that a claim of inconsistency in verdicts may be considered on appeal under the alternative rubric that " 'the jury's conclusion was not reasonably and logically reached' "; State v. Arroyo , supra, 292 Conn. at 580 , 973 A.2d 1254 ; because of inconsistency.

2016This argument, however, is simply another way to phrase a claim of inconsistency, and our Supreme Court in Arroyo specifically rejected the argument that a claim of inconsistency in verdicts may be considered on appeal under the alternative rubric that " 'the jury's conclusion was not reasonably and logically reached' "; State v. Arroyo , supra, 292 Conn. at 580 , 973 A.2d 1254 ; because of inconsistency.

2016It is well established that ‘‘courts do not apply the rule of lenity unless a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.’’ (Empha- sis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198, 219 , 853 A.2d 434 (2004).

2016It is well established that ‘‘courts do not apply the rule of lenity unless a reasonable doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating policies of the statute.’’ (Empha- sis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Lutters, 270 Conn. 198, 219 , 853 A.2d 434 (2004).

2012Additionally, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable pursuant to Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 276, 279-80 , 587 A.2d 1056 (1991), because the evidence at issue was introduced after the court cautioned the state that expert witnesses may not testify regarding the victim’s credibility.

2012Additionally, the defendant argues that the claim is reviewable pursuant to Sokolowski v. Medi Mart, Inc., 24 Conn. App. 276, 279-80 , 587 A.2d 1056 (1991), because the evidence at issue was introduced after the court cautioned the state that expert witnesses may not testify regarding the victim’s credibility.

2012He maintains that his claim is analogous “to the arguments made in many habeas cases . . . that prison officials are impeding on prisoners’ constitutional rights under the guise of safety concerns” and cites Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 , 107 S. Ct. 2254 , 96 L.

2012He maintains that his claim is analogous “to the arguments made in many habeas cases . . . that prison officials are impeding on prisoners’ constitutional rights under the guise of safety concerns” and cites Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 , 107 S. Ct. 2254 , 96 L.

2011Therefore, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action.” He further argues that “prejudgment remedy documents are insufficient to commence an action. ... [In this case] [t]he writ of summons and complaint are not sufficient... to commence an action.” (Citations omitted.) Although the defendant argues that his claim implicates the court’s subject matter jurisdiction, we conclude that the defendant’s claim implicates the court’s personal jurisdiction over the defendant. 9 See Hillman v. Greenwich, 217 *379 Conn. 520, 526, 587 A.2d 99 (1991) (failure to comply with statutory prer

2010In connection with the final judgment question, the defendant argues that a violation of probation hearing is a criminal proceeding and that an appeal taken from a disqualification order is a final judgment for purposes of appeal pursuant to State v. Rapuano, 192 Conn. 228 , *821 229 n.1, 471 A.2d 240 (1984), overruled in part by Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 669-70 , 522 A.2d 812 (1987).

2010In connection with the final judgment question, the defendant argues that a violation of probation hearing is a criminal proceeding and that an appeal taken from a disqualification order is a final judgment for purposes of appeal pursuant to State v. Rapuano, 192 Conn. 228 , *821 229 n.1, 471 A.2d 240 (1984), overruled in part by Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 669-70 , 522 A.2d 812 (1987).

2010In connection with the final judgment question, the defendant argues that a violation of probation hearing is a criminal proceeding and that an appeal taken from a disqualification order is a final judgment for purposes of appeal pursuant to State v. Rapuano, 192 Conn. 228 , *821 229 n.1, 471 A.2d 240 (1984), overruled in part by Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 669-70 , 522 A.2d 812 (1987).

2010In connection with the final judgment question, the defendant argues that a violation of probation hearing is a criminal proceeding and that an appeal taken from a disqualification order is a final judgment for purposes of appeal pursuant to State v. Rapuano, 192 Conn. 228 , *821 229 n.1, 471 A.2d 240 (1984), overruled in part by Burger & Burger, Inc. v. Murren, 202 Conn. 660, 669-70 , 522 A.2d 812 (1987).

2009Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 846 , 633 A.2d 296 (1993). *567 The defendant argues that his claim was “functionally” raised at the probation revocation hearing because at that hearing he established that a revocation of probation was not sought until after his motions were filed.

2009Statewide Grievance Committee v. Whitney, 227 Conn. 829, 846 , 633 A.2d 296 (1993). *567 The defendant argues that his claim was “functionally” raised at the probation revocation hearing because at that hearing he established that a revocation of probation was not sought until after his motions were filed.

2008Our Supreme Court has interpreted § 54-96, noting that the “dominant intention of the legislature [in enacting the statute] was to extend the right of appeal to the state . . . .” State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 110 , 384 A.2d 315 (1977).

2008Our Supreme Court has interpreted § 54-96, noting that the “dominant intention of the legislature [in enacting the statute] was to extend the right of appeal to the state . . . .” State v. Avcollie, 174 Conn. 100, 110 , 384 A.2d 315 (1977).

2007The defendant argues that his claim is reviewable nonetheless because the trial court’s ruling must have been based upon the specific coconspirator hearsay exception provided by § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 16 which, he claims, would require that the statement bear “ ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 362 , 844 A.2d 191 (2004), quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2007The defendant argues that his claim is reviewable nonetheless because the trial court’s ruling must have been based upon the specific coconspirator hearsay exception provided by § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 16 which, he claims, would require that the statement bear “ ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 362 , 844 A.2d 191 (2004), quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2007The defendant argues that his claim is reviewable nonetheless because the trial court’s ruling must have been based upon the specific coconspirator hearsay exception provided by § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 16 which, he claims, would require that the statement bear “ ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 362 , 844 A.2d 191 (2004), quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2007The defendant argues that his claim is reviewable nonetheless because the trial court’s ruling must have been based upon the specific coconspirator hearsay exception provided by § 8-3 (1) (D) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, 16 which, he claims, would require that the statement bear “ ‘adequate indicia of reliability.’ ” State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 362 , 844 A.2d 191 (2004), quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 , 100 S. Ct. 2531 , 65 L.

2005The defendant relies on the fact that in Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 , 108 S. Ct. 646 , 98 L.