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19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2023 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barletta v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Barletta v. State, 994 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d)(referring to Cantu analysis, but finding no preservation of claim); Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 637-38 (admission of victim impact testimony was error, but harmless). 127 This Honorable Court has stated: The danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant inherent in the introduction of “victim impact” evidence with respect to a victim not named in the indictment on which he is being tried is unacceptably high. 2003Trial courts limit victim impact testimony to the victim named in the indictment. (1) See Barletta v. State , 994 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (referring to Cantu analysis, but finding no preservation of claim); Cantu , 939 S.W.2d at 637-38 (admission of victim impact testimony was error, but harmless). (2) We find that the admission of this testimony was error. | 3 | 3 |
Cantu v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Barletta v. State, 994 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.- Texarkana 1999, pet. ref’d)(referring to Cantu analysis, but finding no preservation of claim); Cantu, 939 S.W.2d at 637-38 (admission of victim impact testimony was error, but harmless). 127 This Honorable Court has stated: The danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant inherent in the introduction of “victim impact” evidence with respect to a victim not named in the indictment on which he is being tried is unacceptably high. 2003Trial courts limit victim impact testimony to the victim named in the indictment. (1) See Barletta v. State , 994 S.W.2d 708, 713 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref'd) (referring to Cantu analysis, but finding no preservation of claim); Cantu , 939 S.W.2d at 637-38 (admission of victim impact testimony was error, but harmless). (2) We find that the admission of this testimony was error. | 2 | 2 |
Parrish v. Brooksgreen2 sentences2010Cf. Moncada v. Brown, 202 S.W.3d 794, 797-98 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, no pet.) (allowing review of an order granting a motion for new trial which expressly 4 denied a motion for summary judgment based on immunity); see Parrish v. Brooks, 856 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1993, writ denied). 2010Cf. Moncada v. Brown , 202 S.W.3d 794, 797-98 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (allowing review of an order granting a motion for new trial which expressly denied a motion for summary judgment based on immunity); see Parrish v. Brooks , 856 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Swearingen v. Stategreen2 sentences2010In its response brief, the State argues inter alia that the trial court did not err in denying Cantu’s motion for forensic DNA testing because: (1) Cantu failed to establish “that either victim’s fingernail scrapings actually contain biological material suitable for testing” and (2) the hair found on the floor mat of Mosqueda’s Corvette “possesses no evidentiary value to identify a person associated with the murders.” Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure “requires multiple threshold criteria to be met before a convicted person is entitled to DNA testing.” Swearingen v. State, 303 2010In its response brief, the State argues inter alia that the trial court did not err in denying Cantu's motion for forensic DNA testing because: (1) Cantu failed to establish "that either victim's fingernail scrapings actually contain biological material suitable for testing" and (2) the hair found on the floor mat of Mosqueda's Corvette "possesses no evidentiary value to identify a person associated with the murders." Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure "requires multiple threshold criteria to be met before a convicted person is entitled to DNA testing." Swearingen v. State , 30 | 2 | 2 |
Moncada v. Browngreen2 sentences2010Cf. Moncada v. Brown, 202 S.W.3d 794, 797-98 (Tex. App.–Waco 2006, no pet.) (allowing review of an order granting a motion for new trial which expressly 4 denied a motion for summary judgment based on immunity); see Parrish v. Brooks, 856 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App.–Texarkana 1993, writ denied). 2010Cf. Moncada v. Brown , 202 S.W.3d 794, 797-98 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, no pet.) (allowing review of an order granting a motion for new trial which expressly denied a motion for summary judgment based on immunity); see Parrish v. Brooks , 856 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993, writ denied). | 2 | 2 |
Mid-Continent Casualty Co. v. Global Enercom Management, Inc.green1 sentence2021Co. v. Global Enercom Mgmt., Inc., 323 S.W.3d 151, 157 (Tex. 2010). | 1 | 1 |
Cura-Cruz v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLCgreen1 sentence2020Cf. Cura-Cruz v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Elec., LLC, 522 S.W.3d 565, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (“Neither a particular college degree nor a particular license is 6 Schmidt’s resume was offered into evidence at the Daubert hearing “for purposes of the hearing” and was admitted into evidence over Cantu’s objection. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Crist Industries, Inc.green1 sentence2019See id. | 1 | 1 |
Joachim v. Chambersgreen1 sentence2018See generally Joachim v. Chambers, 815 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. 1991). | 1 | 1 |
Peter C. Browning v. Jeff P. Prostokgreen1 sentence2015See Browning v. Prostok, 165 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 8 2005) (“A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid the binding force of a judgment in a proceeding not instituted for the purpose of correcting, modifying, or vacating the judgment, but in order to obtain some specific relief which the judgment currently stands as a bar against.”). | 1 | 1 |
Gina Lynn Waters v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.green1 sentence2012See id. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Murphygreen1 sentence2003Trial courts limit victim impact testimony to the victim named in the indictment. 1 See Barletta v. State, 994 S.W.2d 708, 718 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1999, pet. ref d) (referring to Cantu analysis, but finding no preservation of claim); Cantu, 989 S.W.2d at 637-38 (admission of victim impact testimony was error, but harmless). 2 We find that the admission of this testimony was error. | 1 | 1 |
Wilkerson v. Stategreen1 sentence1999See Wilkerson v. State, 726 S.W.2d 542, 550 (Tex.Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Apolinar v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In our opinion in Apolinar v. State, 790 S.W.2d 108, 108 (Tex.App.—San Antonio *704 1990), vacated and remanded, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the defendant appealed the trial court’s pretrial ruling on his special plea raising double jeopardy. 3 For the first time on appeal, we interpreted the plea as an application for writ of habeas corpus, which conferred jurisdiction to discuss the merits of the defendant’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
Apolinar v. Stategreen1 sentence1996In our opinion in Apolinar v. State, 790 S.W.2d 108, 108 (Tex.App.—San Antonio *704 1990), vacated and remanded, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1991), the defendant appealed the trial court’s pretrial ruling on his special plea raising double jeopardy. 3 For the first time on appeal, we interpreted the plea as an application for writ of habeas corpus, which conferred jurisdiction to discuss the merits of the defendant’s claim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Thompson v. State
green
1 sentence2023“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. -8- 04-22-00197-CR In this case, the trial court conducted a hearing on Cantu’s motion for new trial at which several witness, including trial counsel, testified. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Garcia-Cantu
green
1 sentence2009Id. at 246 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Penson v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2001In Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 846 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), the Supreme Court advised appellate courts that upon receiving a “frivolous appeal” brief, they must conduct “a full examination of all the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” We have reviewed the record and, finding nothing that would arguably support an appeal, agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous. 2001In Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 846 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), the Supreme Court advised appellate courts that upon receiving a “frivolous appeal” brief, they must conduct “a full examination of all the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” We have reviewed the record and, finding nothing that would arguably support an appeal, agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Gilliard v. United States
green
1 sentence2001In Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 , 109 S.Ct. 846 , 102 L.Ed.2d 300 (1988), the Supreme Court advised appellate courts that upon receiving a “frivolous appeal” brief, they must conduct “a full examination of all the proceeding[s] to decide whether the case is wholly frivolous.” We have reviewed the record and, finding nothing that would arguably support an appeal, agree with counsel that the appeal is wholly frivolous. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Cantu v. Sapenter
green
1 sentence1999Id. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.