Central Hudson test in Texas

2014And while the Central Hudson framework is grounded in the First Amendment, this Court has previously held that it, not the Davenport analysis, also governs 126 Id. at 561 . 127 Id. at 566 . 128 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 129 Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 771 n.24 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 54 challenges under the Texas Constitution to regulations implicating communications that constitute “commercial speech” under Central Hudson.130 We see no reason to depart from these precedents here.

2014And while the Central Hudson framework is grounded in the First Amendment, this Court has previously held that it, not the Davenport analysis, also governs 126 Id. at 561 . 127 Id. at 566 . 128 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 129 Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 771 n.24 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 54 challenges under the Texas Constitution to regulations implicating communications that constitute “commercial speech” under Central Hudson.130 We see no reason to depart from these precedents here.

2003See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 , 101 S.Ct. at 2895 . *678 Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, Houston was required to show that the regulation reached no further than necessary to accomplish its objective.

2003See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 512 , 101 S.Ct. at 2895 . *678 Under the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, Houston was required to show that the regulation reached no further than necessary to accomplish its objective.

2015Thus, "the government may freely regulate commercial speech that ... is misleading," Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 , 115 S. Ct. 2371 , 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (citations omitted), and the remaining Central Hudson factors apply only if the speech is not misleading.

2015Thus, "the government may freely regulate commercial speech that ... is misleading," Florida Bar v. Went For It, 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 , 115 S. Ct. 2371 , 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995) (citations omitted), and the remaining Central Hudson factors apply only if the speech is not misleading.

2005The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test “compliments the direct advancement in *277 quiry of the third, asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it.” Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 188 , 119 S.Ct. at 1932 .

2005The fourth prong of the Central Hudson test “compliments the direct advancement in *277 quiry of the third, asking whether the speech restriction is not more extensive than necessary to serve the interests that support it.” Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 188 , 119 S.Ct. at 1932 .

2003See Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton, 33 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App.CAustin 2000, no pet.) (applying Central Hudson to commercial free speech challenge of temporary injunction ordering appellant to refrain from making certain representations to customers and advertisers of appellees); State Bd. of Med.

2003See Amalgamated Acme Affiliates, Inc. v. Minton , 33 S.W.3d 387, 394 (Tex. App.--Austin 2000, no pet.) (applying Central Hudson to commercial free speech challenge of temporary injunction ordering appellant to refrain from making certain representations to customers and advertisers of appellees); State Bd. of Med.

2005However, the Board “is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest — ‘a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.’ ” Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 188 , 119 S.Ct. at 1932 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3035 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)).

2005However, the Board “is not required to employ the least restrictive means conceivable, but must demonstrate narrow tailoring of the challenged regulation to the asserted interest — ‘a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable.’ ” Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 188 , 119 S.Ct. at 1932 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 , 109 S.Ct. 3028, 3035 , 106 L.Ed.2d 388 (1989)).

2005The Board was also concerned about the “professional image of bondsmen.” The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 , 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295-96 , 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980).

2005The Board was also concerned about the “professional image of bondsmen.” The Supreme Court has held that “[t]he State’s interest in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.” Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 , 100 S.Ct. 2286, 2295-96 , 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980).

2008See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 , 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771-73 , 113 S.Ct. 1792 .

2008See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 628 , 115 S.Ct. 2371 , 132 L.Ed.2d 541 (1995); Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 771-73 , 113 S.Ct. 1792 .

1999The Court concluded that the regulation satisfied the first requirement ofthe Central Hudson test, noting that it “is an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that ‘is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families.“’ Id. at 625 (quoting In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J.

1999The Court concluded that the regulation satisfied the first requirement of the Central Hudson test, noting that it "is an effort to protect the flagging reputations of Florida lawyers by preventing them from engaging in conduct that . . . `is universally regarded as deplorable and beneath common decency because of its intrusion upon the special vulnerability and private grief of victims or their families.'" Id . at 625 (quoting In re Anis , 599 A.2d 1265 , 1270 (N.J.Sup.Ct. 1992)).

2014The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it . . . .”137 Thus, “the government 133 See Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 578 (suggesting that “[i]f anything, in the context of defamation, the First Amendment affords more protection.” (quoting Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 , 116–17 (Tex. 2000)). 134 Operation Rescue-Nat’l, 975 S.W.2d at 559 (emphasis in original); accord Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 577–78. 135 Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 579 . 136 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. 137 Id. at 563 . 56 may freely regulate commercial speech that . .

2014The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it . . . .”137 Thus, “the government 133 See Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 578 (suggesting that “[i]f anything, in the context of defamation, the First Amendment affords more protection.” (quoting Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 , 116–17 (Tex. 2000)). 134 Operation Rescue-Nat’l, 975 S.W.2d at 559 (emphasis in original); accord Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 577–78. 135 Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 579 . 136 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. 137 Id. at 563 . 56 may freely regulate commercial speech that . .

2014And while the Central Hudson framework is grounded in the First Amendment, this Court has previously held that it, not the Davenport analysis, also governs 126 Id. at 561 . 127 Id. at 566 . 128 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 129 Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 771 n.24 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 54 challenges under the Texas Constitution to regulations implicating communications that constitute “commercial speech” under Central Hudson.130 We see no reason to depart from these precedents here.

2014And while the Central Hudson framework is grounded in the First Amendment, this Court has previously held that it, not the Davenport analysis, also governs 126 Id. at 561 . 127 Id. at 566 . 128 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 10 (1979). 129 Id. (citing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 , 771 n.24 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring)). 54 challenges under the Texas Constitution to regulations implicating communications that constitute “commercial speech” under Central Hudson.130 We see no reason to depart from these precedents here.

2014The government may ban forms of communication more likely to deceive the public than to inform it . . . .”137 Thus, “the government 133 See Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 578 (suggesting that “[i]f anything, in the context of defamation, the First Amendment affords more protection.” (quoting Turner v. KTRK Television, Inc., 38 S.W.3d 103 , 116–17 (Tex. 2000)). 134 Operation Rescue-Nat’l, 975 S.W.2d at 559 (emphasis in original); accord Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 577–78. 135 Bentley, 94 S.W.3d at 579 . 136 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563–64. 137 Id. at 563 . 56 may freely regulate commercial speech that . .

2013See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653 , 2667 (2011).