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19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1996–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Laingreen2 sentences2019See Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 394 ; Lain, 349 S.W.2d at 581 (“One who takes possession of another’s land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of possession is in the state and that he is acting for and on behalf of the state”). 2014One who takes possession of another's land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of possession is in the state and that he is acting for and on behalf of the state.”); Tex. Parks and Wildlife Dep't v. Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d 384, 393-394 (concluding that State officials’ claims of State ownership—although not a constitutional taking—constituted "possession” for purpo | 7 | 18 |
Texas Parks & Wildlife Department v. Sawyer Trustgreen2 sentences2019As we stated in Riemer, quoting from Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 395-96 , “[o]ne who takes possession of another’s land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of possession is in the state and that he is acting for an [sic] on behalf of the state.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in construing this dispute as something other than a contract dispute and in deny 2019See Sawyer Trust, 354 S.W.3d at 394 ; Lain, 349 S.W.2d at 581 (“One who takes possession of another’s land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a suit to oust him simply because he asserts a good faith but overzealous claim that title or right of possession is in the state and that he is acting for and on behalf of the state”). | 2 | 3 |
Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp.green2 sentences2009In this type of suit, the plaintiff could obtain judgment against the government agents that the plaintiff, not the government, had superior title or right of possession in the property, as well as remedies against the agents that would have the practical effect of dispossessing the government 18 See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Comm. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1949) (later characterizing Lee and its progeny as involving suits to restrain acts that, while within the government agent’s statutory authority, constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, and 2009In this type of suit, the plaintiff could obtain judgment against the government agents that the plaintiff, not the government, had superior title or right of possession in the property, as well as remedies against the agents that would have the practical effect of dispossessing the government 18 See also Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Comm. Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1949) (later characterizing Lee and its progeny as involving suits to restrain acts that, while within the government agent’s statutory authority, constituted an unconstitutional taking of property without just compensation, and | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Lee
green
1 sentence2009In support, the supreme court cited what it termed “[w]ell-reasoned and authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the courts of this state support[ing] the view that a plea of sovereign immunity by officials of the sovereign will not be sustained in a suit by the owner of land having right of possession when the sovereign has neither title nor right of possession.” Id. at 581-82 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Stanley v. Schwalby, 19 S.W. 264 (Tex. 1892), rev’d on other grounds, 147 U.S. 508 (1893); Imperial Sugar Co. v. Cabell, 179 S.W. 83 (Te | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Stanley v. Schwalby
green
1 sentence2009In support, the supreme court cited what it termed “[w]ell-reasoned and authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the courts of this state support[ing] the view that a plea of sovereign immunity by officials of the sovereign will not be sustained in a suit by the owner of land having right of possession when the sovereign has neither title nor right of possession.” Id. at 581-82 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Stanley v. Schwalby, 19 S.W. 264 (Tex. 1892), rev’d on other grounds, 147 U.S. 508 (1893); Imperial Sugar Co. v. Cabell, 179 S.W. 83 (Te | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Imperial Sugar Co. v. Cabell
green
1 sentence2009In support, the supreme court cited what it termed “[w]ell-reasoned and authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the courts of this state support[ing] the view that a plea of sovereign immunity by officials of the sovereign will not be sustained in a suit by the owner of land having right of possession when the sovereign has neither title nor right of possession.” Id. at 581-82 (citing United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Stanley v. Schwalby, 19 S.W. 264 (Tex. 1892), rev’d on other grounds, 147 U.S. 508 (1893); Imperial Sugar Co. v. Cabell, 179 S.W. 83 (Te | 1 | 2009–2009 |
WD Haden Company v. Dodgen
green
1 sentence2007Id. (citations omitted). 38 Epperson and prior cases on basis that “[i]n that class of cases it is held that suits for property alleged to be unlawfully or wrongfully withheld from the rightful owners by officers of the state are not suits against the sovereign itself and may be maintained without permission of the sovereign.”); cf. State v. Lain, 349 S.W.2d 579, 581-82 (Tex. 1961) (“One who takes possession of another’s land without legal right is no less a trespasser because he is a state official or employee, and the owner should not be required to obtain legislative consent to institute a | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.