mistake of law defense in Texas

2015Additionally, the court noted that the mistake of law defense “was not created to allow a criminal defendant to rely upon old interpretive opinions, opinions that conflict with others, or on overruled opinions.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2015Additionally, the court noted that the mistake of law defense “was not created to allow a criminal defendant to rely upon old interpretive opinions, opinions that conflict with others, or on overruled opinions.” Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).

2024See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Sparkman v. State, 968 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d) (“These allegations might favor an instruction regarding a mistake of fact, as the trial court allowed, but they do not suffice for a mistake of law instruction.”); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d) (mistake-of-law instruction inappropriate when defendant’s asserted legal authorities could not have given rise to reasonable belief that charged conduct was legal), overruled on other grounds, Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim.

2007App. 1992); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d).

2015Consequently, we conclude that the plain language of Penal Code section 8.03 demonstrates that the legislature intended the mistake of law defense to apply when a charged offense includes, as an element of the crime, a culpable mental state that incorporates knowledge of the law or legal concepts and the accused has presented, some evidence that he reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute a crime because he acted in reasonable reliance on official statements or interpretations of the law as specified in the statute. 11 See Gies-berg, 984 S.W.2d at 248 (recognizing that the Penal Code

2015Consequently, we conclude that the plain language of Penal Code section 8.03 demonstrates that the legislature intended the mistake of law defense to apply when a charged offense includes, as an element of the crime, a culpable mental state that incorporates knowledge of the law or legal concepts and the accused has presented some evidence that he reasonably believed his conduct did not constitute a crime because he acted in reasonable reliance on official statements or interpretations of 31 the law as specified in the statute.11 See Giesberg, 984 S.W.2d at 248 (recognizing that the Penal Code

2015See id. § 8.03(b); see also Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir.1990) (recognizing that “[t]he purpose of a mistake-of-law defense is to negate the mental state that the defendant must have to be guilty of the charged crime”).

2015Contrary to the prosecution’s position that the mistake of law defense “does not negate any element of the offense”, it does just that: “[t]he purpose of a mistake-of- law defense is to negate the mental state that the defendant must have to be guilty of the charged crime.” Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 595 (9th Cir. 1990) (Emphasis added).

2015See 692 S.W.2d at 87-88 (affirming portion of court of appeals’ decision holding that statute violated due process by labeling element of offense as an “affirmative defense” and shifting burden to defendant to disprove it).

2015See 692 S.W.2d at 87–88 (affirming portion of court of appeals’ decision holding that statute violated due process by labeling element of offense as an “affirmative defense” and shifting burden to defendant to disprove it).

2010See Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 865 (5th Cir. 1999) (promissory estoppel); McCormick Mktg., Inc. v. City of Colorado City, 42 S.W.3d 162 , 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (equitable estoppel); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 615 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ.

2010See Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. , 176 F.3d 847, 865 (5th Cir. 1999) (promissory estoppel); McCormick Mktg., Inc. v. City of Colorado City , 42 S.W.3d 162 , 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (equitable estoppel); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick , 615 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ.

2010See Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 176 F.3d 847, 865 (5th Cir. 1999) (promissory estoppel); McCormick Mktg., Inc. v. City of Colorado City, 42 S.W.3d 162 , 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (equitable estoppel); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick, 615 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ.

2010See Zenor v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd. , 176 F.3d 847, 865 (5th Cir. 1999) (promissory estoppel); McCormick Mktg., Inc. v. City of Colorado City , 42 S.W.3d 162 , 164–65 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, no pet.) (equitable estoppel); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Frederick , 615 S.W.2d 323, 325 (Tex. Civ.

2015E.g., Steele, 236 P.3d at 170-72 (noting but not resolving argument); State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 615-16 (Minn.2005) (rejecting State’s argument).

2015E.g., Steele, 236 P.3d at 170–72 (noting but not resolving argument); State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610 , 615–16 (Minn. 2005) (rejecting State’s argument). 17 jury a vehicle to find appellant not guilty if he thought he was a resident in reliance on the authorities.

2015See Jenkins, 2015 Tex. App. LEXIS 5667, at **81-82 (citations omitted). 9 As discussed below, the Committee responsible for the Texas Pattern Jury Charge suggests, given the legislative history of the enactment of Section 8.03 Mistake of Law, that defendants should “perhaps” avoid raising a mistake of law defense premised on negating the culpable mental state.

2015A necessary element of the crime is missing.” (Id.) (Emphasis added.) See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.04 explanatory note (1985); and Jenkins, supra, at 676 .35 35 The prosecution posits that “any defense premised on mistake of law negating the culpable mental state was ‘intertwined in the challenge to the element that the State has to prove,’ thus, (continued...) 40 In the present case, the mistake of law defense negated the culpable mental state that Jenkins voted in the election in question allegedly “knowing” that he was not a resident of the precinct in which he registered.

2015E.g., Steele, 236 P.3d at 170-72 (noting but not resolving argument); State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610, 615-16 (Minn.2005) (rejecting State’s argument).

2015E.g., Steele, 236 P.3d at 170–72 (noting but not resolving argument); State v. Jacobson, 697 N.W.2d 610 , 615–16 (Minn. 2005) (rejecting State’s argument). 17 jury a vehicle to find appellant not guilty if he thought he was a resident in reliance on the authorities.

2024See Sparkman v. State, 968 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d) (“These allegations might favor an instruction regarding a mistake of fact, as the trial court allowed, but they do not suffice for a mistake of law instruction.”); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d) (mistake-of-law instruction inappropriate when defendant’s asserted legal authorities could not have given rise to reasonable belief that charged conduct was legal), overruled on other grounds, Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim.

2024See Sparkman v. State, 968 S.W.2d 373, 379 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1997, pet. ref’d) (“These allegations might favor an instruction regarding a mistake of fact, as the trial court allowed, but they do not suffice for a mistake of law instruction.”); Hefner v. State, 735 S.W.2d 608, 625 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, pet. ref’d) (mistake-of-law instruction inappropriate when defendant’s asserted legal authorities could not have given rise to reasonable belief that charged conduct was legal), overruled on other grounds, Campbell v. State, 5 S.W.3d 693, 701 (Tex. Crim.

2023See id.; see also Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492 (requiring us to disregard subjective intent of officer and look solely to whether objective basis for traffic stop existed); Tex. Dep’t of Pub.

2015See Logan, 89 S.W.3d at 627 . 32 omission signals that the legislature intentionally drafted the mistake of law defense to make it inapplicable in a situation in which a party was attempting to negate the mental element, as Jenkins is attempting to do here.

2015The mistake of law defense is 52 “designed to recognize good faith reliance, not to encourage gambling.” See Ostrosky v. State, 725 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (citing 2 P. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 183, at 387 (1984)).

2015See Tex. Penal Code § 8.03(b) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution....); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 153 (Tex. Crim.App.1990) (stating that every affirmative defense requires that the defendant acknowledge he committed the otherwise illegal conduct, and noting that Penal Code section 8.03 is an affirmative defense).

2015See Tex. Penal Code § 8.03(b) (“It is an affirmative defense to prosecution . . . .); Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146, 153 (Tex. Crim.

2015See Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 401-02 .

2015See Juarez, 308 S.W.3d at 401–02.

2015According to the State, knowledge of the law is not relevant to a prosecution for illegal voting, because all the State is required to -prove is that the Residence Inn was not Jenkin’s “domicile, [or] fixed place of habitation, to which he intended to return after a temporary absence.” See id. § 1.015(a); Medrano, 421 S.W.3d at 885 (holding that the State was not required to prove voter subjectively knew she was not eligible to vote, only that she voted in an election when she knew she was not a resident of the precinct for which she was voting).

2015See Comet, 359 S.W.3d at 224-25 (holding that statutory “medical-care defense” was subject to the confession and avoidance doctrine because it “does not negate any element of the offense, including culpable intent; it only excuses what would otherwise constitute criminal conduct”) (quoting Shaw, 243 S.W.3d at 659 ).

2015See Cornet, 359 S.W.3d at 224–25 (holding that statutory “medical-care defense” was subject to the confession and avoidance doctrine because it “does not negate any element of the offense, including culpable intent; it only excuses what would otherwise constitute criminal conduct”) (quoting Shaw, 243 S.W.2d at 659).

2014Instead, Holmes asks us to apply an exception to the mistake-of-law rule, relying upon this Court’s opinion in 1st Coppell Bank v. Smith, 742 S.W.2d 454 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (disapproved in part, Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc., 52 S.W.3d 671, 678 (Tex.2000)).

2010See Austin v. State , 541 S.W.2d 162, 166 (Tex. Crim.