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19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1937–2023 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State Ex Rel. Eggreen2 sentences2018E.G., 249 S.W.3d at 731. 3 testimony from the physician at the hearing, cannot produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established. 2017We explained that “a conclusory statement in the application, without any testimony from a physician at the hearing, cannot produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. | 5 | 9 |
Rowntree v. Hunsuckergreen2 sentences2013Id. § 74.051(c) (Vernon 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree, 833 S.W.2d at 108 . 2011Id. § 74.051(c) (West 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex.1992). 3 *705 We measure the limitations period from (1) the date that the breach or tort occurred, (2) the last date of a course of treatment for a particular condition, or (3) the last date of a hospitalization for which a claim is made. | 2 | 2 |
Rubalcaba v. Kaestnergreen2 sentences2013Id. § 74.051(c) (Vernon 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree, 833 S.W.2d at 108 . 2011Id. § 74.051(c) (West 2005); Rubalcaba v. Kaestner, 981 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); see Rowntree v. Hunsucker, 833 S.W.2d 103, 108 (Tex.1992). 3 *705 We measure the limitations period from (1) the date that the breach or tort occurred, (2) the last date of a course of treatment for a particular condition, or (3) the last date of a hospitalization for which a claim is made. | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Eegreen2 sentences2008Compare In re E.E., 224 S.W.3d at 794 . 2008Compare In re E.E., 224 S.W.3d 791, 794 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (stating that the evidence required to order temporary mental health services includes expert testimony and evidence of the behavior of the proposed patient that provides the factual basis for the expert opinion.) This is the State’s burden of proof. | 2 | 2 |
Aleman v. Tex. Med. Bd.green1 sentence2021Violating that law, according to the Board, constituted “unprofessional or dishonorable conduct that is likely to deceive or defraud the public” under Section 164.052(a)(5) because Section 164.053(a)(1) deems any state-law violation by a physician to be a violation of Section 164.052(a)(5) “if the act is connected with the physician’s practice of medicine.” Id. at 29, 33–34. | 1 | 1 |
Kaster v. Woodsongreen1 sentence1961In Raster v. Woodson, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 981, 982 (wr. ref.), the court said: “[2,3] In the case of Floyd v. Michie [Tex.Civ.App.], 11 S.W.2d 657 , this court held as follows [page 658] : ‘The law entertains in favor of a physician the presumption that he has discharged his full duty, and to defeat this presumption the law exacts affirmative proof of breach of duty coupled with affirmative proof that *779 such breach of duty resulted in injury. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Floyd v. Michie
green
2 sentences1961In Raster v. Woodson, Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 981, 982 (wr. ref.), the court said: “[2,3] In the case of Floyd v. Michie [Tex.Civ.App.], 11 S.W.2d 657 , this court held as follows [page 658] : ‘The law entertains in favor of a physician the presumption that he has discharged his full duty, and to defeat this presumption the law exacts affirmative proof of breach of duty coupled with affirmative proof that *779 such breach of duty resulted in injury. 1938In the case of Floyd v. Michie,. 11 S.W.2d 657 , this court held as follows, [page 658] : “The law entertains in favor-of a physician the presumption that he has. discharged his full duty, and to defeat, this presumption the law exacts affirmative-proof of breach of duty coupled with affirmative proof that such breach of duty resulted in injury. | 3 | 1937–1961 |
Garcia v. Gomez
green
1 sentence2015The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees and held that there was “no evidence of the reasonable fees incurred by the physician in defense of the claim.” Garcia, 319 S.W.3d at 640 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Garcia v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2010The court of appeals affirmed, concluding the trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to award attorney’s fees because the record contained no evidence of the reasonable fees incurred by the physician in defense of the claim. 286 S.W.3d 445, 449 . 2010The court of appeals affirmed, concluding the trial court had not abused its discretion in failing to award attorney's fees because the record contained no evidence of the reasonable fees incurred by the physician in defense of the claim. 286 S.W.3d 445, 449 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Barker v. Heaney
green
1 sentence1937There not only is no expert medical testimony in the record, there is no evidence tending to show that appellant was injured because of appellee’s treatment, or his failure to properly treat appellant.” In Barker v. Heaney (Tex.Civ.App.) 82 S.W.(2d) 417, 420 , writ dismissed, the court said: “We conclude that there is no expert medical testimony to establish that Barker’s death was proximately caused by the negligence or want of proper care and skill on the part of defendants,- and therefore sustain defendants’ contention that the trial judge should have instructíd a verdict in favor of defend | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.