Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1934–2024 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Goodspeed v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Cf. Goodspeed v. State , 187 S.W.3d 390, 392-93 (Tex. Crim. 2008Cf. Goodspeed v. State, 187 S.W.3d 390 , 392–93 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 4 |
Simpson, Mark Twaingreen2 sentences2024Taking the Simpson factors together, we cannot say that Andrade’s fifty-year and seventy-five-year sentences give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.12 See 488 S.W.3d at 323 ; White v. State, 495 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. Crim. 2024Taking the Simpson factors together, we cannot say that Andrade’s fifty-year and seventy-five-year sentences give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.12 See 488 S.W.3d at 323 ; White v. State, 495 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Herndongreen2 sentences2015See Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909 ; Stewart, 282 S.W.3d at 738 . 2015See Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909 ; Stewart, 282 S.W.3d at 738 . | 2 | 2 |
Jenkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2024App. 1973) (holding that sixty-year sentence for selling marijuana was not cruel and unusual); cf. Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) 12 Because Andrade’s disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold test, we need not compare his sentences to others for the same offenses in Texas and elsewhere. 2024App. 1973) (holding that sixty-year sentence for selling marijuana was not cruel and unusual); cf. Jenkins v. State, 870 S.W.2d 626, 631 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d) 12 Because Andrade’s disproportionality argument does not pass the threshold test, we need not compare his sentences to others for the same offenses in Texas and elsewhere. | 1 | 1 |
White v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Taking the Simpson factors together, we cannot say that Andrade’s fifty-year and seventy-five-year sentences give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.12 See 488 S.W.3d at 323 ; White v. State, 495 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. Crim. 2024Taking the Simpson factors together, we cannot say that Andrade’s fifty-year and seventy-five-year sentences give rise to an inference of gross disproportionality.12 See 488 S.W.3d at 323 ; White v. State, 495 S.W.2d 903, 905 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Zemen v. Stategreen1 sentence2019It merely states, “In finding the testimony relevant, the trial court failed to recognize that [Bethany’s] testimony and thus her credibility dealt with a collaterally alleged extraneous offense.” Under Article 38.37, such testimony about Simpson’s extraneous offense was relevant. 10 See Reyes v. State, 267 S.W.3d 268, 274 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that a general relevance objection (like the one lodged by Simpson at trial) is insufficient to preserve a complaint that the purported testimony constitutes bolstering); Zemen v. State, 912 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. App.—Hous | 1 | 1 |
Reyes v. Stategreen1 sentence2019It merely states, “In finding the testimony relevant, the trial court failed to recognize that [Bethany’s] testimony and thus her credibility dealt with a collaterally alleged extraneous offense.” Under Article 38.37, such testimony about Simpson’s extraneous offense was relevant. 10 See Reyes v. State, 267 S.W.3d 268, 274 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2008, pet. ref’d) (holding that a general relevance objection (like the one lodged by Simpson at trial) is insufficient to preserve a complaint that the purported testimony constitutes bolstering); Zemen v. State, 912 S.W.2d 363, 366 (Tex. App.—Hous | 1 | 1 |
Dickey v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Dickey , 96 S.W.3d at 613 (officer who testified he smelled odor of raw marijuana when he opened appellant’s car door had probable cause to search vehicle); see Williams v. State , No. 14-01-01250-CR, 2002 WL 31426293 , at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 10, 2002, no pet.) (trial court did not err in denying motion to suppress PCP found in appellant’s car when officer searched car based on odor of marijuana even though no marijuana was found in vehicle). | 1 | 1 |
Montalvo v. Rio National Bankgreen1 sentence1996Bank, 885 S.W.2d 235, 237 (TexApp.— Corpus Christi 1994, no writ), was too late to reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2015See Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909 ; Stewart, 282 S.W.3d at 738 . 2015See Herndon, 215 S.W.3d at 909 ; Stewart, 282 S.W.3d at 738 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Prystash v. State
green
2 sentences2011The court of criminal appeals has 8 recognized that “plea bargaining is essential to the administration of justice in America.” Prystash, 3 S.W.3d at 528 . 2011The court of criminal appeals has recognized that "plea bargaining is essential to the administration of justice in America." Prystash , 3 S.W.3d at 528 . | 2 | 2011–2011 |
Morales v. State
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Simpson v. State
green
1 sentence1997Id. *900 In applying the three Simpson factors for determining whether probationary conditions are valid to a determination of whether Potter's questions were valid, we note that Potter's questions regarding appellant's religious activities, although probably poorly phrased, were directly related to the crime of sexual assault, were directly related to criminal conduct, were designed to prohibit conduct that was reasonably related to future episodes of sexual assault, and served the statutory ends of probation that appellant successfully complete his probation without committing further acts o | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Akers v. Simpson
neutral
1 sentence1969The trial court granted Simpson’s motion for summary judgment and this was affirmed by the Court of Civil Appeals. 437 S.W.2d 429 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
State of Texas v. Epperson
green
2 sentences1934State v. Epperson, 121 Tex. 80 , 42 S.W.(2d) 228 ; Cavers v. Sioux Oil & Ref. 1934State v. Epperson, 121 Tex. 80 , 42 S.W.(2d) 228 ; Cavers v. Sioux Oil & Ref. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.