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19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1925–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Robert Amersongreen2 sentences2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest 2008The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.”); see generally United States v. Amerson, 185 F.3d 676, 691 (7th Cir.1999) (Posner, C.J., dissenting) (discussing rationale for requiring corroboration). . | 4 | 4 |
Montgomery Independent School District v. Davisgreen2 sentences2015The 26 Supreme Court has held that “[a]n independent fact finder is integral to the structure of the hearing-examiner process.” Mid-South Pavers, 246 S.W.3d at 723 (citing Montgomery I.S.D. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 564 ). 2015The Supreme Court rejects attempts, like those exhibited here, to work around the neutral and has held that “[a]n independent fact finder is integral to the structure of the hearing-examiner process.” Mid-South Pavers, 246 S.W.3d at 723 (citing Montgomery I.S.D. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d at 564 ). | 3 | 9 |
Lester v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded 2008REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 940 (4th ed. 1986) ("Whenever a statement against interest is offered, it is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against his interest at the time he made it."). [27] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible | 3 | 4 |
Davis v. Stategreen2 sentences2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded 2008REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 940 (4th ed. 1986) ("Whenever a statement against interest is offered, it is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against his interest at the time he made it."). [27] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible | 1 | 2 |
Metro Temps, Inc. v. Texas Workers' Compensation Insurance Facilitygreen1 sentence2006Facility, 949 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no writ). 8 The Division construes Texas Mutual as confirming its “exclusive jurisdiction to determine the dates of workers’ compensation coverage.” The present dispute implicates this jurisdiction, the Division urges, due to the structure of the standard form workers’ compensation and employers liability policy. | 1 | 1 |
FM Properties Operating Co. v. City of Austingreen1 sentence2004Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872-73 (Tex. 2000); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995). 5 While subsection (i) of rule 166a does not expressly state that the time provisions of subsection (c) apply to no-evidence motions, we believe that their application is implied by the structure of the rule as a whole. | 1 | 1 |
Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doegreen1 sentence2004Operating Co. v. City of Austin, 22 S.W.3d 868, 872-73 (Tex. 2000); Star-Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995). 5 While subsection (i) of rule 166a does not expressly state that the time provisions of subsection (c) apply to no-evidence motions, we believe that their application is implied by the structure of the rule as a whole. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
TIG Insurance Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2006In its third point, Summit alleges that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment with respect to Article 21.55 of the Texas Insurance Code. 3 Specifically, it contends that it is entitled to an eighteen percent penalty and reasonable attorneys’ fees under the statute because the Insurers wrongfully refused and delayed payment of defense cost. *833 In TIG Insurance Co. v. Dallas Basketball, Ltd., 129 S.W.3d 232 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied), after a detailed analysis of article 21.55, we concluded that any attempt to apply the statute’s structure to a defense claim 2006Any attempt to apply the statute’s structure to a claim for a defense is unworkable and, based on the *107 language of the statute, clearly unintended by the legislature.” Id. at 239 . | 3 | 2005–2006 |
Cunningham v. State
green
1 sentence2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Walter v. State
green
2 sentences2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest 2015The requirement of corroboration is therefore construed in such a manner as to effectuate its purpose of circumventing fabrication.135 While there is no definitive test to determine whether sufficient corroborating circumstances exist, when analyzing the sufficiency of corroborating circumstances, a number of factors are relevant: (1) whether the guilt of the declarant is inconsistent with the guilt of the defendant; (2) whether 132 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 . 133 Cunningham, 877 S.W.2d at 313 . 134 Davis, 872 S.W.2d at 748–49 (internal quotations omitted). 135 Walter, 267 S.W.3d at 891 ; Lest | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bingham v. State
green
2 sentences2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded 2008REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 940 (4th ed. 1986) ("Whenever a statement against interest is offered, it is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against his interest at the time he made it."). [27] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dewberry v. State
green
2 sentences2008Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to 'clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible the trustworthiness of the statement so as to avoid the admissibility of a fabrication.”); Lester v. State, 120 S.W.3d 897, 901 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2003, no pet.) ("The structure of the rule and its wording demonstrate the obvious suspicion with which the drafters of the rule regarded 2008REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL at 940 (4th ed. 1986) ("Whenever a statement against interest is offered, it is the job of the Trial Judge to determine whether the declarant was under the impression that the statement was against his interest at the time he made it."). [27] Dewberry, 4 S.W.3d at 751 ; Bingham, 987 S.W.2d at 57 ; Davis v. State, 872 S.W.2d 743, 748-49 (Tex.Crim.App. 1994) ("The corroborating circumstances must be sufficiently convincing to `clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.' The focus of this inquiry is on verifying to the greatest extent possible | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Houston, E. & W. T. Ry. Co. v. Barron
neutral
1 sentence1925App.) 235 S. W. 335 .” “The peril of the injured party is the real *208 foundation upon which the structure of this doctrine rests. | 1 | 1925–1925 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.