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19 Texas opinions name it 2 courts 1976–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Plessinger v. Stategreen2 sentences2024The Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “[t]he object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tex. Crim. 2002App. 1995) ("The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice."); Plessinger v. State , 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Crim. | 4 | 11 |
Cole v. Stategreen2 sentences2014“The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. 2011“The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment [or other charging instrument] is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Cole v. State, 611 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Gollihar v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Id.; see Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 244-45 (Tex.Crim. 2007Id.; see Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 244-45 (Tex.Crim.App.2001) (holding that a hypothetically correct jury charge, as used to measure sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction, need not incorporate allegations that give rise to immaterial variances between indictment and proof). | 2 | 2 |
Stevens v. Stategreen2 sentences2001“The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such a variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Stevens v. State, 891 S.W.2d 649, 650 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) citing Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). 6 In his brief, Appellant makes no claim that he was prejudiced or surprised in any way by the variance in the names. 1999“The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment is to avoid surprise, and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the party to his prejudice.” Id., quoting Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 , (Tex.Crim.App.1976). | 1 | 2 |
Freda v. Stategreen1 sentence2024App. 1976) (citation omitted); see Freda v. State, 704 S.W.2d 41 , 42–43 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Worsham v. State
green
2 sentences1982We further note that Michael Williams, an Amarillo police officer, testified that he was a part-time employee at the store where the offense occurred and in the course of his testimony the store was referred to as “Furr’s Foods,” “Furr Food Stores,” “Furr’s No. 51” and “Store No. 51.” In Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Cr.App.), it was stated: “The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment [and the proof] is to avoid surprise, Worsham v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.R. 253 , 120 S.W. 439 (1909), and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the p 1982We further note that Michael Williams, an Amarillo police officer, testified that he was a part-time employee at the store where the offense occurred and in the course of his testimony the store was referred to as “Furr’s Foods,” “Furr Food Stores,” “Furr’s No. 51” and “Store No. 51.” In Plessinger v. State, 536 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.Cr.App.), it was stated: “The object of the doctrine of variance between allegations of an indictment [and the proof] is to avoid surprise, Worsham v. State, 56 Tex.Cr.R. 253 , 120 S.W. 439 (1909), and for such variance to be material it must be such as to mislead the p | 4 | 1976–1982 |
Castro v. State
green
2 sentences1982Castro v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 13 , 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933), Thurmon v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 279 , 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” In Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.), the owner of the stolen postage was alleged in the indictment to have been Ken Bercaw. 1982Castro v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 13 , 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933), Thurmon v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 279 , 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” In Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.), the owner of the stolen postage was alleged in the indictment to have been Ken Bercaw. | 4 | 1976–1982 |
Gilliam v. State
neutral
2 sentences1982Castro v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 13 , 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933), Thurmon v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 279 , 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” In Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.), the owner of the stolen postage was alleged in the indictment to have been Ken Bercaw. 1981Castro v. State [ 124 Tex.Cr. 13 ], 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933); Thurmon v. State [ 145 Tex.Cr. 279 ], 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” Reference in Plessinger was- also made to McGill v. United States, 10 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1926), wherein the Court of Appeals held that a variance in the cause numbers between the allegation of the prior offense and the proof thereof was not a fatal variance. | 4 | 1976–1982 |
Thurmon v. State
neutral
2 sentences1982Castro v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 13 , 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933), Thurmon v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 279 , 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” In Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.), the owner of the stolen postage was alleged in the indictment to have been Ken Bercaw. 1981Castro v. State [ 124 Tex.Cr. 13 ], 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933); Thurmon v. State [ 145 Tex.Cr. 279 ], 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” Reference in Plessinger was- also made to McGill v. United States, 10 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1926), wherein the Court of Appeals held that a variance in the cause numbers between the allegation of the prior offense and the proof thereof was not a fatal variance. | 4 | 1976–1982 |
Baity v. State
green
2 sentences2001The Plessinger court cited Bailey v. State , 455 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. Crim. 1984The defendant’s indictment in Baity v. State, 455 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) alleged that the conviction for the prior offense occurred in the “89th District Court.” The Court found no problem with proof that showed it had occurred in the “30th District Court.” The Court of Criminal Appeals’ position on variances and enhancement allegations was perhaps best summarized in Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), wherein it stated: “It appears that in alleging prior convictions for enhancement of punishment the trend is toward a relaxation of the former rigid rules.” To this, I agr | 2 | 1984–2001 |
Dietz v. State
green
1 sentence2002App. 1976) (holding variance in style of case pleaded for enhancement not material where defendant not surprised or misled to his prejudice). 4 In Dietz v. State, 62 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, pet. filed), this Court analyzed the materiality requirement of variance pursuant to the test set out in Gollihar: whether the indictment, as written, informed the defendant of the charge against him sufficiently to allow him to prepare an adequate defense at trial, and whether prosecution under the indictment would subject the defendant to the risk of being prosecuted later for the same crime. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences1984The defendant’s indictment in Baity v. State, 455 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) alleged that the conviction for the prior offense occurred in the “89th District Court.” The Court found no problem with proof that showed it had occurred in the “30th District Court.” The Court of Criminal Appeals’ position on variances and enhancement allegations was perhaps best summarized in Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), wherein it stated: “It appears that in alleging prior convictions for enhancement of punishment the trend is toward a relaxation of the former rigid rules.” To this, I agr 1984The defendant's indictment in Baity v. State, 455 S.W.2d 305 (Tex.Crim.App.1970) alleged that the conviction for the prior offense occurred in the "89th District Court." The Court found no problem with proof that showed it had occurred in the "30th District Court." The Court of Criminal Appeals' position on variances and enhancement allegations was perhaps best summarized in Hall v. State, 619 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Crim.App.1980), wherein it stated: "It appears that in alleging prior convictions for enhancement of punishment the trend is toward a relaxation of the former rigid rules." To this, I agr | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Carrillo v. State
green
1 sentence1982Castro v. State, 124 Tex.Cr.R. 13 , 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933), Thurmon v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 279 , 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” In Carrillo v. State, 591 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.Cr.App.), the owner of the stolen postage was alleged in the indictment to have been Ken Bercaw. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
McGill v. United States
green
2 sentences1981Castro v. State [ 124 Tex.Cr. 13 ], 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933); Thurmon v. State [ 145 Tex.Cr. 279 ], 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942).” Reference in Plessinger was- also made to McGill v. United States, 10 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1926), wherein the Court of Appeals held that a variance in the cause numbers between the allegation of the prior offense and the proof thereof was not a fatal variance. 1981Castro v. State [ 124 Tex.Cr. 13 ], 60 S.W.2d 211 (1933); Thurmon v. State [ 145 Tex.Cr. 279 ], 167 S.W.2d 528 (1942)." Reference in Plessinger was also made to McGill v. United States, 10 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1926), wherein the Court of Appeals held that a variance in the cause numbers between the allegation of the prior offense and the proof thereof was not a fatal variance. | 1 | 1981–1981 |