Clark test in Washington

2016Probation conditions satisfy the Clark test if "'the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for permissible purposes, and ... the conditions are reasonably related to the purposes."' Id. (quoting United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988)).

2016Probation conditions satisfy the Clark test if "'the sentencing judge imposed the conditions for permissible purposes, and ... the conditions are reasonably related to the purposes."' Id. (quoting United States v. Terrigno, 838 F.2d 371, 374 (9th Cir. 1988)).

2013State v. Clark, 167 Wn.

2013State v. Clark, 167 Wn.

2010Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 540 , 114 P.3d 1182 . ¶ 15 Smith Bunday contends that the rationale articulated by Judge Rogers shows that he denied Clark's motion to unseal after applying *241 the Ishikawa factors.

2010Rufer, 154 Wn.2d at 540 . ¶15 Smith Bunday contends that the rationale articulated by Judge Rogers shows that he denied Clark’s motion to unseal after applying the Ishikawa factors.

2010RAP 2.5(a); Ryder v. Port of Seattle, 50 Wash.App. 144, 150 , 748 P.2d 243 (1987) (An issue, theory, or argument not presented to the trial court will not be considered on appeal.).

2010RAP 2.5(a); Ryder v. Port of Seattle, 50 Wn.

2006The prosecutor asked R.T. directly if Price had touched her (other than hugging), and she asked R.T. to tell the jury what she had said to her mother and to Detective Bergt. ¶30 The Clark test also requires that the defendant have an opportunity for full cross-examination. “ ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” ’ ” Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20 )).

2006The prosecutor asked R.T. directly if Price had touched her (other than hugging), and she asked R.T. to tell the jury what she had said to her mother and to Detective Bergt. ¶30 The Clark test also requires that the defendant have an opportunity for full cross-examination. “ ‘[T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees only “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” ’ ” Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original) (quoting Stincer, 482 U.S. at 739 (quoting Fensterer, 474 U.S. at 20 )).

2026The reviewing court held that the trial court erred in failing to consider Clark’s claim of irregularity, because the court “may well have refused to [grant the default judgment] . . . had he seen that the signature upon which the judgment was sought had been crossed off—a fact which the [lessors] knew when they brought suit.” Id. at 653 .

2026Similarly, in Wilson v. Henkle, the court upheld an order vacating an ex parte judgment based on a writ of garnishment, reasoning that had the commissioner been informed that the back of the answer to the writ reflected a dispute over ownership of the funds, he would not have signed the judgment. 45 Wn.

2025App. 2d 51 , 469 P.3d 322 (2020), abrogated on other grounds by State v. J.H.-M., ___ Wn.3d ___, 566 P.3d 847 (2025).

2025This argument potentially supports Clark’s claim that the convictions are the same in fact, but does not address whether they are the same in law, since in Villanueva- 18 No. 86217-1-I/19 Gonzalez, the two assault statutes at issue were “plainly the same in law.” 180 Wn.2d at 981-82 .

2025Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court unduly limited the scope of Clark’s counsel’s closing argument as in State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 773 , 161 P.3d 361 (2007), on which Clark relies. 10 No. 86217-1-I/11 Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704 , 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

2025Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court unduly limited the scope of Clark’s counsel’s closing argument as in State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 773 , 161 P.3d 361 (2007), on which Clark relies. 10 No. 86217-1-I/11 Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704 , 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

2025Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court unduly limited the scope of Clark’s counsel’s closing argument as in State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 773 , 161 P.3d 361 (2007), on which Clark relies. 10 No. 86217-1-I/11 Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704 , 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

2025Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court unduly limited the scope of Clark’s counsel’s closing argument as in State v. Frost, 160 Wn.2d 765, 773 , 161 P.3d 361 (2007), on which Clark relies. 10 No. 86217-1-I/11 Glasmann, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704 , 286 P.3d 673 (2012).

2024“Due process, the appearance of fairness doctrine and Canon [2.11] of the Code of Judicial Conduct . . . require a judge to disqualify himself if he is biased against a party or his impartiality may reasonably be questioned.” State v. Dominguez, 81 Wn.

2023Hampton, 184 Wn.2d at 662 .

2023Hampton recognized Gonzalez- Lopez but explained that nothing in Gonzalez-Lopez explained how to determine whether the right to counsel of choice was violated. 184 Wn.2d at 666-68 . 8 No. 56565-0-II Because the trial court’s decision to deny Clark’s motion to substitute counsel was not based on untenable grounds or reasons and it was not manifestly unreasonable, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

2021Diaz, 175 Wn.2d at 462 ; State v. Arredondo, 188 Wn.2d 244 , 256, 394 P.3d 348 (2017).

2021Therefore, under Bander, Clark’s defense counsel’s decision not to question SV on her medical history was a legitimate trial strategy and Clark’s ineffective assistance claim fails.13 Bander, 150 Wn.

2018The trial court ruled that Officer Clark’s stop of the Durango was a lawful Terry stop to further investigate the shooting. 4 A person is guilty of first degree assault if “with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . [a]ssaults another with a firearm or any deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). 5 A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm if after having previously been convicted of a serious offense, that person “owns, has in his or her possession, or has in his or her control any firearm.” RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). 6 CrR 3.6 allows a criminal defendant to file a motion to suppress ph

2018The trial court ruled that Officer Clark’s stop of the Durango was a lawful Terry stop to further investigate the shooting. 4 A person is guilty of first degree assault if “with intent to inflict great bodily harm . . . [a]ssaults another with a firearm or any deadly weapon.” RCW 9A.36.011(1)(a). 5 A person is guilty of unlawful possession of a firearm if after having previously been convicted of a serious offense, that person “owns, has in his or her possession, or has in his or her control any firearm.” RCW 9.41.040(1)(a). 6 CrR 3.6 allows a criminal defendant to file a motion to suppress ph

2010Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 540 , 114 P.3d 1182 . ¶ 15 Smith Bunday contends that the rationale articulated by Judge Rogers shows that he denied Clark's motion to unseal after applying *241 the Ishikawa factors.

2010The stipulated protective order entered in December 2007 allowed the parties to designate documents as "Confidential" and required the filing of such documents under seal, a procedure discussed with approval in Rufer, 154 Wash.2d at 550 , 114 P.3d 1182 .

2006Id. at 17, 84 P.3d 859 .

2006Id. at 17, 84 P.3d 859 .

2004Id. at 159, 985 P.2d 377 . [8] The dissent argues that R.G. fails the second element of the Clark test because she was asked about the events, but R.G.'s answers lacked content.

2004Id. at 159, 985 P.2d 377 . [8] The dissent argues that R.G. fails the second element of the Clark test because she was asked about the events, but R.G.'s answers lacked content.

1977App. 171 , 528 P.2d 1003 (1974) and State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976), it is held that constitutional "due process" and "equal protection" do not require "an opportunity to be heard at the prosecutor's meeting where the decision to file a habitual criminal information is made" (State v. Anderson, supra at 174), Clark's challenge cannot be summarily dismissed.

1977App. 171 , 528 P.2d 1003 (1974) and State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976), it is held that constitutional "due process" and "equal protection" do not require "an opportunity to be heard at the prosecutor's meeting where the decision to file a habitual criminal information is made" (State v. Anderson, supra at 174), Clark's challenge cannot be summarily dismissed.

1977App. 171 , 528 P.2d 1003 (1974) and State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976), it is held that constitutional "due process" and "equal protection" do not require "an opportunity to be heard at the prosecutor's meeting where the decision to file a habitual criminal information is made" (State v. Anderson, supra at 174), Clark's challenge cannot be summarily dismissed.