Clark factors in Mississippi

2010“It is a well-settled rule in this State that a finding of mistrial is reserved for those instances where the trial court cannot take any action which would correct improper occurrences inside or outside the courtroom.” Madere v. State, 794 So.2d 200, 214 (Miss.2001).

2008“It is a well-settled rule in this State that a finding of mistrial is reserved for those instances where the trial court cannot take any action which would correct improper occurrences inside or outside the courtroom.” Madere v. State, 794 So. 2d 200, 214 (Miss. 2001).

2006In Wolfe v. State, 743 So.2d 380, 387 (Miss.1999), this Court reiterated the longstanding rule in Mississippi that assault is not a lesser-included offense of murder.

2006In Wolfe v. State, 743 So.2d 380, 387 (Miss.1999), this Court reiterated the longstanding rule in Mississippi that assault is not a lesser-included offense of murder.

1997See Luther McGill v. Bradley, 674 So.2d 11 (Miss. 1996); Quick Change Oil and Lube, Inc., supra ; Northern Electric Co. v. Phillips, 660 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1995); Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143 (Miss. 1994); W.J.

1997See Luther McGill v. Bradley, 674 So.2d 11 (Miss. 1996); Quick Change Oil and Lube, Inc., supra ; Northern Electric Co. v. Phillips, 660 So.2d 1278 (Miss. 1995); Richardson v. APAC-Mississippi, Inc., 631 So.2d 143 (Miss. 1994); W.J.

1997We will not reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial "unless we are convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Morgan v. State, 681 So.2d 82, 93 (Miss. 1996); Johnson, 642 So.2d at 928 .

1992We will not reverse the denial of a motion for a new trial "unless we are convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Morgan v. State, 681 So. 2d 82, 93 (Miss. 1996); Johnson, 642 So. 2d at 928 .

2025We find here that Clark’s defense was not “compromised” by the omission of Alvaronda’s name.2 Again, “the primary purpose of an indictment is to notify an accused of the charges against him [and] to allow him to prepare an adequate defense.” Townsend, 188 So. 3d at 620 (¶13) (quoting Brown, 944 So. 2d at 106 (¶8)).

2025We find here that Clark’s defense was not “compromised” by the omission of Alvaronda’s name.2 Again, “the primary purpose of an indictment is to notify an accused of the charges against him [and] to allow him to prepare an adequate defense.” Townsend, 188 So. 3d at 620 (¶13) (quoting Brown, 944 So. 2d at 106 (¶8)).

2024Ct. App. 2022) (citing Walker v. State, 197 So. 3d 914, 919 (¶25) (Miss. 2 Clark’s brief simply relayed the four assignments of error without being in the proper form or providing any authority or argument whatsoever as to each assignment. 6 Ct. App. 2016)).

2024The rule “does not simply require a party to mention authority; the authority must be used to develop the argument in a meaningful way.” Id.

2022Our standard of review when considering the trial court’s decision on jury instructions is as follows: “It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (Miss. 2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (internal citations omitted)).

2022Our standard of review when considering the trial court’s decision on jury instructions is as follows: “It is well settled that jury instructions generally are within the discretion of the trial court, so the standard of review for the denial of jury instructions is abuse of discretion.” Newell v. State, 49 So. 3d 66, 73 (Miss. 2010) (citing Davis v. State, 18 So. 3d 842, 847 (Miss. 2009) (internal citations omitted)).

2017“In order to prevail on an ineffeetive-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Dartez v. State, 177 So.3d 420, 423 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2015) (citing Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss. 1998) (applying the two-pronged test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984))).

2017“We review denials of motions for change of venue for abuse of discretion.” Stewart v. State, 29 So.3d 12, 14 (¶ 6) (Miss.

2017These factors include: (1) ‘‘[c]apital cases based on considerations of a heightened standard of review”—in other words, death-penalty cases; (2) “[c]rowds threatening violence toward the accused”; and (3) "[a]n inordinate amount of media coverage.” White, 495 So.2d at 1349 ; see also King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 886 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2001).

2017“In order to prevail on an ineffeetive-assistance-of-counsel claim, a defendant must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency was so substantial as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial.” Dartez v. State, 177 So.3d 420, 423 (¶ 19) (Miss. 2015) (citing Holly v. State, 716 So.2d 979, 989 (Miss. 1998) (applying the two-pronged test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984))).

2017Further, none of the factors set forth by the supreme court in White v. State, 495 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Miss. 1986), are present, which would render, the presumption for a change of venue irrebutable. 7 We therefore find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Clark’s motion for change of venue. 10.

2017These factors include: (1) ‘‘[c]apital cases based on considerations of a heightened standard of review”—in other words, death-penalty cases; (2) “[c]rowds threatening violence toward the accused”; and (3) "[a]n inordinate amount of media coverage.” White, 495 So.2d at 1349 ; see also King v. State, 784 So.2d 884, 886 (¶ 5) (Miss. 2001).

1987Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Miss. 1987) (not yet reported); Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of Jackson, 493 So.2d 955, 961 (Miss. 1986); Adams v. Green, 474 So.2d 577, 582 (Miss. 1985); Rule 59, Miss.R.Civ.P.

1987Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Miss. 1987) (not yet reported); Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of Jackson, 493 So.2d 955, 961 (Miss. 1986); Adams v. Green, 474 So.2d 577, 582 (Miss. 1985); Rule 59, Miss.R.Civ.P.

1987Thornhill v. Wilson, 504 So.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Miss. 1987) (not yet reported); Maryland Casualty Co. v. City of Jackson, 493 So.2d 955, 961 (Miss. 1986); Adams v. Green, 474 So.2d 577, 582 (Miss. 1985); Rule 59, Miss.R.Civ.P.