Clark claim in Texas

2009This Court rejected that argument, holding instead that, under Texas's unclaimed property statute, property is held for the benefit of the State and that "the State's use of unclaimed property and retention of any interest earned before the owner asserts a claim is not an unconstitutional taking." Clark , 184 S.W.3d at 915 (emphasis added).

2009This Court rejected that argument, holding instead that, under Texas’s unclaimed property statute, property is held for the benefit of the State and that “the State’s use of unclaimed property and retention of any interest earned before the owner asserts a claim is not an unconstitutional taking.” Clark, 184 S.W.3d at 915 (emphasis added).

2009Clark's claim was largely premised on his assertion that the funds in the Comptroller's possession were held in trust for the owner until they were claimed, analogizing to cases discussing an owner's right to interest earned on interpleader funds and IOLTA accounts, see Phillips v. Washington Legal Found. , 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) ; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).

2009Clark’s claim was largely premised on his assertion that the funds in the Comptroller’s possession were held in trust for the owner until they were claimed, analogizing to cases discussing an owner’s right to interest earned on interpleader funds and IOLTA accounts, see Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).

2009Clark's claim was largely premised on his assertion that the funds in the Comptroller's possession were held in trust for the owner until they were claimed, analogizing to cases discussing an owner's right to interest earned on interpleader funds and IOLTA accounts, see Phillips v. Washington Legal Found. , 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) ; Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith , 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).

2009Clark’s claim was largely premised on his assertion that the funds in the Comptroller’s possession were held in trust for the owner until they were claimed, analogizing to cases discussing an owner’s right to interest earned on interpleader funds and IOLTA accounts, see Phillips v. Washington Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998); Webb’s Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 164-65 (1980).

2006Clark does not contest a State’s power to deem private property abandoned and allow that property to escheat to the State. 7 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 , 102 S.Ct. 781 , 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 , 71 S.Ct. 822 , 95 L.Ed. 1078 (1951).

2006Clark does not contest a State’s power to deem private property abandoned and allow that property to escheat to the State. 7 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 , 102 S.Ct. 781 , 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 , 71 S.Ct. 822 , 95 L.Ed. 1078 (1951).

2006Clark does not contest a State’s power to deem private property abandoned and allow that property to escheat to the State. 7 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 , 102 S.Ct. 781 , 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 , 71 S.Ct. 822 , 95 L.Ed. 1078 (1951).

2006Clark does not contest a State’s power to deem private property abandoned and allow that property to escheat to the State. 7 See Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 530 , 102 S.Ct. 781 , 70 L.Ed.2d 738 (1982); Standard Oil Co. v. New Jersey, 341 U.S. 428, 436 , 71 S.Ct. 822 , 95 L.Ed. 1078 (1951).

2018See Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (outlining elements of a hostile-work-environment claim).

2018See Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C. , 433 F.3d 428 , 434 (5th Cir. 2005) (outlining elements of a hostile-work-environment claim).

2010See Moreno, 201 S.W.3d at 688 .

2010See Moreno , 201 S.W.3d at 688 .

2026See Anthony, 531 S.W.3d at 743 .

2022Because Loyd III’s interest in the property gained through his father’s will was no more than an expectancy, however, we need not 30 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020). 31 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956). 32 Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 745–46 (analyzing the scope of an assignment of presently owned overriding mineral interest); Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 673–74 (determining the effect of a subsequent conveyance on previously executed mineral leases). 33 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2017). 34 Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 12 decide whether Clark applies to a fully vested, inde

2022Because Loyd III’s interest in the property gained through his father’s will was no more than an expectancy, however, we need not 30 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020). 31 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956). 32 Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 745–46 (analyzing the scope of an assignment of presently owned overriding mineral interest); Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 673–74 (determining the effect of a subsequent conveyance on previously executed mineral leases). 33 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2017). 34 Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 12 decide whether Clark applies to a fully vested, inde

2022Because Loyd III’s interest in the property gained through his father’s will was no more than an expectancy, however, we need not 30 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020). 31 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956). 32 Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 745–46 (analyzing the scope of an assignment of presently owned overriding mineral interest); Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 673–74 (determining the effect of a subsequent conveyance on previously executed mineral leases). 33 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2017). 34 Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 12 decide whether Clark applies to a fully vested, inde

2022Because Loyd III’s interest in the property gained through his father’s will was no more than an expectancy, however, we need not 30 596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020). 31 299 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1956). 32 Piranha Partners, 596 S.W.3d at 745–46 (analyzing the scope of an assignment of presently owned overriding mineral interest); Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 673–74 (determining the effect of a subsequent conveyance on previously executed mineral leases). 33 Davis v. Mueller, 528 S.W.3d 97, 102 (Tex. 2017). 34 Cockrell, 299 S.W.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 12 decide whether Clark applies to a fully vested, inde

2020That clause restricts the government’s power to punish for some offense by exacting value from an offender, whether in cash or in kind. 2007 Infiniti G35X Motor Vehicle, Vin JNKBV61E17M708556 v. State, No. 06- 13-00057-CV, 2014 WL 991970 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 609–10 (1993); Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989).

2020That clause restricts the government’s power to punish for some offense by exacting value from an offender, whether in cash or in kind. 2007 Infiniti G35X Motor Vehicle, Vin JNKBV61E17M708556 v. State, No. 06- 13-00057-CV, 2014 WL 991970 , at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 13, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 , 609–10 (1993); Browning–Ferris Industries of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989).

2020App. 2004) (alteration in original) (quoting Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim.

2020After the trial court overruled Clark’s objection to “anything the homeowner told him as being hearsay,” Hicks testified that Friday identified a person named “Gotti” as the person who started the fire and described “Gotti.” “An error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection.” Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim.

2020The supreme court “[has] not ruled definitively on the existence, elements, and scope of such torts and related torts such as negligent training and hiring.” Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796 , 804 n.27 (Tex. 2010); see also JBS Carriers, Inc. v. Washington, 564 S.W.3d 830, 842 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Waffle House).

2020Because we find that some evidence supported the trial court’s rejection of Clark’s affirmative defense and Clark cannot establish as a matter of law his lack of consent to the drug-related activity on the Property, we overrule this point of error. 5 Clark’s brief admits that he was aware of a possibility of illegal activity on the Property. 12 (3) The Forfeiture Does Not Violate the Excessive Fines Clause Invoking the Excessive Fines Clause, Clark also argues that the forfeiture of the home was grossly disproportionate to the gravity of his offense. “[T]he protection against excessive fines h

2020Parol Evidence Rule/Merger Doctrine In their fifth sub-issue, appellants contend the trial court erred in granting TLCP and Clark’s motion for summary judgment on the common law and statutory fraud causes of action on the ground that appellants’ evidence of the misrepresentations was excluded by the parol evidence rule. –18– Besides the no-evidence grounds discussed above, TLCP and Clark also moved for summary judgment on the fraud causes of action on the ground that “[t]he parol evidence rule excludes any of Clark’s alleged misrepresentations regarding sex offenders at the apartments.” “The p

2018See San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 137 (Tex. 2015); 13 Specifically, Clark stated:  “[Monterrubio] exposes us all to a type of behavior that is not only inappropriate, but illegal.”  “I have been forced to work in a hostile work environment . . . to the extent that I am unable to perform the duties expected of me at the Junior School.”  “Ann continues to use offensive and derogatory language, threatening and intimidating conduct, offensive jokes, name calling, insults, slurs, and rumors about me.” As relevant to Clark’s claim, the District’s sexual-harassment policy sta

2016When considering whether a trial court errs by overruling a defendant’s objection to the State’s use of a peremptory strike allegedly based on race, we “examine a trial court’s conclusion that a facially race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge is genuine, rather than a pretext.” Watkins v. State, 245 S.W.3d 444, 448 (Tex. Crim.

2015Corp., 516 F. Supp. 2d 678, 702 (N.D.

2015See Jackson, 435 S.W.3d at 829 (“Deputy Clark’s stop of Jackson for speeding was closely connected to the officers' use of the GPS device.

2015See Jackson, 435 S.W.3d at 829 (“Deputy Clark’s stop of Jackson for speeding was closely connected to the officers’ use of the GPS device.

2015See 46 F.Supp.2d 587 (N.D.Tex.1999).

2012Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2 Mendenhall had a traditional motion for summary judgment which the trial court denied in the same order that granted Clark’s motion.

2008City of Houston, 197 S.W.3d at 324. 3 Therefore, our review must be confined to the City’s arguments that challenge the hearing examiner’s jurisdiction to rule on the motion to dismiss at all (as contrasted from those that contend, in effect, that the hearing examiner ruled incorrectly that the acting fire chief lacked the necessary authority by misapplying applicable law). 4 The City first challenges the hearing examiner’s jurisdiction to rule on Clark’s motion to dismiss on the ground that Clark waived his objection to the acting fire chiefs lack of authority to suspend him by failing to inc