Clark factors in California

2026III Defendant further claims that his case is governed by Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 , and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 , and the jury should have been instructed on Banks and Clark factors.

2026III Defendant further claims that his case is governed by Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 , and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 , and the jury should have been instructed on Banks and Clark factors.

2026(Ibid.) Noting that the Clark factors are “ ‘nonexhaustive’ ” (Emanuel, at pp. 884–885, quoting Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 706 )), Emanuel also repeated Clark’s observation that no one of the Clark factors is necessary or necessarily sufficient.

2026Section 190.2’ — that is, the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.” 5 (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708 .) “Banks and Clark both substantially clarified the law governing findings under . . . section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks elucidated what it means to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to act with reckless indifference to human life, while Clark further refined the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Id., at pp. 706-707.) Although appellant was tried after Banks and Clark had been decided, the jury was not instructed on the Banks/Clark facto

2026III Defendant further claims that his case is governed by Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 , and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 , and the jury should have been instructed on Banks and Clark factors.

2026Appellant contends he is eligible for section 1172.6 relief because the trial court did not instruct the jury sua sponte on the Banks/Clark factors concerning the meaning of “reckless indifference to human life.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 ; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 .) At the prima facie stage of the section 1172.6 proceeding, the superior court initially accepted appellant’s contention and issued an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) This normally would have been followed by an evidentiary hearing.

2025(Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 615 , citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [“the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life”].) Thus, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Silva acted with reckless indifference to human life using the Clark factors and address Silva’s arguments in the appropriate context.

2025(Clark, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 615 , citing Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S. 137, 153 [ 95 L.Ed.2d 127 ] [“the greater the defendant’s participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life”].) Thus, we consider whether substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Silva acted with reckless indifference to human life using the Clark factors and address Silva’s arguments in the appropriate context.

2024(See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 545 .)” (In re Harper, at p. 466, fn. 8.) When we decided In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 450 , three cases involving defendants who were minors at the time of their offenses had already held that a defendant’s youth is an appropriate factor to consider when conducting the Banks/Clark analysis: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939 (17-year-old) (Harris),11 In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434 (16-year-old), and People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 While perhaps suggestive of the Legislature’s increasing awareness of the “psychological and neurological diff

2024(See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 545 .)” (In re Harper, at p. 466, fn. 8.) When we decided In re Harper, supra, 76 Cal.App.5th 450 , three cases involving defendants who were minors at the time of their offenses had already held that a defendant’s youth is an appropriate factor to consider when conducting the Banks/Clark analysis: People v. Harris (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 939 (17-year-old) (Harris),11 In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434 (16-year-old), and People v. Ramirez (2021) 71 While perhaps suggestive of the Legislature’s increasing awareness of the “psychological and neurological diff

2022(See In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 976-977, 980 [granting a habeas corpus petition before passage of Senate Bill 1437 after finding insufficient evidence supported special circumstance finding under Banks and Clark].) Permitting a Banks/Clark challenge through a section 1170.95 petition would also unjustifiably shift the burden from the defendant under a substantial evidence review (as in a habeas petition challenging the sufficiency of the evidence) to the prosecutor under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard (as in a § 1170.95 hearing).

2021Rather, the high court in those cases ‘merely clarified the “major participant” and “reckless indifference to human life” principles that existed when defendant’s conviction became final.’ (In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 978 ; Allison, supra, 55 Cal.App.5th at p. 458.)” (People v. Nunez, supra, 57 Cal.App.5th at p. 92, rev. granted.) “Jury instructions regarding the mental state required for a felony-murder special circumstance are not defective if they do not include the Banks and Clark factors. [Citation.] Indeed, the pattern jury instruction regarding major participation and reckle

2025(See In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592 ; cf. Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 740, fn. 14 [leaving undecided any constitutional issues raised by the replacement of the Clark standard].) 9 The People contend that we need not address “the superior court’s determination of successiveness and untimeliness” because “[o]n remand, Tuilaepa can overcome section 1509, subdivision (d)’s prohibition on successive petitions if he can demonstrate ‘by the preponderance of all available evidence . . . that [he] . . . is ineligible for [his death] sentence.’” We reach the issue to provide gui

2025(See In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 592 ; cf. Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 740, fn. 14 [leaving undecided any constitutional issues raised by the replacement of the Clark standard].) 9 The People contend that we need not address “the superior court’s determination of successiveness and untimeliness” because “[o]n remand, Tuilaepa can overcome section 1509, subdivision (d)’s prohibition on successive petitions if he can demonstrate ‘by the preponderance of all available evidence . . . that [he] . . . is ineligible for [his death] sentence.’” We reach the issue to provide gui

2025“There is no authority requiring that a jury be instructed sua sponte on the various Clark factors.” (People v. Superior Court (White), supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277; see Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 575, 579 [where the jury is “instructed in the language” of section 190.2, subdivision (d), the “trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to further amplify ‘reckless indifference to human life’”]; People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 444 (Price) [same]; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 719-720 [the “mandatory instructions” on the felony-murder special circumstance did no

2025“There is no authority requiring that a jury be instructed sua sponte on the various Clark factors.” (People v. Superior Court (White), supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277; see Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 575, 579 [where the jury is “instructed in the language” of section 190.2, subdivision (d), the “trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to further amplify ‘reckless indifference to human life’”]; People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 444 (Price) [same]; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 719-720 [the “mandatory instructions” on the felony-murder special circumstance did no

2023This case is not like Clark, where the defendant planned a robbery at a store when it was closed and planned that the robbery 15 involve only one unloaded gun. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622.) Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not “ ‘ “the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Loza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 46 .) Except for the absence of any evidence concerning Johnson’s proclivity to kill, all of the Clark factors support th

2023This case is not like Clark, where the defendant planned a robbery at a store when it was closed and planned that the robbery 15 involve only one unloaded gun. ( Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621–622.) Considering the totality of the circumstances, appellant was not “ ‘ “the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Loza, supra, 10 Cal.App.5th at p. 46 .) Except for the absence of any evidence concerning Johnson’s proclivity to kill, all of the Clark factors support th

2025“There is no authority requiring that a jury be instructed sua sponte on the various Clark factors.” (People v. Superior Court (White), supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277; see Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 575, 579 [where the jury is “instructed in the language” of section 190.2, subdivision (d), the “trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to further amplify ‘reckless indifference to human life’”]; People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 444 (Price) [same]; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 719-720 [the “mandatory instructions” on the felony-murder special circumstance did no

2025“There is no authority requiring that a jury be instructed sua sponte on the various Clark factors.” (People v. Superior Court (White), supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1277; see Estrada, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 575, 579 [where the jury is “instructed in the language” of section 190.2, subdivision (d), the “trial court does not have a sua sponte duty to further amplify ‘reckless indifference to human life’”]; People v. Price (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 409, 444 (Price) [same]; see also Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 719-720 [the “mandatory instructions” on the felony-murder special circumstance did no

2022(Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 .) Although not a juvenile in the legal sense of the word, appellant was as young as an “adult” can be and age is an appropriate factor to consider along with the other Clark factors.

2022(Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 .) Although not a juvenile in the legal sense of the word, appellant was as young as an “adult” can be and age is an appropriate factor to consider along with the other Clark factors.

2023(See Gilbert v. State of California (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 234, 240, fn. 4 ; US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 [“We do not review the rationale for the court’s decision.

2023(See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976 ; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12 ; see also US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 [“We do not review the rationale for the court’s decision.

2023(See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 ; People v. Avanessian (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 635, 637 [“As mandated by the traditional rule governing appellate review, we recite the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment”].) Thus, the appellate court appropriately relied on evidence supporting its conclusion that Leggett’s participation was “significant,” while largely disregarding the evidence Leggett presented in her own defense.

2021(See People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 ; People v. Avanessian (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 635, 637 [“As mandated by the traditional rule governing appellate review, we recite the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment.”].) Thus, the appellate court appropriately relied on evidence supporting its conclusion that Leggett’s participation was “significant,” while largely disregarding the evidence Leggett presented in her own defense.

2024In November 2021, eight months before Williams’s evidentiary hearing, this court in People v. Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970 held “‘a defendant’s youth is a relevant factor in determining whether the defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Id. at p. 987.) In In re Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434 , decided earlier that year, the court vacated a robbery-murder special- circumstance finding, concluding that, even if the Clark factors supported a finding of reckless indifference to human life for an adult, a 16-year-old boy “lacked ‘“the experience, perspective, and judgm

2024(Oliver, at p. 488.) Unlike in Jones, however, the Oliver court did not decide whether the trial court was required to consider the defendant’s age as part of the Banks/Clark analysis and it 27 did not remand for such consideration.13 Instead, Oliver held that, “even if the trial court was required to expressly consider Oliver’s youth, any such error in this regard is harmless under the specific circumstances of this case.” (Oliver, at p. 489, italics added, fn. omitted; see id. at p. 489, fn. 8 [concluding the harmless error standard under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 applied].) “We

2022(Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 745 .) The court began by observing that section 1509.1(c) requires a certificate of appealability from the superior court or the Court of Appeal in order to appeal the dismissal of a successive petition, and that such a certificate may issue “only when there is ‘a substantial claim that the requirements of [section 1509(d)] have been met.’ ” (Friend, at p. 745.) The court then construed section 1509.1(c) as permitting 7 the issuance of a certificate of appealability to address the question of successiveness, explaining that a certificate is properly issued upo

2022(Friend, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 745 .) The court began by observing that section 1509.1(c) requires a certificate of appealability from the superior court or the Court of Appeal in order to appeal the dismissal of a successive petition, and that such a certificate may issue “only when there is ‘a substantial claim that the requirements of [section 1509(d)] have been met.’ ” (Friend, at p. 745.) The court then construed section 1509.1(c) as permitting 7 the issuance of a certificate of appealability to address the question of successiveness, explaining that a certificate is properly issued upo

2021(See In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 434 , 439 (Moore).) In Moore and cases it cites, our appellate courts have granted habeas relief, applying the Banks and Clark factors to vacate special circumstance findings on insufficient evidence grounds. 7 Our high court 7 Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 450, citing In re Taylor (2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543 (Taylor), In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384 , 404- 406 (Ramirez), In re Bennett (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 1002, 1018-1027 (Bennett), In re Miller (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 960, 966-967, 974-980 (Miller); see Taylor, at pp. 557-562.

2019At the time of the shooting, [the defendant] was not at the store, but he drove to the location shortly thereafter and fled when he saw a woman lying on the ground, the police approaching, and [the shooter] fleeing the scene.” ( Bennett, supra, 26 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1014-1015, quoting Clark, at p. 612.) Despite the evidence of the defendant’s significant involvement in planning the robbery, there was also evidence that he “planned the crime 10 with an eye to minimizing the possibilities for violence,” because it was timed for after the store closed and there were not supposed to be bullets in

2026(See Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 216 [“Our precedent has recognized . . . that ‘but for’ causation is not the only possible meaning of the phrase ‘because of’ in the context of an antidiscrimination statute”], 217 [acknowledging “that there are at least three plausible meanings of the phrase ‘because of’ in [Government Code] section 12940(a)”].) In some circumstances “because of” can describe a causal connection in which the “cause” is not strictly necessary, in a but-for sense, for a consequence to occur.

2025(Clark, at p. 894; see People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475 , 479–480.) The trial court then dismissed the felony charge on motion by the prosecution but denied Clark’s motion to dismiss the misdemeanor violation for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.