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123 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1987–2022 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Cheshire Mortgage Service, Inc. v. Montesgreen2 sentences1996"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we [the Connecticut Supreme Court] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule' by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise- whether, in other words, it is in at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressi 1996"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we [the Connecticut Supreme Court] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule' by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise- whether, in other words, it is in at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressi | 3 | 11 |
Naples v. Keystone Building & Development Corp.green2 sentences2021See, e.g., Naples v. Keystone Building & Devel- opment Corp., 295 Conn. 214 , 238–39, 990 A.2d 326 (2010) (Zarella, J., concurring). 2021See, e.g., Naples v. Keystone Building & Devel- opment Corp., 295 Conn. 214 , 238–39, 990 A.2d 326 (2010) (Zarella, J., concurring). | 2 | 4 |
Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 | 2 | 4 |
Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 | 2 | 3 |
In Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Realgy, LLCgreen2 sentences2022In cases where the facts that establish a breach of contract are the same as those relied on to support a CUTPA claim, ‘‘our focus . . . has been on whether the defendant’s breach of contract was merely negligent or incompe- tent, in which case the CUTPA claim was barred, or whether the defendant’s actions would support a find- ing of intentional, reckless, unethical or unscrupulous conduct, in which case the contractual breach will sup- port a CUTPA claim under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ (Emphasis added.) Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 410; see also IN Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Realg 2022In cases where the facts that establish a breach of contract are the same as those relied on to support a CUTPA claim, ‘‘our focus . . . has been on whether the defendant’s breach of contract was merely negligent or incompe- tent, in which case the CUTPA claim was barred, or whether the defendant’s actions would support a find- ing of intentional, reckless, unethical or unscrupulous conduct, in which case the contractual breach will sup- port a CUTPA claim under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ (Emphasis added.) Ulbrich v. Groth, supra, 410; see also IN Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Realg | 2 | 2 |
Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLCgreen2 sentences2021The defen- dants contend that, because the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts no longer apply the cigarette rule as the test governing unfair trade practice claims; see, e.g., Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC, 331 Conn. 53 , 123–24 n.46, 202 A.3d 262 , cert. denied sub nom. 2021The defen- dants contend that, because the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the federal courts no longer apply the cigarette rule as the test governing unfair trade practice claims; see, e.g., Soto v. Bushmaster Firearms International, LLC, 331 Conn. 53 , 123–24 n.46, 202 A.3d 262 , cert. denied sub nom. | 2 | 2 |
cluster 455766green2 sentences2005See American Financial Services Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 767 F.2d 957, 969-70 (D.C. 2005See American Financial Services Assn. v. Federal Trade Commission, 767 F.2d 957, 969-70 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
| Daddona v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
Federal Trade Commission v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.green2 sentences2021The historical context of this issue is as follows. ‘‘[I]n determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria [previously] set [forth] in the cigarette rule by the [FTC] for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlaw- ful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some [com- mon-law], statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppres- si 2021The historical context of this issue is as follows. ‘‘[I]n determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria [previously] set [forth] in the cigarette rule by the [FTC] for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [w]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlaw- ful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some [com- mon-law], statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppres- si | 1 | 10 |
Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospitalgreen2 sentences2000Although the defendants do not dispute that the plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to support the first prong of the cigarette rule, they rely on the proposition enunciated in A-G Foods, Inc. v. CT Page 4785 Pepperidge Farm, Inc., 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990), that "the first prong, standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." In Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17 , 34 , 669 A.2d 964 (1997), however, the court noted that subsequent to its decision in A-G Foods, Inc., it had stated 1998General Statutes § 42-110b (a) provides that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Although in determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of CUTPA our courts frequently refer to the well known cigarette rule of the Federal Trade Commission; see Haynes v. Yale-New Haven Hospital, 243 Conn. 17 , 33-34 n.18, 699 A.2d 964 (1997); the cigarette rule analysis is unnecessary here. | 1 | 4 |
Associated Investment Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Williams Associates IVgreen2 sentences1995Regarding recovery under CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (a) provides that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b , may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages ." (Emphasis added.) To determine whether a practice violates CUTPA, Connecticut has adopted the federal trade commission's cigarette rule and looks at whether the practice (1) "without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been estab 1995Regarding recovery under CUTPA, General Statutes § 42-110g (a) provides that "[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice prohibited by section 42-110b , may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages ." (Emphasis added.) To determine whether a practice violates CUTPA, Connecticut has adopted the federal trade commission's cigarette rule and looks at whether the practice (1) "without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been estab | 1 | 4 |
Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co.green2 sentences1994Leaving aside a claim of mere negligence it is certainly true that neither our courts or the FTC require that all three criteria of the cigarette rule need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co. , 202 Conn. 234 , 242 (1987), McLaughlin Ford Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 192 Conn. 558 , 569 N. 15 (1984) and reckless conduct may here involve a violation of other prongs of the cigarette rule also. 1993"A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria [of the cigarette rule] or because to lesser extent it meets all three." Atlantic-Richfield Company v. Canaan Oil Company, 202 Conn. 234 , 242 (1987), quoting McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 192 Conn. 558 , 569 n. 15 (1984). | 1 | 4 |
Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc.green2 sentences2019In Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005), by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant had violated the second prong of the cigarette rule by inducing them to believe that the defendant would either provide financing for a deferred billing program or close on the proposed acquisition of the plaintiff's company. 2019In Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005), by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant had violated the second prong of the cigarette rule by inducing them to believe that the defendant would either provide financing for a deferred billing program or close on the proposed acquisition of the plaintiff's company. | 1 | 3 |
Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc.green2 sentences2003Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc. , 33 Conn. App. 575 , 585-86 , 636 A.2d 1383 (1994). 2003Prishwalko v. Bob Thomas Ford, Inc. , 33 Conn. App. 575 , 585-86 , 636 A.2d 1383 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Lestergreen | 1 | 1 |
| American Car Rental, Inc. v. Commissioner of Consumer Protectiongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sportsmen's Boating Corp. v. Hensleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Web Press Services Corp. v. New London Motors, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc.green2 sentences2019In Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005), by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant had violated the second prong of the cigarette rule by inducing them to believe that the defendant would either provide financing for a deferred billing program or close on the proposed acquisition of the plaintiff's company. 2019In Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc. , 274 Conn. 33 , 873 A.2d 929 (2005), by contrast, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant had violated the second prong of the cigarette rule by inducing them to believe that the defendant would either provide financing for a deferred billing program or close on the proposed acquisition of the plaintiff's company. | 1 | 3 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams Ford, Inc. v. Hartford Courant Co.
green
2 sentences2005In determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of this act, we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission . . . (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to co 2005In determining whether certain acts constitute a violation of this act, we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission . . . (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to co | 26 | 1995–2005 |
Conaway v. Prestia
green
2 sentences1987Although it was not until 1983 in the case of Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484 , 464 A.2d 847 (1983), that this court first had occasion to recognize the cigarette rule, the delineation of the rule at the federal level preceded the trial by several years. 1987Although it was not until 1983 in the case of Conaway v. Prestia, 191 Conn. 484 , 464 A.2d 847 (1983), that this court first had occasion to recognize the cigarette rule, the delineation of the rule at the federal level preceded the trial by several years. | 13 | 1987–1997 |
A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc.
green
2 sentences2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990). 2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990). | 12 | 1993–2003 |
Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co.
green
2 sentences2005Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 250 Conn. 334, 367 , 736 A.2d 824 (1999). *310 Application of that scope of review leads us to conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the degree to which the speeding fee violated public policy was sufficient to find a CUTPA violation without addressing the remaining criteria of the cigarette rule. 2005Hartford Electric Supply Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 250 Conn. 334, 367 , 736 A.2d 824 (1999). *310 Application of that scope of review leads us to conclude that the trial court properly concluded that the degree to which the speeding fee violated public policy was sufficient to find a CUTPA violation without addressing the remaining criteria of the cigarette rule. | 10 | 1999–2005 |
Jacobs v. Healey Ford-Subaru, Inc.
green
2 sentences1999In determining whether a particular act or practice violates CUTPA, the Connecticut courts "have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when [an act or] practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends a public policy established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or otherwise established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or uns 1999In determining whether a particular act or practice violates CUTPA, the Connecticut courts "have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when [an act or] practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends a public policy established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or otherwise established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or uns | 6 | 1996–1999 |
Macomber v. Travelers Property & Casualty Corp.
green
2 sentences2003All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of [a violation of CUTPA]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp. , 261 Conn. 620 , 644 , 803 A.2d 311 (2002). 2003All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of [a violation of CUTPA]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp. , 261 Conn. 620 , 644 , 803 A.2d 311 (2002). | 5 | 2002–2003 |
McLaughlin Ford, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1995Connecticut General Statutes § 42-110g "It is well settled that in determining whether an act or practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when an act or practice is unfair; (1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law or otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethic 1994Leaving aside a claim of mere negligence it is certainly true that neither our courts or the FTC require that all three criteria of the cigarette rule need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness, Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Canaan Oil Co. , 202 Conn. 234 , 242 (1987), McLaughlin Ford Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. , 192 Conn. 558 , 569 N. 15 (1984) and reckless conduct may here involve a violation of other prongs of the cigarette rule also. | 5 | 1992–1996 |
Harris v. Bradley Memorial Hospital & Health Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [Wjhether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it ca 2010It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [Wjhether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise—in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it ca | 4 | 2010–2012 |
Fink v. Golenbock
green
2 sentences2003"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA [Connecticut courts] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice . . . offends public policy as it has been established by the statutes, the common law or otherwise . . . (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businessmen]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 215 , 680 A. 2003"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA [Connecticut courts] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice . . . offends public policy as it has been established by the statutes, the common law or otherwise . . . (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers, [competitors or other businessmen]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183 , 215 , 680 A. | 4 | 1997–2003 |
Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo
green
2 sentences2003All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo , 50 Conn. App. 767 , 785-86 , 720 A.2d 242 (1998)." Calandro v. Allstate Ins. 2003All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of unfairness.' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo , 50 Conn. App. 767 , 785-86 , 720 A.2d 242 (1998)." Calandro v. Allstate Ins. | 4 | 2001–2003 |
Willow Springs Condominium Ass'n v. Seventh BRT Development Corp.
green
2 sentences2000"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it 2000"It is well settled that in determining whether a practice violates CUTPA we have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the federal trade commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) [W]hether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or otherwise — in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it | 4 | 1998–2001 |
Allstate Insurance v. Mottolese
green
2 sentences2003All three criteria do not need to be satisfied to support a finding of [a violation of CUTPA]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Macomber v. Travelers Property Casualty Corp. , 261 Conn. 620 , 644 , 803 A.2d 311 (2002). 2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990). | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co.
green
2 sentences2003Thus a violation of CUTPA may be established by showing either an actual deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a violation of public policy." Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co. , 261 Conn. 673 , CT Page 4447-be 695-96, 803 A.2d 311 (2002). "[T]he first prong [of the cigarette rule], standing alone, is insufficient to support a CUTPA violation, at least when the underlying claim is grounded solely in negligence." A-G Foods, Inc. v. Pepperidge Farm, Inc. , 216 Conn. 200 , 217 , 579 A.2d 69 (1990). 2003Journal Publishing Co. v. Hartford Courant Co., 261 Conn. 673 , 695 (2002). | 3 | 2003–2003 |
Vallejo v. Texas
neutral
2 sentences2021Remington Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L. 2021Remington Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Brown v. United States
neutral
2 sentences2021Remington Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L. 2021Remington Arms Co., LLC v. Soto, U.S. , 140 S. Ct. 513 , 205 L. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc.
green
2 sentences2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 2019Specifically, they allege that, by ‘‘capitaliz- ing inflated past due interest along with attorney’s fees and costs, the defendant ultimately profits from the excessive delay at the cost of the consumer through servicing fees.’’ It is well settled that a ‘‘trade practice that is undertaken to maximize the defendant’s profit at the expense of the plaintiff’s rights comes under the second prong of the cigarette rule.’’ Votto v. American Car Rental, Inc., 273 Conn. 478, 485 , 871 A.2d 981 (2005); see Johnson Electric Co. v. Salce Contracting Associates, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 342, 357 , 805 A.2d 735 | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC
green
2 sentences2006A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 155 , 881 A.2d 937 (2005); but see Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33 , 82 n.34, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) (noting “that a serious question exists as to whether the cigarette rule remains the guiding rule utilized under federal law”). 17 The plaintiffs have neither asserted nor provided us with any authority that the designation of Edmands as an individual “doing business as” 2006A practice may be unfair because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser extent it meets all three.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 275 Conn. 105, 155 , 881 A.2d 937 (2005); but see Glazer v. Dress Barn, Inc., 274 Conn. 33 , 82 n.34, 873 A.2d 929 (2005) (noting “that a serious question exists as to whether the cigarette rule remains the guiding rule utilized under federal law”). 17 The plaintiffs have neither asserted nor provided us with any authority that the designation of Edmands as an individual “doing business as” | 2 | 2006–2007 |
| Normand Josef Enterprises, Inc. v. Connecticut National Bank green | 2 | 1996–2001 |
| Emlee Equipment Leasing Corp. v. Waterbury Transmission, Inc. green | 2 | 1997–1997 |
| Landmark Investment Group, LLC v. Chung Family Realty Partnership, LLC green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Schiavo v. Comm'r of Corr. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Juan C. green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Buddington Park Condominium Association v. Planning and Zoning Commission of the City of Shelton green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Pommer v. Commissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Pedrini v. Kiltonic green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Osborn v. Waterbury green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| Lydall, Inc. v. Ruschmeyer green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Gaynor v. Hi-Tech Homes green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Ramirez v. Health Net of the Northeast, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Larsen Chelsey Realty Co. v. Larsen green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Murray v. Taylor green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Pinchbeck v. Department of Public Health green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Murray v. Taylor green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Roberts v. Norton neutral | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Roncari Development Co. v. GMG Enterprises, Inc. green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Brown v. Town of Branford green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Eamiello v. Liberty Mobile Home Sales, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Service Road Corp. v. Quinn green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Krawiec v. Blake Manor Development Corp. yellow | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Meyers v. Cornwell Quality Tools, Inc. green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.