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123 Ohio opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2026 24 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
City of Dayton v. Ericksongreen2 sentences2026The Ohio Supreme Court held in Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 (1996), that “where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Id. at 11-12 . 2026Whether a defendant can be or is ultimately convicted of the underlying offense giving rise to the stop resulting in an OVI charge “is not determinative of whether the officer acted reasonably in stopping and citing him for that offense.” Bowling Green v. Godwin, 2006-Ohio-3563 , ¶ 15. {¶35} To the extent that Clay argues that “not every minor traffic infraction requires an officer to perform a traffic stop,” it has been held that a stop is valid “where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic | 33 | 113 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2024See also Dayton v. 5 Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid . . . .”) A stop is constitutionally valid provided the law enforcement officer has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶17} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 2022Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7 , quoting Weisner at 299, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). {¶14} In Weisner, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] telephone tip can, by itself, create reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop where the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability.” Weisner at paragraph two of t | 7 | 9 |
Whren v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 809- 810 (1996). “‘[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid.’” State v. Bennett, 2011-Ohio-4527, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), quoting City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). {¶9} This Court has consistently held that a stop-bar violation can justify a traffic stop. 2025Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 809- 810 (1996). “‘[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid.’” State v. Bennett, 2011-Ohio-4527, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), quoting City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). | 5 | 12 |
State v. Maysgreen2 sentences2020Where a law enforcement officer has probable cause or an articulable, reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic -4- Butler CA2019-09-161 violation, the stop is constitutionally valid.1 City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11- 12 (1996); accord State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , ¶ 23. 2018Mr. Woods argues that “[t]here 4 was no marked lanes violation” and it was unreasonable to stop the car for “the minor, isolated infraction of ‘hitting’ the yellow line.” {¶13} R.C. 4511.33(A)(1) prescribes: “Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or more clearly marked lanes for traffic * * * [a] vehicle * * * shall be driven, as nearly as is practicable, entirely within a single lane or line of traffic * * *.” The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly found that “where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, incl | 4 | 6 |
City of Maumee v. Weisnergreen2 sentences2021Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7 , quoting Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). 2020Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7 , quoting Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). | 3 | 7 |
State v. Vanscodergreen2 sentences2024See also Dayton v. 5 Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid . . . .”) A stop is constitutionally valid provided the law enforcement officer has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶17} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 2023See also Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.”) “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 664 , citing State v. VanScoder, 92 Ohio App.3d 853, 855 (9th Dist.1994). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Hodgegreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., State v. Hodge , *Page 13 147 Ohio App. 3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , at _27 (overruling Drogi ) and cases cited therein. 2004However, this process is two-fold, as an appellate court "must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's application of the law to the facts." State v. Hodge, 147 Ohio App.3d 550 , 2002-Ohio-3053 , at ¶ 9 (citations omitted). {¶ 11} The Ohio Supreme Court has held that "where an officer has * * * probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid." Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11-12 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Bennettgreen2 sentences2025Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 809- 810 (1996). “‘[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid.’” State v. Bennett, 2011-Ohio-4527, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), quoting City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). {¶9} This Court has consistently held that a stop-bar violation can justify a traffic stop. 2025Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 , 809- 810 (1996). “‘[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid.’” State v. Bennett, 2011-Ohio-4527, ¶ 22 (5th Dist.), quoting City of Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Campbell, Unpublished Decision (8-24-2005)green2 sentences2021Medina No. 05CA0032-M, 2005-Ohio-4361, ¶ 10-11 . “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid[.]” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996); State v. Woods, 9th Dist. 2020Medina No. 05CA0032-M, 2005-Ohio-4361, ¶ 10-11 . “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid[.]” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996); State v. Woods, 9th Dist. | 1 | 6 |
State v. Andrewsgreen2 sentences2005Id. "* * * [W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer's underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question." Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11-12 . {¶ 19} Trooper Romero testified at the hearing below that he stopped appellant after he determined that appellant was driving too closely to the semi. 1998Id. "[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer's underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question." Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11-12 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Roberts, Unpublished Decision (6-16-2006)green2 sentences2024See also Dayton v. 5 Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) (“where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid . . . .”) A stop is constitutionally valid provided the law enforcement officer has “a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.” (Emphasis added.) State v. Roberts, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7 (2d Dist.); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶17} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 2023Montgomery No. 21221, 2006-Ohio-3042, ¶ 7 ; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). {¶10} “Reasonable suspicion is something less than probable cause.” Epling at 664 , citing State v. VanScoder, 92 Ohio App.3d 853, 855 (9th Dist.1994). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Bobogreen2 sentences2018In evaluating the facts and inferences supporting the stop, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances as “‘viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.’” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjectiv 2005State v. Bobo (1988), 37 Ohio St.3d 177 , 524 N.E.2d 489 , paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 20} In the case sub judice, trial counsel was faced with a fact pattern wherein Trooper Warner had effectuated the stop of Mitchell's vehicle upon noting a missing license plate (see R.C. 4503.21 (A)), the lack of a seat belt utilized for the driver (see R.C. 4513.263 ), and visible damage and smoke about the front of the vehicle. "* * * [W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the st | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen1 sentence2025It is well-settled that “[t]he use of a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-3704, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Bordieri, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Placegreen1 sentence2025It is well-settled that “[t]he use of a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-3704, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Bordieri, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bordieri, Unpublished Decision (9-9-2005)green1 sentence2025It is well-settled that “[t]he use of a drug dog to sniff the exterior of a vehicle, lawfully detained, is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Jones, 2019-Ohio-3704, ¶ 18 (6th Dist.), citing State v. Bordieri, 2005-Ohio-4727, ¶ 22 (6th Dist.); U.S. v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Joyce E. Hall, A/K/A Joyce E. Suttongreen1 sentence2018In evaluating the facts and inferences supporting the stop, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances as “‘viewed through the eyes of a reasonable and cautious police officer on the scene, guided by his experience and training.’” State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d 177, 179 (1988), quoting United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857, 859 (D.C.Cir.1976). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjectiv | 1 | 1 |
| Hiatt v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Halczyszakgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dayton v. Erickson
green
2 sentences2014Moreover, “where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 . 2011Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 ; State v. Gedeon (1992), 81 Ohio App.3d 617, 618 , 611 N.E.2d 972 ; State v. Heinrichs (1988), 46 Ohio App.3d 63 , 545 N.E.2d 1304 . {¶ 18} When “an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officers underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , 11–12, –8– 1996-Ohio-431 , 665 N.E.2d 10 | 9 | 2003–2014 |
State v. Kordich
green
2 sentences2022Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7 , quoting Weisner at 299, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). {¶14} In Weisner, the Ohio Supreme Court held that “[a] telephone tip can, by itself, create reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory stop where the tip has sufficient indicia of reliability.” Weisner at paragraph two of t 2021Medina No. 15CA0058-M, 2017-Ohio-234, ¶ 7 , quoting Maumee v. Weisner, 87 Ohio St.3d 295, 299 (1999), quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). | 4 | 2019–2022 |
Ornelas v. United States
green
2 sentences2008The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact." Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 695-96 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1661-62 . *Page 8 {¶ 25} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that "* * * where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer's underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question." City of Dayton v 2008The first part of the analysis involves only a determination of historical facts, but the second is a mixed question of law and fact." Ornelas v. United States (1996), 517 U.S. 690 , 695-96 , 116 S.Ct. 1657 , 1661-62 . *Page 8 {¶ 25} The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that "* * * where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer's underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question." City of Dayton v | 4 | 2008–2020 |
Delaware v. Prouse
green
2 sentences2014Stopping an automobile constitutes a “seizure.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996) (police officer stopped the vehicle after seeing the vehicle fail to signal a turn); State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 22-23 (reasonable suspicion or probable cau 2014Stopping an automobile constitutes a “seizure.” Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 , 665 N.E.2d 1091 (1996) (police officer stopped the vehicle after seeing the vehicle fail to signal a turn); State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , 894 N.E.2d 1204, ¶ 22-23 (reasonable suspicion or probable cau | 3 | 2011–2014 |
State v. Jackson
neutral
2 sentences2021Summit No. 28625, 2018-Ohio-19, ¶ 16 , quoting Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). 2018Summit No. 28625, 2018-Ohio-19, ¶ 16 , quoting Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). | 2 | 2018–2021 |
State v. Woods
neutral
2 sentences2021Summit No. 28838, 2018-Ohio-3352, ¶ 13 . {¶7} “To determine whether an officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop, the ‘totality of circumstances’ must be considered and viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.” (Internal quotations and citation omitted.) State v. Hawkins, 158 Ohio St.3d 94 , 2019-Ohio- 4210, ¶ 21. 2020Summit No. 28838, 2018-Ohio-3352, ¶ 13 . | 2 | 2020–2021 |
Ohio v. Freeman
green
2 sentences2019State v. Freeman, 64 Ohio St.2d 291 (1980), paragraph one of the syllabus. “[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996). {¶7} With respect to the initial traffic stop, the trial court found that Sergeant Laughlin observed Mr. Gurley traveling above the posted speed limit and following to 2008Rather, `* * * where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *' Id. | 2 | 2008–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2008Rather, `* * * where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * *' Id. " {¶ 37} Trooper Shephard's testimony established objective facts and circumstances to support the stop. {¶ 38} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress. {¶ 39} Assignments of Error I and II are denied. *Page 8 {¶ 40} The judgment of the Massillon Municipal Court of Stark County, Ohio is hereby affirmed. 2001Rather, " * * * where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid * * * " Id. | 2 | 2001–2008 |
State v. Hammen
neutral
1 sentence2025“The propriety of an investigative stop must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop ‘as viewed through the eyes of the reasonable and prudent police officer on the scene who must react to events as they unfold.’” State v. Hammen, 2012-Ohio-3628 . ¶ 26 (5th Dist.), quoting State v. Andrews, 57 Ohio St.3d 86, 87-88 (1991). {¶10} R.C. 4511.21(C) provides that “[i]t is prima-facie unlawful for any person to exceed any of the speed limitations” listed in the statute. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Burnside
green
1 sentence2022(Citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152 , 2003-Ohio-5372 , ¶8. {¶10} In Dayton v. Erickson (1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 3 , the Supreme Court of Ohio stated that “where an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.” (Emphasis added.) Id. at 11-12 . {¶11} Pursuant to R.C. 4513.02(A), “[n]o person shall drive * * * on any highway any veh | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Hentenaar
green
1 sentence2021Butler No. CA2019-09-161, 2020-Ohio-4503, ¶ 9 , citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio St.3d 3, 11-12 (1996) and State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406 , 2008-Ohio-4539 , ¶ 23. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Willis
green
1 sentence2021Butler No. CA2012-08-155, 2013-Ohio-2391, ¶ 18 , citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996). {¶ 13} "Where a law enforcement officer has probable cause or an articulable, reasonable suspicion to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid." State v. Hentenaar, 12th Dist. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Egnor
green
2 sentences2020Warren No. CA2019-05-042, 2020-Ohio-327, ¶ 17 . {¶18} Here, the officer had probable cause to believe appellant committed a traffic violation. 2020Warren No. CA2019-05-042, 2020-Ohio-327, ¶ 17 . {¶18} Here, the officer had probable cause to believe appellant committed a traffic violation. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Phillips
green
1 sentence2018Medina No. 16CA0018-M, 2017-Ohio-1312, ¶ 6 . “‘[W]here an officer has an articulable reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop a motorist for any criminal violation, including a minor traffic violation, the stop is constitutionally valid regardless of the officer’s underlying subjective intent or motivation for stopping the vehicle in question.’” State v. Jackson, 9th Dist. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Haas green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Arizona v. Johnson green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Stateo v. Heinrichs green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Gedeon green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| State v. Cook, 2006 Ca 00280 (9-10-2007) neutral | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Berkemer v. McCarty green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Mapp v. Ohio green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.