Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
18 California opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences1992(People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 525, fn. 10 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ] (Bell); e.g., Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-s 1992(People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 525, fn. 10 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ] (Bell); e.g., Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 48-49.) “In order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-s | 4 | 6 |
People v. Sandersgreen2 sentences2009(People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) “As to the third element of the Duren test, a defendant does not meet the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion, by establishing only statistical evidence of a disparity. 2009(People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].) “As to the third element of the Duren test, a defendant does not meet the burden of demonstrating that the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion, by establishing only statistical evidence of a disparity. | 3 | 6 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d | 3 | 5 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences1991Proc., §§ 197, subd. (a), 204.) Under Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ] (Duren), in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not *298 fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection proces 1991Proc., §§ 197, subd. (a), 204.) Under Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 579 , 99 S.Ct. 664 ] (Duren), in order to establish a prima facie violation of the fair cross-section requirement, “the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’ group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not *298 fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection proces | 3 | 4 |
People v. Hortongreen2 sentences2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the 2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the | 2 | 5 |
Swain v. Alabamared2 sentences2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d | 2 | 2 |
People v. Burgenergreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d | 1 | 2 |
People v. Moralesgreen2 sentences1991(People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 ; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 543 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ].) Defendant argues that the second prong of the Duren test is also met, i.e., that the number of Hispanics on the venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of Hispanics in the population. 1991(People v. Sanders, supra, 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 ; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 543 [ 257 Cal.Rptr. 64 , 770 P.2d 244 ].) Defendant argues that the second prong of the Duren test is also met, i.e., that the number of Hispanics on the venires is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of Hispanics in the population. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Andersongreen2 sentences2025(See Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 [holding that a defendant must satisfy all three Duren prongs to “ ‘ “establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” ’ ”].) 7 discrimination.”5 He asserts the Legislature’s rejection of McCleskey renders untenable Anderson’s holding that a defendant must show that an improper feature of the jury selection process caused a racial disparity in the venires from which jurors are selected. 2025(See Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 566 [holding that a defendant must satisfy all three Duren prongs to “ ‘ “establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement” ’ ”].) 7 discrimination.”5 He asserts the Legislature’s rejection of McCleskey renders untenable Anderson’s holding that a defendant must show that an improper feature of the jury selection process caused a racial disparity in the venires from which jurors are selected. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Todd Eugene Cannady, United States of America v. Peter Jess Ojeda, United States of America v. Robert Lewis Blackgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Ramosgreen2 sentences2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 2015(See, e.g., People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 856 [ 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747 , 62 P.3d 1 ] (Burgener) [expressing uncertainty as to whether an absolute disparity of 10.7 percent, which produced a relative disparity of 65 percent, satisfied the second prong of the Duren test]; People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1156 [ 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892 , 938 P.2d 950 ] [concluding an absolute disparity between 2.7 and 4.3 percent and a comparative disparity between 23.5 and 37.4 percent was not constitutionally significant]; People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 528, fn. 15 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d | 1 | 1 |
People v. Burneygreen2 sentences2014If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 225-226 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 ].) As to the first element of the Duren test, defendant lists 127 prospective jurors he claims were excused because their employers did not pay for at least 25 days of jur 2014If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Burney (2009) 47 Cal.4th 203, 225-226 [ 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 348 , 212 P.3d 639 ].) As to the first element of the Duren test, defendant lists 127 prospective jurors he claims were excused because their employers did not pay for at least 25 days of jur | 1 | 1 |
People v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2014Based on this list, he contends that the court should “recognize poor people as a distinctive group which was systematically excluded from [defendant’s] jury because the trial court could not or would not provide adequate compensation for jurors in this long trial.” *958 Even assuming individuals who are poor constitute a cognizable group (but see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1214 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ]), the fact that an employer would not compensate an employee for at least 25 days of jury service, or that an individual had a prepaid vacation or business trip or wa 2014Based on this list, he contends that the court should “recognize poor people as a distinctive group which was systematically excluded from [defendant’s] jury because the trial court could not or would not provide adequate compensation for jurors in this long trial.” *958 Even assuming individuals who are poor constitute a cognizable group (but see People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1214 [ 255 Cal.Rptr. 569 , 767 P.2d 1047 ]), the fact that an employer would not compensate an employee for at least 25 days of jury service, or that an individual had a prepaid vacation or business trip or wa | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jose Antonio Torres-Hernandez, A.K.A. Roberto Martinez-Hernandezgreen1 sentence2012For this reason, defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the representation of African-Americans and Hispanics in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the ‘community,’ with the meaning of Duren . [Citation.]” ( Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 1089-1090, italics added; see also U.S. v. Torres-Hernandez, supra, 447 F.3d at p. 704 [identifying split in Ninth Circuit concerning whether a defendant may use raw population data or, on the other hand, must account for jury eligibility in establishing second prong of | 1 | 1 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2012Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment claim is a “nonstarter” because, as in a recent California Supreme Court case, “nothing in [the] rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against [Hispanics and Asian-Americans].” (People v. Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 738.) There is ample evidence in the record of nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the superior court and its officers. 2012Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment claim is a “nonstarter” because, as in a recent California Supreme Court case, “nothing in [the] rules or procedures authorized, encouraged, or established that the judges nominated grand jurors in a manner that discriminated against [Hispanics and Asian-Americans].” (People v. Garcia, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 738.) There is ample evidence in the record of nondiscriminatory motivations and methods of the superior court and its officers. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Stansburygreen2 sentences2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the 2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the | 1 | 1 |
People v. Carpenterred2 sentences2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the 2003If a defendant establishes a prima facie case of systematic underrepresentation, the burden shifts to the prosecution to provide either a more precise statistical showing that no constitutionally significant disparity exists or a compelling justification for the procedure that has resulted in the disparity in the jury venire. ( People v. Sanders (1990) 51 Cal.3d 471, 491 [ 273 Cal.Rptr. 537 , 797 P.2d 561 ].)" ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1087-1088 , 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 .) We have already held that persons of low income do not constitute a cognizable class under the | 1 | 1 |
Hovey v. Superior Courtred2 sentences1989(People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 51 ; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20, fn. 45 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 ].) To meet the second prong of the Duren test, defendant must show that Blacks were underrepresented in jury venires in relation to the number of such persons in the community. 1989(People v. Harris, supra, 36 Cal.3d 36, 51 ; Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20, fn. 45 [ 168 Cal.Rptr. 128 , 616 P.2d 1301 ].) To meet the second prong of the Duren test, defendant must show that Blacks were underrepresented in jury venires in relation to the number of such persons in the community. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences1990Application (1b) The first prong of the Duren test is clearly satisfied; Hispanics, or those with Spanish surnames, constitute a distinctive group for purposes of a fair cross-section analysis. ( Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 543 .) The second prong may be satisfied by showing "that the number of members of the cognizable group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the *492 number of members in the relevant community." ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526 .) Working from defendant's most refined statistics, adult Hispanic citizens made up 16.3 percent of Kern County, whereas only 8.3 perce 1990Application (1b) The first prong of the Duren test is clearly satisfied; Hispanics, or those with Spanish surnames, constitute a distinctive group for purposes of a fair cross-section analysis. ( Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 543 .) The second prong may be satisfied by showing "that the number of members of the cognizable group is not fair and reasonable in relation to the *492 number of members in the relevant community." ( Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 526 .) Working from defendant's most refined statistics, adult Hispanic citizens made up 16.3 percent of Kern County, whereas only 8.3 perce | 2 | 1990–2000 |
People v. Buford
green
2 sentences1989To "impose upon a defendant the burden of excluding all possible and permissible explanations for underrepresentation" in order to make out a prima facie case would be onerous, "unrealistic and contrary to applicable principles...." ( People v. Buford, supra, 132 Cal. App.3d at p. 298 , citing Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 368-369 [58 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589-590], and People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287.) These violations, although not necessary to make a Duren claim, when combined with defendant's showing of substantial and continued underrepresentation of Blacks in coun 1989To "impose upon a defendant the burden of excluding all possible and permissible explanations for underrepresentation" in order to make out a prima facie case would be onerous, "unrealistic and contrary to applicable principles...." ( People v. Buford, supra, 132 Cal. App.3d at p. 298 , citing Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at pp. 368-369 [58 L.Ed.2d at pp. 589-590], and People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 286-287.) These violations, although not necessary to make a Duren claim, when combined with defendant's showing of substantial and continued underrepresentation of Blacks in coun | 2 | 1984–1989 |
People v. De Rosans
green
2 sentences2025The evidence required for the prima facie showing is therefore entirely available before voir dire begins.” (De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 , fn. omitted.) Applying these principles to the case before it, the De Rosans court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s request, made during jury selection, for a continuance to “prepare and file a [Duren] challenge to the jury panel.” (See De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614, 616–617, 619–620, 622.) Because the 11 composition of the particular jury panel assigned to Studnicka’s case has 2025The evidence required for the prima facie showing is therefore entirely available before voir dire begins.” (De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 621 , fn. omitted.) Applying these principles to the case before it, the De Rosans court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defense counsel’s request, made during jury selection, for a continuance to “prepare and file a [Duren] challenge to the jury panel.” (See De Rosans, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 614, 616–617, 619–620, 622.) Because the 11 composition of the particular jury panel assigned to Studnicka’s case has | 1 | 2025–2025 |
McCleskey v. Kemp
green
2 sentences2025Racial Justice Act . . . and is ‘overly strict.’ ” Studnicka claims “the adoption of the [Racial Justice Act] has fundamentally changed the landscape in terms of jury selection” such that he should not be required to “establish that the racial disparity [in the pool of potential jurors] . . . was the result of some ‘constitutionally objectionable’ procedure . . . .” Studnicka further argues that “the burden should have shifted to the prosecution to refute [his] challenge to the jury venire” because “the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the third prong of Duren is outdated” and he “ 2025Racial Justice Act . . . and is ‘overly strict.’ ” Studnicka claims “the adoption of the [Racial Justice Act] has fundamentally changed the landscape in terms of jury selection” such that he should not be required to “establish that the racial disparity [in the pool of potential jurors] . . . was the result of some ‘constitutionally objectionable’ procedure . . . .” Studnicka further argues that “the burden should have shifted to the prosecution to refute [his] challenge to the jury venire” because “the California Supreme Court’s interpretation of the third prong of Duren is outdated” and he “ | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Stansbury v. California
green
2 sentences2003Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 .) The parties dispute whether Duren's second prong has been met. 2003Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318 , 114 S.Ct. 1526 , 128 L.Ed.2d 293 .) The parties dispute whether Duren's second prong has been met. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Howard
green
2 sentences2001A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th [1132,] 1160 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ]; People v. Bell, supra, (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 530 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ].) When a county's jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, the defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are applied (the probable cause of the disparity) that is constitutionally impermissible. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 2001A defendant must show, in addition, that the disparity is the result of an improper feature of the jury selection process. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th [1132,] 1160 [ 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268 , 824 P.2d 1315 ]; People v. Bell, supra, (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 530 [ 262 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 778 P.2d 129 ].) When a county's jury selection criteria are neutral with respect to race, ethnicity, sex, and religion, the defendant must identify some aspect of the manner in which those criteria are applied (the probable cause of the disparity) that is constitutionally impermissible. ( People v. Sanders, supra, 51 | 1 | 2001–2001 |
People v. Mattson
green
2 sentences2000As noted, the appropriate community with which to establish such a comparison was the judicial district in which the Van Nuys courthouse is situated. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 *440 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1088, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 844 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 802 , 789 P.2d 983 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 745 , 263 Cal. Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 .) [14] In any event, as the trial court found, there was insufficient showing that any underrepresentation was due to a systematic exclusion. 2000As noted, the appropriate community with which to establish such a comparison was the judicial district in which the Van Nuys courthouse is situated. ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 *440 Cal.4th at pp. 1087-1088, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516 , 906 P.2d 478 ; People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 844 , 268 Cal.Rptr. 802 , 789 P.2d 983 ; Williams v. Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 736, 745 , 263 Cal. Rptr. 503 , 781 P.2d 537 .) [14] In any event, as the trial court found, there was insufficient showing that any underrepresentation was due to a systematic exclusion. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Hazelwood School District v. United States
green
2 sentences1989No general rule of law emerges from the majority opinion, but it does suggest that a defendant cannot make out a prima facie case under Duren if the jury selection system he complains of appears neutral on its face and his only evidence of systematic exclusion is that a cognizable group is significantly underrepresented. "[W]e believe that a prima facie case of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of a distinctive class is not made merely by demonstrating that the county's race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher pe 1989No general rule of law emerges from the majority opinion, but it does suggest that a defendant cannot make out a prima facie case under Duren if the jury selection system he complains of appears neutral on its face and his only evidence of systematic exclusion is that a cognizable group is significantly underrepresented. "[W]e believe that a prima facie case of systematic exclusion or underrepresentation of a distinctive class is not made merely by demonstrating that the county's race/class neutral jury selection processes may nonetheless operate to permit the de facto exclusion of a higher pe | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Alexander v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences1989In Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. 625 , a case decided prior to Duren and differing in that it involved an equal protection challenge to allegedly discriminatory jury selection procedures, the high court indicated it had never "announced mathematical standards for the demonstration of `systematic' exclusion of blacks" from jury pools. ( Id. at p. 630 [ 31 L.Ed.2d at p. 541 ].) A 14 percent absolute disparity was seemingly found constitutionally significant in that case. ( Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 630 ; compare Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202, 208-209 [ 13 L.E 1989In Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. 625 , a case decided prior to Duren and differing in that it involved an equal protection challenge to allegedly discriminatory jury selection procedures, the high court indicated it had never "announced mathematical standards for the demonstration of `systematic' exclusion of blacks" from jury pools. ( Id. at p. 630 [ 31 L.Ed.2d at p. 541 ].) A 14 percent absolute disparity was seemingly found constitutionally significant in that case. ( Alexander v. Louisiana, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 630 ; compare Swain v. Alabama (1965) 380 U.S. 202, 208-209 [ 13 L.E | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.