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18 California opinions name it 3 courts 1931–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Andre R.green2 sentences2006Section 278.7(a) uses the phrase “does not apply” rather than “shall not apply,” but we see no difference in meaning. “ ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.’ ” (People v. George (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) Here, section 278.7(a) is an exception to section 278.5, which supports the conclusion it is an affir 2006Section 278.7(a) uses the phrase “does not apply” rather than “shall not apply,” but we see no difference in meaning. “ ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.’ ” (People v. George (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) Here, section 278.7(a) is an exception to section 278.5, which supports the conclusion it is an affir | 5 | 7 |
People v. Sprygreen2 sentences2001First, it is important to note that long accepted canons of statutory construction support interpreting the Act to create an affirmative defense. "`"It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]"'" ( People v. Spry (1997) 58 Cal. App.4th 1345, 1365 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) By its language and in the context of the overall statutory scheme, the Act clearly creates an exception. 2001First, it is important to note that long accepted canons of statutory construction support interpreting the Act to create an affirmative defense. "`"It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]"'" ( People v. Spry (1997) 58 Cal. App.4th 1345, 1365 , 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) By its language and in the context of the overall statutory scheme, the Act clearly creates an exception. | 2 | 3 |
People v. Georgegreen2 sentences2006Section 278.7(a) uses the phrase “does not apply” rather than “shall not apply,” but we see no difference in meaning. “ ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.’ ” (People v. George (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) Here, section 278.7(a) is an exception to section 278.5, which supports the conclusion it is an affir 2006Section 278.7(a) uses the phrase “does not apply” rather than “shall not apply,” but we see no difference in meaning. “ ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.’ ” (People v. George (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 262, 275 [ 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 750 ], quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) Here, section 278.7(a) is an exception to section 278.5, which supports the conclusion it is an affir | 2 | 2 |
People v. Boldengreen2 sentences1994“In drafting Business and Professions Code section 4149, the Legislature relegated to defendant the burden regarding lawful acquisition of a hypodermic needle or syringe. ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ (In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ]; see also People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1601 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 724 ].) Section 4149 does just that. 1994“In drafting Business and Professions Code section 4149, the Legislature relegated to defendant the burden regarding lawful acquisition of a hypodermic needle or syringe. ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ (In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ]; see also People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1601 [ 266 Cal.Rptr. 724 ].) Section 4149 does just that. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Neidingergreen2 sentences2021Section 1091.5 7 does not describe or define the section 1090 offense but instead describes situations in which, despite the existence of a conflict of interest, the Legislature has decided to excuse the conduct. “ ‘ “It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.” ’ ” (People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 75 .) Section 1091.5 was accurately described by the California Supreme Court in Lexin as an affirmative defen 2015In addition, “ ‘ “[i]t is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.” ’ [Citation.]” (Neidinger, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 75 .) Here, the offense is defined in unconditional terms in section 45.19.6.2, subdivision A, in a section titled “Prohibited Activities,” and is then followed by the exception titled “Limited Immunity” in section 45.19.6.3. | 1 | 4 |
Ex Parte Hornefgreen2 sentences1994“It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] “It was stated in Ex parte Homef [(1908)] 154 Cal. 355 [ 97 P. 891 ], that ‘“[t]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be contained in the enacting clause or section, or be i 1994“It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] “It was stated in Ex parte Homef [(1908)] 154 Cal. 355 [ 97 P. 891 ], that ‘“[t]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be contained in the enacting clause or section, or be i | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kirwingreen2 sentences2010(See People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 75 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 , 146 P.3d 502 ] [“ ‘ “where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant” ’ ”]; and id. at p. 74 [the People must be held to their burden to prove each element of the offense, but “ ‘[d]ue process does not require that the state prove the nonexistence of a constitutionally permissible affirmative defense . . .’ ”].) Nonetheless, as the third instruction contains no such defect and c 2010(See People v. Neidinger (2006) 40 Cal.4th 67, 75 [ 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 45 , 146 P.3d 502 ] [“ ‘ “where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant” ’ ”]; and id. at p. 74 [the People must be held to their burden to prove each element of the offense, but “ ‘[d]ue process does not require that the state prove the nonexistence of a constitutionally permissible affirmative defense . . .’ ”].) Nonetheless, as the third instruction contains no such defect and c | 1 | 1 |
People v. Masongreen2 sentences1984(Exparte Hornef (1908) 154 Cal. 355, 360 [ 97 P. 891 ]; People v. Lawrence (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 54, 62-63 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; People v. Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 356 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ]; Witkin, Cal. Crim. 1984(Exparte Hornef (1908) 154 Cal. 355, 360 [ 97 P. 891 ]; People v. Lawrence (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 54, 62-63 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; People v. Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 356 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ]; Witkin, Cal. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Lawrencegreen2 sentences1984(Exparte Hornef (1908) 154 Cal. 355, 360 [ 97 P. 891 ]; People v. Lawrence (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 54, 62-63 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; People v. Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 356 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ]; Witkin, Cal. Crim. 1984(Exparte Hornef (1908) 154 Cal. 355, 360 [ 97 P. 891 ]; People v. Lawrence (1961) 198 Cal.App.2d 54, 62-63 [ 18 Cal.Rptr. 196 ]; People v. Mason (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 317, 356 [ 7 Cal.Rptr. 627 ]; Witkin, Cal. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Oregon Short Line & U. N. Ry. Co. v. Tracygreen2 sentences1931Co. v. Tracy, 66 Fed. 931, 936 [ 14 C. 1931Co. v. Tracy, 66 Fed. 931, 936 [ 14 C. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Fuentes
green
2 sentences1999Some cases hold that “ ‘where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 , quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) People v. Gott (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 881 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ], however, eschews what it describes as the “grammatical rule” of those cases. 1997(People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d 1041, 1044 .) The court interpreted section 4149 as allocating to the defendant the burden regarding lawful acquisition of a hypodermic needle. “ ‘It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ [Citations.] Section 4149 does just that. | 3 | 1994–1999 |
People v. Gott
green
2 sentences1999Some cases hold that “ ‘where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 , quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) People v. Gott (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 881 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ], however, eschews what it describes as the “grammatical rule” of those cases. 1999Some cases hold that “ ‘where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.]’ ” (People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 , quoting In re Andre R. (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 336, 341 [ 204 Cal.Rptr. 723 ].) People v. Gott (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 881 [ 31 Cal.Rptr.2d 840 ], however, eschews what it describes as the “grammatical rule” of those cases. | 2 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Fisher
green
1 sentence2014(Fisher, supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1151 .) In rejecting the defendant’s argument, the court in Fisher reasoned: “ ‘ “It is well established that where a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant. [Citations.] . . . ‘ “[T]he question is whether the exception is so incorporated with, and becomes a part of the enactment, as to constitute a part of the definition, or description of the offense; for it is immaterial whether the exception or proviso be co | 1 | 2014–2014 |
People v. Mower
green
1 sentence2006Both of the reasons we cited in Mower, supra, 28 Cal.4th at page 477 , for placing on the defendant the initial burden regarding the medical marijuana defense apply equally here. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Gallardo
green
2 sentences1994The jury instruction reflects the Legislature’s intent and the statutory requirement.” ( 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 .) Fuentes sets forth a grammatical rule, borrowed from In re Andre R., supra, for determining whether the language of a penal statute imposes an affirmative defense. “[Wjhere a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.” (People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 .) The rule is misstated, as shown by the holding in People v. Ga 1994The jury instruction reflects the Legislature’s intent and the statutory requirement.” ( 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 .) Fuentes sets forth a grammatical rule, borrowed from In re Andre R., supra, for determining whether the language of a penal statute imposes an affirmative defense. “[Wjhere a statute first defines an offense in unconditional terms and then specifies an exception to its operation, the exception is an affirmative defense to be raised and proved by the defendant.” (People v. Fuentes, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 1045 .) The rule is misstated, as shown by the holding in People v. Ga | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.