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18 California opinions name it 1 courts 2009–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The People v. Piraligreen2 sentences2016(See Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 ; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 599 ] {Kim); Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) With respect to each of the five conditions she challenges for lack of an express scienter requirement, Minor claims there is no need to resort to the specific facts of her situation. 2015Prohibition on Access to the Internet Defendant challenges the probation condition prohibiting him from “access[ing] the internet or any other online service, through the use of a computer or other electronic device, including a phone, at any location, including place of employment, without prior approval of the probation officer.” The Attorney General contends the condition is valid so long as it includes an express scienter requirement, as held by a panel of this court in People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341,1351 (Pirali). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Garciagreen2 sentences2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno 2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno | 2 | 2 |
People v. Turnergreen2 sentences2016(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [association with approved persons]; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436 [persons under 18]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 ; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [minors]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 .) Because defendant may act unknowingly the conditions must be modified to incorporate an express scienter requirement. 2014(People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374 [modifying probation conditions to include both actual and constructive knowledge requirements]; see also People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 .) Since the probation condition at issue in this case prohibits both alcohol and medical marijuana use—which are not illegal—and it is possible that defendant might unknowingly ingest something that has been “laced with” marijuana or “spiked with” alcohol, the addition of an express scienter requirement will eliminate any potential for vagueness or overbr | 2 | 2 |
People v. Mooregreen2 sentences2016I, §1). 9 In her zeal to argue the irreconcilability of cases adopting the implied scienter analysis of Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 , on the one hand, and cases in line with Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , on the other hand, the Attorney General does not distinguish sharply between two related but distinct points in the logic of Moore—first, that the more clearly a probation condition defines proscribed conduct, the less need there is for an express scienter requirement (Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [“the weapons prohibition here is *347 sufficiently precise to inform 2016I, §1). 9 In her zeal to argue the irreconcilability of cases adopting the implied scienter analysis of Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 , on the one hand, and cases in line with Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , on the other hand, the Attorney General does not distinguish sharply between two related but distinct points in the logic of Moore—first, that the more clearly a probation condition defines proscribed conduct, the less need there is for an express scienter requirement (Moore, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 1186 [“the weapons prohibition here is *347 sufficiently precise to inform | 1 | 5 |
People v. Patelgreen2 sentences2024(See e.g., People v. Patel (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 956, 960-961, fn.4 .) In that case, the court expressed its frustration with the “dismaying regularity” with which it had to revisit the issue of a lack of an express scienter requirement in orders of probation. 2016A substantial body of case law establishes that a "probationer cannot be punished for presence, possession, association, or other actions absent proof of scienter." (Patel, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 960 .) Generally, therefore, it is not necessary to include an express scienter requirement in probation orders. | 1 | 4 |
People v. Victor L.green2 sentences2016(See Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 ; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 599 ] {Kim); Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) With respect to each of the five conditions she challenges for lack of an express scienter requirement, Minor claims there is no need to resort to the specific facts of her situation. 2016(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [association with approved persons]; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436 [persons under 18]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 ; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [minors]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 .) Because defendant may act unknowingly the conditions must be modified to incorporate an express scienter requirement. | 1 | 3 |
People v. Mosesgreen2 sentences2016(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [association with approved persons]; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436 [persons under 18]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 ; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [minors]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 .) Because defendant may act unknowingly the conditions must be modified to incorporate an express scienter requirement. 2014(People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374 [modifying probation conditions to include both actual and constructive knowledge requirements]; see also People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 .) Since the probation condition at issue in this case prohibits both alcohol and medical marijuana use—which are not illegal—and it is possible that defendant might unknowingly ingest something that has been “laced with” marijuana or “spiked with” alcohol, the addition of an express scienter requirement will eliminate any potential for vagueness or overbr | 1 | 3 |
People v. Freitasgreen2 sentences2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno 2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kacy S.green2 sentences2016(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [association with approved persons]; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436 [persons under 18]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 ; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [minors]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 .) Because defendant may act unknowingly the conditions must be modified to incorporate an express scienter requirement. 2014(People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374 [modifying probation conditions to include both actual and constructive knowledge requirements]; see also People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 .) Since the probation condition at issue in this case prohibits both alcohol and medical marijuana use—which are not illegal—and it is possible that defendant might unknowingly ingest something that has been “laced with” marijuana or “spiked with” alcohol, the addition of an express scienter requirement will eliminate any potential for vagueness or overbr | 1 | 2 |
People v. Kimgreen2 sentences2016(See Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 ; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 599 ] {Kim); Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) With respect to each of the five conditions she challenges for lack of an express scienter requirement, Minor claims there is no need to resort to the specific facts of her situation. 2016(See Pirali, supra, 217 Cal.App.4th at p. 1352 ; People v. Kim (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 836, 843 [ 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 599 ] {Kim); Victor L., supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 912 .) With respect to each of the five conditions she challenges for lack of an express scienter requirement, Minor claims there is no need to resort to the specific facts of her situation. | 1 | 2 |
In Re Sheena K.green2 sentences2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno 2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno | 1 | 1 |
People v. Contrerasgreen2 sentences2016(People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 887 [ 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 698 ].) We think the best approach is for courts to incorporate an express knowledge requirement only when necessary to address an inherently vague category of conduct. {Ibid.) Since there is nothing inherently vague or ambiguous about requiring defendant not to delete his browser history, we perceive no need for an express scienter requirement. 2016(People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 868, 887 [ 188 Cal.Rptr.3d 698 ].) We think the best approach is for courts to incorporate an express knowledge requirement only when necessary to address an inherently vague category of conduct. {Ibid.) Since there is nothing inherently vague or ambiguous about requiring defendant not to delete his browser history, we perceive no need for an express scienter requirement. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2014We note that the reasoning applied in Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 578 , and Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th 836 , does not extend to cure a defect with respect to the vagueness of a condition that lacks a clear definition of one of its key terms, “incendiary device.” The holdings in Rodriguez and Kim are best understood as imputing a scienter requirement in a probation condition when the condition references or tracks a statute that includes an express scienter requirement. 2014We note that the reasoning applied in Rodriguez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th 578 , and Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th 836 , does not extend to cure a defect with respect to the vagueness of a condition that lacks a clear definition of one of its key terms, “incendiary device.” The holdings in Rodriguez and Kim are best understood as imputing a scienter requirement in a probation condition when the condition references or tracks a statute that includes an express scienter requirement. | 5 | 2014–2016 |
People v. Hall
green
2 sentences2022(People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500-503 .) This “reasoning applies with equal force to conditions prohibiting a probationer from entering certain spaces” including those prohibiting a defendant “from entering a 1 As such, we need not reach defendant’s contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the probation conditions as constitutionally defective. 4 business which primarily sells alcohol.” (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1128 ; People v. Kelley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 993 , 1001.) Thus, an express scienter requirement is not necessary for the 2020(People v. Hall, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 501–503.) Accordingly, the absence of an express scienter requirement here does not render the no-contact condition unconstitutional. | 2 | 2020–2022 |
People v. Cervantes
green
2 sentences2016(People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 .) As the Sixth District Court of Appeal has explained, “[n]o reasonable law enforcement officer or judge can expect probationers to know where their victims are at all times,” and a no-contact condition “does not require [a] defendant to stay away from all locations where the victim might 4 The issue whether no-contact probation conditions require an express scienter requirement is currently pending before our state Supreme Court. 2016(See People v. Cervantes, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th at p. 295 .) And based on the same authorities already cited, we conclude that it is unnecessary to include an express scienter requirement to emphasize this. 7 Because we have concluded that the orally pronounced version of the drug-related condition controls, we need not consider Trevor G.’s argument that the condition is also vague based on the written version’s redundant directive that Trevor G. “[n]ot possess or have in [his] possession” the covered substances. 12 III. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Rhinehart
green
1 sentence2022(People v. Hall (2017) 2 Cal.5th 494, 500-503 .) This “reasoning applies with equal force to conditions prohibiting a probationer from entering certain spaces” including those prohibiting a defendant “from entering a 1 As such, we need not reach defendant’s contention that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the probation conditions as constitutionally defective. 4 business which primarily sells alcohol.” (People v. Rhinehart (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1123, 1128 ; People v. Kelley (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 993 , 1001.) Thus, an express scienter requirement is not necessary for the | 1 | 2022–2022 |
People v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2016(See, e.g., People v. Lopez (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 615, 629 ; In re Kacy S. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 704, 713 [association with approved persons]; People v. Turner (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1435-1436 [persons under 18]; In re Victor L. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 902, 912-913 ; People v. Moses (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 374, 377 [minors]; People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1185 .) Because defendant may act unknowingly the conditions must be modified to incorporate an express scienter requirement. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Galvan
green
1 sentence2016Further, "[a] court may not revoke probation unless the evidence supports 'a conclusion [that] the probationer's conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation.' " (People v. Cervantes (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 291, 295 , quoting People v. Galvan (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 978, 982 .) Because a scienter requirement is inherent in these two probation conditions, Medrano will not be punished for unwillingly violating the conditions. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Martinez
green
1 sentence2016(People v. Martinez, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 765-766; see Sheena K., at p. 889.) Martinez contends that the weapon-possession condition is vague because it does not include an express scienter requirement that he “knowingly” possess the prohibited weapons.6 Such an express scienter requirement is unnecessary, however, because “[a] court may not revoke probation unless the evidence supports ‘a conclusion [that] the probationer’s conduct constituted a willful violation of the terms and conditions of probation,’ ” as opposed to an unintentional violation due to circumstances beyond the 6 A | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Kevin F.
green
2 sentences2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno 2016Relying primarily on Kevin F, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 351 , and People v. Freitas (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 747 [ 102 Cal.Rptr.3d 51 ] {Freitas), she argues that a knowledge requirement “should not be left to implication.” (People v. Garcia (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 97, 102 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 340 ]; see Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890 .) In her view, Kevin F and Freitas correctly apply Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at page 890 , our Supreme Court’s most recent decision addressing “the need for a scienter clause in probation cases.” Without an express scienter requirement, she argues, she might inno | 1 | 2016–2016 |
In Re RP
green
1 sentence2014Moreover, defendant was not only prohibited from possessing and transporting firearms, but also “any deadly or dangerous weapons.” In People v. Moore (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 1179 (Moore), the court also considered a probation condition that prohibited possession of “ ‘dangerous or deadly weapon[s],’ ” finding that the condition did not need to include an express scienter requirement because “the term ‘dangerous or deadly weapon’ . . . has a clearly established meaning.” (Id. at p. 1186.) Specifically, as phrased, the probation condition “prohibited possession of items specifically designed as w | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.