import-export clause in California

1980I, § 10, cl. 2.) In 1827 the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 [ 6 L.Ed. 678 ], determined that the import-export clause also prohibited taxation of imported goods.

1980I, § 10, cl. 2.) In 1827 the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 [ 6 L.Ed. 678 ], determined that the import-export clause also prohibited taxation of imported goods.

1978(Id, at pp. 279-281 [46 L.Ed.2d at pp. 499-501].) The United States Supreme Court sustained the taxes against a contention that they violated the import-export clause (pp. 278-279, 281-283 [46 L.Ed.2d pp. 499-502]), abandoned the longstanding “original container doctrine” in the process (pp. 279, 294-301 [46 L.Ed.2d pp. 499-500, 508-512] [overruling Low v. Austin (1871) 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (20 L..Ed. 517)]), and stated in pertinent part: “Unlike imposts and duties, which are essentially taxes on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into a country, such property taxes are taxes by which

1977Accordingly, we treat the notice of appeal as pertaining thereto. 2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references will be made to the California Revenue and Taxation Code. 3 The legislative findings set out in Statutes 1976, chapter 335, section 1, read as follows: “The Legislature finds and declares that in Low v. Austin (1872), 20 L.Ed. 517 , the Supreme Court of the United States held, in effect, that imported goods were not subject to property taxation under the import-export clause contained in Section 10 of Article I of the Constitution of the United States.

1978(Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 68-70 [ 67 L.Ed. 865, 867-868 , 43 S.Ct. 485 ]; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 78-83 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 90-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) The court has since qualified the effect of this view, and distinguished Spalding and Richfield, by holding that the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside “handling” of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: “The difference is that. . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them

1978(Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 68-70 [ 67 L.Ed. 865, 867-868 , 43 S.Ct. 485 ]; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 78-83 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 90-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) The court has since qualified the effect of this view, and distinguished Spalding and Richfield, by holding that the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside “handling” of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: “The difference is that. . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them

1992In Coe v. Errol, supra, 116 U.S. 517 , the court upheld New Hampshire’s tax on logs cut within the state and floated downriver for eventual sale in Maine.

1972I, § 8, cl. 3) in Coe v. Errol (1886) 116 U.S. 517, 527 [ 29 L.Ed. 715, 719 , 6 S.Ct. 475 ].) 5 (Italics added.) In Carson Petroleum Co. v. Vial (1929) 279 U.S. 95 [ 73 L.Ed. 626 , 49 S.Ct. 292 ], an exporter shipped oil from inland states to the coastal storage tanks of a corporate subsidiary to fill orders already received from foreign buyers.

1993Co. v. Rogan (1951) 340 U.S. 511, 513-515 [ 95 L.Ed. 488, 492-493 , 71 S.Ct. 447 , 20 A.L.R.2d 145 ], the Supreme Court held that “the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside ‘handling’ of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: ‘The difference is that . . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them at the port.’ [Citations.]” ( 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 438 .) The Blue Star Line court adopted this view and found that “[respondent's payroll tax reaches only the dockside ‘handling’

1993Co. v. Rogan (1951) 340 U.S. 511, 513-515 [ 95 L.Ed. 488, 492-493 , 71 S.Ct. 447 , 20 A.L.R.2d 145 ], the Supreme Court held that “the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside ‘handling’ of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: ‘The difference is that . . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them at the port.’ [Citations.]” ( 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 438 .) The Blue Star Line court adopted this view and found that “[respondent's payroll tax reaches only the dockside ‘handling’

1992Nothing less will suffice.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].) 4 “[W]here an article is manufactured and sold in one of the states for export to a foreign country, it is free from state sales tax under the import-export clause of the [U.S.] Constitution if at the time title passed the certainty of the foreign destination was plain.” (Gough Industries v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746, 749 [ 336 P.2d 161 ].) Although the parties agree on these general principles, they dispute whether MDC’s aircraft parts sold to Aeromexico had entered the export stream and thus were exempt from

1992Nothing less will suffice.” (Id. at p. 157 [93 L.Ed. at p. 1280].) 4 “[W]here an article is manufactured and sold in one of the states for export to a foreign country, it is free from state sales tax under the import-export clause of the [U.S.] Constitution if at the time title passed the certainty of the foreign destination was plain.” (Gough Industries v. State Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 746, 749 [ 336 P.2d 161 ].) Although the parties agree on these general principles, they dispute whether MDC’s aircraft parts sold to Aeromexico had entered the export stream and thus were exempt from

1986In Michelin, supra, 423 U.S. 276 the court upheld, against an import-export clause challenge, Georgia’s assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on imported goods stored as business inventory. 12 The court reasoned that because the purpose of such a property tax is to recover the costs, on an apportioned basis, of locally provided services such as police and fire protection, and the tax is imposed on all property regardless of origin, the tax could not be characterized as an “impost or duty” levied on imported goods.

1986In Michelin, supra, 423 U.S. 276 the court upheld, against an import-export clause challenge, Georgia’s assessment of a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on imported goods stored as business inventory. 12 The court reasoned that because the purpose of such a property tax is to recover the costs, on an apportioned basis, of locally provided services such as police and fire protection, and the tax is imposed on all property regardless of origin, the tax could not be characterized as an “impost or duty” levied on imported goods.

1978(Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 68-70 [ 67 L.Ed. 865, 867-868 , 43 S.Ct. 485 ]; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 78-83 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 90-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) The court has since qualified the effect of this view, and distinguished Spalding and Richfield, by holding that the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside “handling” of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: “The difference is that. . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them

1978(Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards (1923) 262 U.S. 66, 68-70 [ 67 L.Ed. 865, 867-868 , 43 S.Ct. 485 ]; Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board (1946) 329 U.S. 69, 78-83 [ 91 L.Ed. 80, 90-93 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ].) The court has since qualified the effect of this view, and distinguished Spalding and Richfield, by holding that the import-export clause does not bar a local tax which reaches only the dockside “handling” of articles in the flow of maritime importation or exportation, and is not levied upon the articles themselves: “The difference is that. . . the tax is not on the goods but on the handling of them

1955As was pointed out in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 [ 65 S.Ct. 870 , 89 L.Ed. 1252 ], quoted from above, there is a vast difference between the commerce clause and the import-export clause.

1955As was pointed out in Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U. S. 652 [ 65 S.Ct. 870 , 89 L.Ed. 1252 ], quoted from above, there is a vast difference between the commerce clause and the import-export clause.

1966(Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 61 S.Ct. 885 , 85 L.Ed. 1188 ].) Directly in point, of course, is the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the tax on the sale of fuel to airplanes in interstate commerce, discussed above with reference to the import-export clause.

1966(Department of Treasury v. Wood Preserving Corp. (1941) 313 U.S. 62, 68 [ 61 S.Ct. 885 , 85 L.Ed. 1188 ].) Directly in point, of course, is the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the tax on the sale of fuel to airplanes in interstate commerce, discussed above with reference to the import-export clause.

1993Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, supra, 479 U.S. at p. 153 [93 L.Ed.2d at pp. 469-470].) In both Michelin and Reynolds the court found that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax did not offend the import-export clause.

1986(Id., 441 U.S. at pp. 449-450, fn. 14 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 348-349].) “ ‘The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d at p. 523 ].) Judge, Fowler-Caruthers Justice Court, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

1986(Id., 441 U.S. at pp. 449-450, fn. 14 [60 L.Ed.2d at pp. 348-349].) “ ‘The very purpose of the Commerce Clause was to create an area of free trade among the several States.’” (Boston Stock Exchange, supra, 429 U.S. at p. 328 [ 50 L.Ed.2d at p. 523 ].) Judge, Fowler-Caruthers Justice Court, assigned by the Chairperson of the Judicial Council.

1978(Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co. (1974) 417 U.S. 62, 67, fn. 5 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 660, 665 , 94 S.Ct. 2108 ].) Any effect of the fifth clause may therefore be disregarded because our discussion of the import-export clause will reach it.

1978(Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co. (1974) 417 U.S. 62, 67, fn. 5 [ 40 L.Ed.2d 660, 665 , 94 S.Ct. 2108 ].) Any effect of the fifth clause may therefore be disregarded because our discussion of the import-export clause will reach it.

1975I, § 10, cl. 2.) The clause prohibits a local tax upon the “occupation of an importer.” (Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 [ 6 L.Ed. 678, 687 ].) “It is sufficient ... to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax u

1975I, § 10, cl. 2.) The clause prohibits a local tax upon the “occupation of an importer.” (Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 [ 6 L.Ed. 678, 687 ].) “It is sufficient ... to say, generally, that when the importer has so acted upon the thing imported that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power of the state; but while remaining the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was imported, a tax u

1972I, § 10, cl. 2) provides: “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: ...” The clause prohibits a state or local tax upon “the occupation of an importer” (Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 [ 6 L.Ed. 678, 687 ]), including a direct tax upon the sale of imports by the importer (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69 [ 91 L.Ed. 80 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ]) because the “immunity [of imports from local taxes] survives their arrival in this country and

1972I, § 10, cl. 2) provides: “No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: ...” The clause prohibits a state or local tax upon “the occupation of an importer” (Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 444 [ 6 L.Ed. 678, 687 ]), including a direct tax upon the sale of imports by the importer (Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69 [ 91 L.Ed. 80 , 67 S.Ct. 156 ]) because the “immunity [of imports from local taxes] survives their arrival in this country and

1972“Under the import-export clause, a state may not impose a tax against an article of export if the article has commenced its movement abroad and. the ‘certainty of the foreign destination is plain.’ ” (Shell Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 713, 718 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 414 P.2d 820 ].) “It is the entrance of the articles into the export stream that marks the start of the process of exportation.

1972“Under the import-export clause, a state may not impose a tax against an article of export if the article has commenced its movement abroad and. the ‘certainty of the foreign destination is plain.’ ” (Shell Oil Co. v. State Bd. of Equal. (1966) 64 Cal.2d 713, 718 [ 51 Cal.Rptr. 524 , 414 P.2d 820 ].) “It is the entrance of the articles into the export stream that marks the start of the process of exportation.

1969The court followed the ‘' original package doctrine ’ ’ and concluded, ‘ ‘ Imports, therefore, whilst retaining their distinctive character as such, must be treated as being without the jurisdiction of the taxing power of the State.” ( 80 U.S. at p. 35 [20 L.Ed. at p. 519].) In State v. Pinckney, supra, the court adopted the opinion of the circuit judge which held that neither the commerce clause nor the import-export clause precluded a tax upon the sale of goods imported from a sister state. (10 Rich.

1969They have lost their distinctive character as imports and have become taxable by the State. ’ ’ (276 U.S. at p. 127 [72 L.Ed. at p. 497].) From the foregoing it is clear that once the ores and concentrates are appropriated to the smelting and refining process for which they were imported they lose whatever immunity they might otherwise have had under the import-export clause.

1969(Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 703, 707-709 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; and cf. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. *454 County of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 300, 303-304 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supra, the court stated: The design of the constitutional immunity was to prevent ‘ [t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on the non-importing States, ’ to which the imported property is or might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate against them but also ‘ would necessarily produce countervailing measures o

1969(Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 703, 707-709 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; and cf. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. *454 County of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 300, 303-304 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supra, the court stated: The design of the constitutional immunity was to prevent ‘ [t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on the non-importing States, ’ to which the imported property is or might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate against them but also ‘ would necessarily produce countervailing measures o

1969(Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 703, 707-709 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; and cf. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. *454 County of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 300, 303-304 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supra, the court stated: The design of the constitutional immunity was to prevent ‘ [t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on the non-importing States, ’ to which the imported property is or might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate against them but also ‘ would necessarily produce countervailing measures o

1969(Hugo Neu Corp. v. County of Los Angeles (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 703, 707-709 [ 50 Cal.Rptr. 916 ]; and cf. Montrose Chemical Corp. v. *454 County of Los Angeles (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 300, 303-304 [ 52 Cal.Rptr. 209 ].) In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, supra, the court stated: The design of the constitutional immunity was to prevent ‘ [t]he great importing States [from laying] a tax on the non-importing States, ’ to which the imported property is or might ultimately be destined, which would not only discriminate against them but also ‘ would necessarily produce countervailing measures o

1969Co. v. Calexico (1920) 47 Cal.App. 666, 669-671 [ 191 P. 50 ].) In this case it is established that all of the materials imported and held by the taxpayer were committed to the smelting and refining process from which the metals which gave the materials their value would be extracted. 8a In the absence of some other countervailing factor the import-export clause confers no immunity on the materials held for further processing.

1969Co. v. Calexico (1920) 47 Cal.App. 666, 669-671 [ 191 P. 50 ].) In this case it is established that all of the materials imported and held by the taxpayer were committed to the smelting and refining process from which the metals which gave the materials their value would be extracted. 8a In the absence of some other countervailing factor the import-export clause confers no immunity on the materials held for further processing.