inapplicability rule in California

2016The first was a contract for the purchase and installation of an air conditioner that specified only cooling capacity and “not the precise manner of construction.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 509 .) Air conditioners, of course, are usually commercially available products—but that was not the reason given by the court for the inapplicability of the defense.

2016The first was a contract for the purchase and installation of an air conditioner that specified only cooling capacity and ‘“not the precise manner of construction.” (Boyle, supra, 487 U.S. at p. 509 .) Air conditioners, of course, are usually commercially available products—but that was not the reason given by the court for the inapplicability of the defense.

2014We are aware of "[t]he settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment will bar appeal therefrom [citations] . . . ." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 744 .) The inapplicability of this rule to the instant case is shown by Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461 (Templeton).

2014We are aware of "[t]he settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment will bar appeal therefrom [citations] . . . ." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 744 .) The inapplicability of this rule to the instant case is shown by Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461 (Templeton).

2014We are aware of "[t]he settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment will bar appeal therefrom [citations] . . . ." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 744 .) The inapplicability of this rule to the instant case is shown by Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461 (Templeton).

2014We are aware of "[t]he settled rule that the voluntary acceptance of the benefits of a judgment will bar appeal therefrom [citations] . . . ." (In re Marriage of Fonstein (1976) 17 Cal.3d 738, 744 .) The inapplicability of this rule to the instant case is shown by Templeton Feed and Grain v. Ralston Purina Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 461 (Templeton).

2025The court also ruled that Reyes-Gonzalez “failed to cite or analyze [Bigler-Engler v. Breg, Inc. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 276 ] on the issue of fraudulent concealment” and that the “argument in opposition 12 to punitive damages was made in pages of his oversize brief which were stricken.”4 F. Reyes-Gonzalez Files a Motion for Relief from the Trial Court’s Order Granting C & C’s Motion for Summary Judgment and for a New Trial Reyes-Gonzalez filed a motion for relief under Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (b) or, in the alternative, for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure secti

2021In Department of Personnel Administration v. California Correctional Peace Officers Assn. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1193 , the dispute concerned a written collective bargaining memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the parties.

2020(See Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 .) Despite the inapplicability of the doctrine of implied findings (to those issues for which Dixie requested a statement of decision and timely objected), the majority (1) concludes that both final statements of decision are “adequate” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 632 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33), yet (2) on more than one occasion further concludes that there is no error based on inferences or what the majority deems to be findings “implicitly” made by the family court (e.g., maj. opn

2020(See Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 .) Despite the inapplicability of the doctrine of implied findings (to those issues for which Dixie requested a statement of decision and timely objected), the majority (1) concludes that both final statements of decision are “adequate” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 632 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33), yet (2) on more than one occasion further concludes that there is no error based on inferences or what the majority deems to be findings “implicitly” made by the family court (e.g., maj. opn

2020(See Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at pp. 1133-1134; Thompson, supra, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 983 .) Despite the inapplicability of the doctrine of implied findings (to those issues for which Dixie requested a statement of decision and timely objected), the majority (1) concludes that both final statements of decision are “adequate” for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure section 632 (maj. opn., ante, at p. 33), yet (2) on more than one occasion further concludes that there is no error based on inferences or what the majority deems to be findings “implicitly” made by the family court (e.g., maj. opn

2013(Stone).) Despite the inapplicability of the doctrine of transferred intent, a person who shoots at a group of people may be found guilty of the attempted murder of everyone in the group, even if he or she primarily targeted only one of them, if the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within what has been termed the ―‗kill zone.‘‖ (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 .) ―‗The intent is concurrent … when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by ha

2013(Stone).) Despite the inapplicability of the doctrine of transferred intent, a person who shoots at a group of people may be found guilty of the attempted murder of everyone in the group, even if he or she primarily targeted only one of them, if the person also, concurrently, intended to kill others within what has been termed the ―‗kill zone.‘‖ (People v. Bland, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 329 .) ―‗The intent is concurrent … when the nature and scope of the attack, while directed at a primary victim, are such that we can conclude the perpetrator intended to ensure harm to the primary victim by ha

1989Here, as in Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d 212 , the trial took place before our Davenport opinion and the argument “occurred only once at the outset when the prosecutor went through the list of aggravating and mitigating factors in light of the evidence presented.” (Id., at p. 255.) The prosecutor prefaced his remarks with the statement he would discuss the factors, “if they apply and if they don’t”; defense counsel argued the inapplicability of the factors; and the court instructed the jury to consider the factors “if applicable.” The prosecutor did not count up factors in aggravation and ask the j

1989Here, as in Boyde, supra, 46 Cal.3d 212 , the trial took place before our Davenport opinion and the argument "occurred only once at the outset when the prosecutor went through the list of aggravating and mitigating factors in light of the evidence presented." ( Id., at p. 255.) The prosecutor prefaced his remarks with the statement he would discuss the factors, "if they apply and if they don't"; defense counsel argued the inapplicability of the factors; and the court instructed the jury to consider the factors "if applicable." The prosecutor did not count up factors in aggravation and ask the

1987Preclusion of the RMS Tort Causes of Action RMS argues that the findings against it on the “unclean hands” affirmative defense may be disregarded because “that defense is insufficient as a matter of law.” RMS says that the inapplicability of the defense was revealed by two cases decided after RMS I. *1061 The first of these, Jewel v. Boxer (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 171 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 13 ], holds that, absent an agreement to the contrary, the rights of the members of a dissolved partnership to share in winding up fees received is dependent upon their interest in the partnership, not on the basis o

1987Preclusion of the RMS Tort Causes of Action RMS argues that the findings against it on the “unclean hands” affirmative defense may be disregarded because “that defense is insufficient as a matter of law.” RMS says that the inapplicability of the defense was revealed by two cases decided after RMS I. *1061 The first of these, Jewel v. Boxer (1984) 156 Cal.App.3d 171 [ 203 Cal.Rptr. 13 ], holds that, absent an agreement to the contrary, the rights of the members of a dissolved partnership to share in winding up fees received is dependent upon their interest in the partnership, not on the basis o

1982(Dresser v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 130 Cal. App.3d 506 ; Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 31 Cal. 3d 124 .) 3.

1982(Dresser v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 130 Cal. App.3d 506 ; Franz v. Board of Medical Quality Assurance, supra, 31 Cal. 3d 124 .) 3.

1968Plaintiff cites the recent case of Kaake v. Lott, 252 Cal.App.2d 895 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] in support of the proposition but it is our view that the cited case demonstrates the inapplicability of the rule in the present instance.

1968Plaintiff cites the recent case of Kaake v. Lott, 252 Cal.App.2d 895 [ 60 Cal.Rptr. 843 ] in support of the proposition but it is our view that the cited case demonstrates the inapplicability of the rule in the present instance.

1950The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Nourse points out the inapplicability of the doctrine in such a case. ( 48 Cal.App. at p. 437 .) (c) In Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ], the court granted mandate ordering salary paid to petitioner, after deciding on the merits that he held legal title to the office, an attempted ouster being invalid.

1950The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Nourse points out the inapplicability of the doctrine in such a case. ( 48 Cal.App. at p. 437 .) (c) In Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ], the court granted mandate ordering salary paid to petitioner, after deciding on the merits that he held legal title to the office, an attempted ouster being invalid.

1950The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Nourse points out the inapplicability of the doctrine in such a case. ( 48 Cal.App. at p. 437 .) (c) In Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [ 119 P. 1080 ], the court granted mandate ordering salary paid to petitioner, after deciding on the merits that he held legal title to the office, an attempted ouster being invalid.