Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Pennsylvania opinions name it 4 courts 1893–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Wannergreen1 sentence2023See Commonwealth v. Wanner, 158 A.3d 714, 717 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“[The a]ppellant avers that there is a statutory affirmative defense to Defiant Trespass that is applicable in the instant case. [The a]ppellant waived this claim by failing to raise it before the trial court and preserve it in her Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement.”) (footnote and citation omitted).4 ____________________________________________ 4 Had Appellant not waived his abandonment claim, we would be unpersuaded, based on the record before us, by the Commonwealth’s argument that it successfully established the inapplicability of | 1 | 1 |
Feldman v. Hoffmangreen1 sentence2015See id. at 831-35 . | 1 | 1 |
cluster 276008green2 sentences1972In factual situations such as that, we are in agreement that the assured clear distance rule would not apply." A terse reiteration of the inapplicability of the rule where the other vehicle is within the assured clear distance appears in Mihalic v. Texaco, Inc., 377 F. 2d 978, 983 (3d Cir. 1967): "Where an obstacle moves into the driver's path within a distance short of the assured clear distance, and he is unable to *220 stop, the driver is, of course, beyond the scope of the prohibition." The cases make clear that when there is another vehicle within the visible distance other rules become a 1972In factual situations such as that, we are in agreement that the assured clear distance rule would not apply.” A terse reiteration of the inapplicability of the rule where the other vehicle is within the assured clear distance appears in Mihalic v. Texaco, Inc., 377 F. 2d 978, 983 (3d Cir. 1967): “Where an obstacle moves into the driver’s path within a distance short of the assured clear distance, and he is unable to stop, the driver is, of course, beyond the scope of the prohibition.” The cases make clear that when there is another vehicle within the visible distance other rules become applic | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2023The Commonwealth argues that the evidence established that the building was not abandoned, citing Commonwealth v. Henderson, 419 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. 1980), where this Court held that the General Assembly intended “abandon” to track the dictionary definition meaning of “wholly forsaken or deserted.” Id. 2023The Commonwealth argues that the evidence established that the building was not abandoned, citing Commonwealth v. Henderson, 419 A.2d 1366 (Pa. Super. 1980), where this Court held that the General Assembly intended “abandon” to track the dictionary definition meaning of “wholly forsaken or deserted.” Id. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Commonwealth v. Grant
green
2 sentences2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. 2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Marian v. California
green
1 sentence2011Bomar v. Pennsylvania, 540 U.S. 1115 [ 124 S.Ct. 1053 , 157 L.Ed.2d 906 ] (2004), this claim appears underdeveloped — not waived — for review on the merits on this direct appeal. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Harley v. McMaster
green
1 sentence2011Bomar v. Pennsylvania, 540 U.S. 1115 [ 124 S.Ct. 1053 , 157 L.Ed.2d 906 ] (2004), this claim appears underdeveloped — not waived — for review on the merits on this direct appeal. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Adams v. Schriro
green
1 sentence2011Bomar v. Pennsylvania, 540 U.S. 1115 [ 124 S.Ct. 1053 , 157 L.Ed.2d 906 ] (2004), this claim appears underdeveloped — not waived — for review on the merits on this direct appeal. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Bomar
green
2 sentences2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. 2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Commonwealth v. Grant
green
2 sentences2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. 2011As Blye himself acknowledges: In light of Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726 (2002), clarified 573 Pa. 141 , 821 A.2d 1246 (2003) and the inapplicability here of the exception under Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831 (2003), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Howell v. Clyde
green
2 sentences2000If, despite the inapplicability of the doctrine, the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the sustaining of injury, the apportionment of responsibility will follow naturally under comparative negligence law and the defendant will be relieved of responsibility commensurately, if not altogether. .The Supreme Court, as evidenced by the lead opinions in the cases of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), and Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981), twice attempted to abolish the doctrine but came up short of the necessary votes to gain 2000If, despite the inapplicability of the doctrine, the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the sustaining of injury, the apportionment of responsibility will follow naturally under comparative negligence law and the defendant will be relieved of responsibility commensurately, if not altogether. .The Supreme Court, as evidenced by the lead opinions in the cases of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), and Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981), twice attempted to abolish the doctrine but came up short of the necessary votes to gain | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District
green
2 sentences2000If, despite the inapplicability of the doctrine, the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the sustaining of injury, the apportionment of responsibility will follow naturally under comparative negligence law and the defendant will be relieved of responsibility commensurately, if not altogether. .The Supreme Court, as evidenced by the lead opinions in the cases of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), and Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981), twice attempted to abolish the doctrine but came up short of the necessary votes to gain 2000If, despite the inapplicability of the doctrine, the plaintiffs negligence contributed to the sustaining of injury, the apportionment of responsibility will follow naturally under comparative negligence law and the defendant will be relieved of responsibility commensurately, if not altogether. .The Supreme Court, as evidenced by the lead opinions in the cases of Howell v. Clyde, 533 Pa. 151 , 620 A.2d 1107 (1993), and Rutter v. Northeastern Beaver County School District, 496 Pa. 590 , 437 A.2d 1198 (1981), twice attempted to abolish the doctrine but came up short of the necessary votes to gain | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Commonwealth v. West
green
2 sentences1996Issue XI, claiming the failure of counsel to cite Commonwealth v. West, 270 Pa.Super. 301 , 411 A.2d 537 (1979), in connection with Issue G (error to order disclosure of witness list) is specious and does not warrant extended discussion except to observe that the trial court was *542 within its authority in seeking a witness list to inquire of the jury if anyone knew of the proposed witness(es) to avoid any chance of a mistrial in the absence of such a precaution. 1996Issue XI, claiming the failure of counsel to cite Commonwealth v. West, 270 Pa.Super. 301 , 411 A.2d 537 (1979), in connection with Issue G (error to order disclosure of witness list) is specious and does not warrant extended discussion except to observe that the trial court was *542 within its authority in seeking a witness list to inquire of the jury if anyone knew of the proposed witness(es) to avoid any chance of a mistrial in the absence of such a precaution. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Whalen v. Roe
green
2 sentences1996As to Issue X, wherein the "right to privacy” remarks of the court to the jury (as not being a defense) were permitted for jury consideration without counsel’s objection, our discussion supra as to the inapplicability of such a defense (see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 , 97 S.Ct. 869, 877-78 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977)) dispenses with the need to address it here under the cloak of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 1996As to Issue X, wherein the "right to privacy” remarks of the court to the jury (as not being a defense) were permitted for jury consideration without counsel’s objection, our discussion supra as to the inapplicability of such a defense (see Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 602 , 97 S.Ct. 869, 877-78 , 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977)) dispenses with the need to address it here under the cloak of an ineffectiveness of counsel claim. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Commonwealth v. Kahley
green
2 sentences1977Id. 467 Pa. at 277 , 356 A.2d at 748 . 1977Id. 467 Pa. at 277 , 356 A.2d at 748 . | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Bucks v. American Cigar Box Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence1937Res adjudicata exists where the four following conditions concur: “(1) Identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of persons and of parties to the action; (4) identity of the quality in the persons for or against whom the claim is made”: Bucks v. American Cigar Box Lumber Co., 112 Pa. Superior Ct. 193, 197 . | 1 | 1937–1937 |
Gearhart v. Jordan
neutral
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Holt v. Bodey
green
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Huston's Appeal
neutral
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Fessler v. Hickernell & Bomberger
neutral
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Knouf's Appeal
neutral
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Miller v. Miller
green
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Stewart v. Stewart
green
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Ebenhardt's Appeal
neutral
1 sentence1927In Gearhart v. Jordan, 11 Pa. 325 , it was said, speaking of the rule we are considering, “Yet, when the funds or subjects of lien belong to different persons, the inquiry is whether the debt, which is a lien on both of them, or any part of it, ought in justice to be paid by one of them in relief of the other.” See also Huston’s App., 69 Pa. 485 ; Ebenhardt’s App., 8 W. & S. 327 ; Holt v. Bodey, 18 Pa. 207 ; Fessler v. Hickernell, 82 Pa. 150 ; Knouf’s App., 91 Pa. 78 ; Stewart v. Stewart, 207 Pa. 59 ; Miller’s App., 119 Pa. 620 . | 1 | 1927–1927 |
Thomas v. Phila. & Reading R. R.
neutral
1 sentence1893Co., 148 Pa. 180 , affords a still more striking illustration of the inapplicability of the rule of the highest possible care, in the case of an injured passenger, and of the necessity of affirmative proof of actual negligence, before a recovery could he had. | 1 | 1893–1893 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.