John motion in California

2018While UCSB's rules provide "no formal right to discovery," the Committee's rulings during the hearing placed John in a catch-22; he learned the name of the medication Jane was taking too late to *855 allow him to obtain an expert opinion, but the Committee precluded John from offering evidence of the side effects of Viibryd without an expert. ( Doe v. Regents of University of California , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 479 .) The Committee recognized the relevance of the Viibryd issue, but it rejected John's claim about insufficient notice by stating John " already had know

2018While UCSB's rules provide "no formal right to discovery," the Committee's rulings during the hearing placed John in a catch-22; he learned the name of the medication Jane was taking too late to *855 allow him to obtain an expert opinion, but the Committee precluded John from offering evidence of the side effects of Viibryd without an expert. ( Doe v. Regents of University of California , supra , 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 1095 , 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 479 .) The Committee recognized the relevance of the Viibryd issue, but it rejected John's claim about insufficient notice by stating John " already had know

2026(See People v. Oglesby (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818 , 826–827; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 , 1100 [challenge to a preplea determination of mental competence is a “certificate issue[]” that goes “to the legality of the proceedings, and, specifically, the validity of [the] guilty plea”].) 6 defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) And a trial court is required to hold a section 1368 hearing only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence: “[E]vidence ‘that does no more than form the basis for speculation

2026(See People v. Oglesby (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818 , 826–827; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 , 1100 [challenge to a preplea determination of mental competence is a “certificate issue[]” that goes “to the legality of the proceedings, and, specifically, the validity of [the] guilty plea”].) 6 defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) And a trial court is required to hold a section 1368 hearing only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence: “[E]vidence ‘that does no more than form the basis for speculation

2026(See People v. Oglesby (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818 , 826–827; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 , 1100 [challenge to a preplea determination of mental competence is a “certificate issue[]” that goes “to the legality of the proceedings, and, specifically, the validity of [the] guilty plea”].) 6 defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) And a trial court is required to hold a section 1368 hearing only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence: “[E]vidence ‘that does no more than form the basis for speculation

2026(See People v. Oglesby (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818 , 826–827; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 , 1100 [challenge to a preplea determination of mental competence is a “certificate issue[]” that goes “to the legality of the proceedings, and, specifically, the validity of [the] guilty plea”].) 6 defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) And a trial court is required to hold a section 1368 hearing only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence: “[E]vidence ‘that does no more than form the basis for speculation

2026(See People v. Oglesby (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 818 , 826–827; cf. People v. Mendez (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084 , 1100 [challenge to a preplea determination of mental competence is a “certificate issue[]” that goes “to the legality of the proceedings, and, specifically, the validity of [the] guilty plea”].) 6 defendant’s demeanor, irrational behavior, and prior mental evaluations.” (Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 847 .) And a trial court is required to hold a section 1368 hearing only if there is substantial evidence of incompetence: “[E]vidence ‘that does no more than form the basis for speculation

2025Maria requests this court to deem “all the issues raised in this appeal waived for failure to present [the facts] properly [Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 ].” We conclude that John, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on the assault claim, failed to “set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 .) “Because [John] has failed in his obligations concerning the discussion and analysis of a substantial e

2025Maria requests this court to deem “all the issues raised in this appeal waived for failure to present [the facts] properly [Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 881 ].” We conclude that John, in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings on the assault claim, failed to “set forth, discuss, and analyze all the evidence on that point, both favorable and unfavorable.” (Doe v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Cashel & Emly, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th at p. 218 .) “Because [John] has failed in his obligations concerning the discussion and analysis of a substantial e

2023Because both parties signed it, the Deal Memo is not a proposal; it is an agreement. 10 grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221 .) “ ‘Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.]’ ” (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1158–1159.) Not only did Robert fail to file any opposition to John’s motion to enforce the Deal Memo in the trial court, but he did

2023In any event, Brian has not satisfied his burden to rebut the presumption that the trial court’s order is correct. ( Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609.) Brian also argues the trial court erroneously “refused to continue the MSJ hearing,” and that John’s motion for summary adjudication relied on inadmissible evidence and an “incompetent declaration.” The trial court overruled all of Brian’s evidentiary objections to John’s evidence in support of his motion for summary adjudication, and Brian’s conclusory assertions of trial court error without pertinent cites to the record are insufficie

2023While the trial court’s order granting John’s motion and denying Bodhi’s motion does not use the term “judgment,” its effect was “to finally determine the rights of the parties in this action by enforcing the settlement agreement.” (Critzer v. Enos (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1252 .) We therefore “will amend the order to include an appealable judgment so as to expedite appellate review.” (Ibid.) 4 Bodhi filed a request for judicial notice on November 10, 2022 in connection with the indispensable party issue, which John opposed and we previously took under submission.

2023Because both parties signed it, the Deal Memo is not a proposal; it is an agreement. 10 grounds for reversal on appeal when he or she fails to raise the objection in the trial court.” (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 221 .) “ ‘Any other rule would permit a party to play fast and loose with the administration of justice by deliberately standing by without making an objection of which he is aware. [Citation.]’ ” (In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1158–1159.) Not only did Robert fail to file any opposition to John’s motion to enforce the Deal Memo in the trial court, but he did

2023(Hoffman v. 162 North Wolfe LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1178 , 1185–1186.) According to the allegations of the cross-complaint, the following acts by Thomas formed the basis of both his fraud and breach of fiduciary duty cross-claims: (1) John’s failure to inform Thomas about the status of the Oak Grove malpractice claim, (2) John’s failure to tell Thomas that William failed 12 to secure tail coverage, (3) John’s instruction to Littlefield not to discuss the Oak Grove malpractice claim with Thomas, and (4) John’s instruction to Lipanovich not to share the coverage denial letter from Lawyers’ Mu

2021(Davis, supra, 526 U.S. at p. 650 .) The trial court concluded that the complaint did not allege discrimination or harassment based on gender or sex because it alleged the coach “created a sexually charged atmosphere that the students were expected to join, not as to each other but as to the opposite sex in general.” Further, while the principal’s “alleged response may seem indifferent, the Court’s review of the [complaint] suggests that, based on the facts pled, there are a mere handful of identifiable incidents cited to support John’s claim.” a.

2021(Id. at p. 640; see also Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 112 [litigation can improve defendant’s sensitivity to rights of others affected by its actions].) “Attorney fees have consistently been awarded for the enforcement of well-defined, existing obligations.” (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 318 .) Additionally, John’s defense of the judgment resulted in a published opinion, which “alone supports a conclusion that the result was of significant statewide public interest.” (Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 495, fn. 8 ; see al

2021(Id. at p. 640; see also Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 112 [litigation can improve defendant’s sensitivity to rights of others affected by its actions].) “Attorney fees have consistently been awarded for the enforcement of well-defined, existing obligations.” (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 318 .) Additionally, John’s defense of the judgment resulted in a published opinion, which “alone supports a conclusion that the result was of significant statewide public interest.” (Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 495, fn. 8 ; see al

2021(Id. at p. 640; see also Beach Colony II v. California Coastal Com. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 106, 112 [litigation can improve defendant’s sensitivity to rights of others affected by its actions].) “Attorney fees have consistently been awarded for the enforcement of well-defined, existing obligations.” (Press, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 318 .) Additionally, John’s defense of the judgment resulted in a published opinion, which “alone supports a conclusion that the result was of significant statewide public interest.” (Protect Our Water v. County of Merced (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 488, 495, fn. 8 ; see al

2020We recognize the Second District stated that “where a protected party seeks a renewal of a restraining order and the restrained party … has lost on appeal, the restrained party cannot challenge the findings and evidence underlying the original order nor the validity of that order.” (Cooper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 92 .) We do not interpret the phrase “the validity of that order” as precluding a restrained party from seeking modification of the terms of a renewed restraining order, a procedure specifically authorized by statute.

2020II., ante.) This incorrect assumption or determination tainted the court’s exercise of discretion, which means its decisions to renew the restraining order and to deny John’s motion were “ ‘not an exercise of informed discretion and [are] subject to reversal.’ ” (Cooper, supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 90 .) Accordingly, the decisions must be reversed and the trial court directed to reevaluate Maria’s request to renew the restraining order.

2015In a written ruling, the court reasoned that Pagarigan v. Libby Care Center, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 298 (Pagarigan), which held that an arbitration agreement could not be enforced when an elderly patient’s adult children signed on the resident’s behalf without express authorization, was “directly on point.” The court found St.

2014Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468 , 475 examined whether a homeowners association's meetings and newsletter were public forums for purposes of an anti-SLAPP motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16.

2014Hemingway v. Superior Court (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1148 , 1153 involved a peremptory challenge under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6, not a motion to disqualify for cause under section 170.1, as John's motion was.