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18 California opinions name it 1 courts 1998–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Hillgreen2 sentences2022(Bigboy v. County of San Diego, at pp. 411‒412.) The court concluded there was no comparison between the conduct in its case and that in Love, where the court “found 60 instances of flagrant misconduct” which was “intentional, blatant and continuous and was carefully contrived and calculated to inflame the jury.” (Bigboy v. County of San Diego, at pp. 411‒412.) Here, while the misconduct was not as persistent as that in Love, the trial court reasonably could find the errors raised “the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice 2022(Bigboy v. County of San Diego, at pp. 411‒412.) The court concluded there was no comparison between the conduct in its case and that in Love, where the court “found 60 instances of flagrant misconduct” which was “intentional, blatant and continuous and was carefully contrived and calculated to inflame the jury.” (Bigboy v. County of San Diego, at pp. 411‒412.) Here, while the misconduct was not as persistent as that in Love, the trial court reasonably could find the errors raised “the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice | 2 | 16 |
People v. Fayedgreen1 sentence2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204 (Fayed).) But the prosecution “ ‘enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore, although it is misconduct for the prosecutor to “personally vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may properly argue a witness is telling the truth based on the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433 .) In assessing multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, “we consider the cumulative effect of [the] misconduct | 1 | 1 |
Shawn Garfield Price v. Superior Courtgreen1 sentence2021Nevertheless, a series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844 , overruled on another ground in Price v. Superior Court (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1046, 1069, fn. 13 .) Cumulative error depends on any number of errors whose aggregate prejudicial effect must be considered in deciding whether the defendant’s “guilt or innocence was fairly adjudicated.” ( Hill, supra, at p. 844 .) In Hill, the court found that “the sheer number of instances of prosecutorial misc | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smitheygreen1 sentence2020(See generally People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017-1018 [considering the cumulative effect of the defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims and prosecutorial misconduct claims].) As to each of defendant’s three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct, we have determined that defendant has failed to establish he was prejudiced by any deficient performance. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Boltongreen2 sentences2006Prejudice In assessing prejudice, we consider the cumulative effect of Jones’s misconduct because the number and gravity of incidents “raises the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 845.) In assessing the effect of the misconduct, we must factor in the “ ‘special regard the jury has for the prosecutor’ ” (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 ]), and the circumstance that the trial court overruled appellant’s ob 2006Prejudice In assessing prejudice, we consider the cumulative effect of Jones’s misconduct because the number and gravity of incidents “raises the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 845.) In assessing the effect of the misconduct, we must factor in the “ ‘special regard the jury has for the prosecutor’ ” (People v. Bolton (1979) 23 Cal.3d 208, 213 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 141 , 589 P.2d 396 ]), and the circumstance that the trial court overruled appellant’s ob | 1 | 1 |
People v. Robertsgreen2 sentences1998(Cf. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ] [concluding “the whole” of the trial errors “did not outweigh the sum of their parts”].) At the outset, we may not escape the fact defendant was forced to suffer constant and outrageous misconduct by Prosecutor Morton. 1998(Cf. People v. Roberts (1992) 2 Cal.4th 271, 326 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 276 , 826 P.2d 274 ] [concluding “the whole” of the trial errors “did not outweigh the sum of their parts”].) At the outset, we may not escape the fact defendant was forced to suffer constant and outrageous misconduct by Prosecutor Morton. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Cuccia
green
2 sentences2015(See People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) However, as discussed ante, since we have found none of appellant’s claims of error meritorious and/or prejudicial, a cumulative error argument cannot be sustained. 2015(See People v. Cuccia (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 785, 795 .) However, as discussed ante, since we have found none of Estrada’s claims of error meritorious and/or prejudicial, a cumulative error argument cannot be sustained. | 4 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences2015Cumulative Error Appellant contends that the cumulative effect of the errors discussed ante, “rendered his trial fundamentally unfair and requires the reversal of the entire judgment.” Reversal based on cumulative error is required only if a high number of instances of error occurring at trial create a strong possibility that “the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845 .) For instance, in Hill, at pages 844 through 847, the court concluded that the cumulative impact of const 2015However, reversal based on cumulative error is required only if a high number of instances of error occurring at trial create a strong possibility that “the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845 .) For instance, in People v. Hill, supra, at pages 844 through 847, the court concluded that the cumulative impact of constant and outrageous misconduct by the prosecutor and several legal errors occurring at trial “created a negative synergistic effect, rendering the degree of ove | 4 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Woods
green
2 sentences2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204 (Fayed).) But the prosecution “ ‘enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore, although it is misconduct for the prosecutor to “personally vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may properly argue a witness is telling the truth based on the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433 .) In assessing multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, “we consider the cumulative effect of [the] misconduct 2020Prosecutorial Misconduct - Cumulative Prejudice In assessing the prejudice of multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, “we consider the cumulative effect of [the] misconduct because the number and gravity of incidents ‘raises the strong possibility the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.’ ” (People v. Woods (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 106, 117 , quoting Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 845 .) Thus, where we are considering the forfeited contentions of prosecutorial misconduct under the framework of ineffective assis | 2 | 2020–2025 |
People v. Boyette
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204 (Fayed).) But the prosecution “ ‘enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore, although it is misconduct for the prosecutor to “personally vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may properly argue a witness is telling the truth based on the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433 .) In assessing multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, “we consider the cumulative effect of [the] misconduct | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Lopez
green
1 sentence2025(People v. Fayed (2020) 9 Cal.5th 147, 204 (Fayed).) But the prosecution “ ‘enjoys wide latitude in commenting on the evidence, including the reasonable inferences and deductions that can be drawn therefrom.’ ” (Ibid.) Furthermore, although it is misconduct for the prosecutor to “personally vouch for the credibility of a witness, a prosecutor may properly argue a witness is telling the truth based on the circumstances of the case.” (People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 433 .) In assessing multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct, “we consider the cumulative effect of [the] misconduct | 1 | 2025–2025 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2016We agree. “[A] series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844 .) The “aggregate prejudicial effect of” a series of errors can be “greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (Id. at p. 845.) Applying the state-law harmless-error standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , we must determine whether it is reasonably probable that Hogan would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial absent the several errors we h 2016We agree. “[A] series of trial errors, though independently harmless, may in some circumstances rise by accretion to the level of reversible and prejudicial error.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 844 .) The “aggregate prejudicial effect of” a series of errors can be “greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (Id. at p. 845.) Applying the state-law harmless-error standard of People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818 , we must determine whether it is reasonably probable that Hogan would have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial absent the several errors we h | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Kronemyer
green
1 sentence2015(See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 844 .) The “litmus test” for such a claim is “whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.” (People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 349 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 742 .) “Accordingly, we review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant in their absence.” (Ibid.) Rosa relies on Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 845 , in arguing that “the number of ‘legal errors raises the st | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Butler
green
1 sentence2015(See People v. Butler (2009) 46 Cal.4th 847, 885 ; Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp. 844-845.) Mei contends “had it not been for the various instructional errors concerning [her] culpability for Selma’s murder, it is unlikely that the jury would have found the 100 pound appellant guilty of the attempted premeditated murder of Eric.” With respect to Mei’s appeal, we have found the instructional error related to count one was prejudicial and reversal of that conviction is required. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Whitmer
green
1 sentence2015(See Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 844 .) The “litmus test” for such a claim is “whether defendant received due process and a fair trial.” (People v. Kronemyer (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 314, 349 , disapproved on another ground in People v. Whitmer (2014) 59 Cal.4th 733, 742 .) “Accordingly, we review each allegation and assess the cumulative effect of any errors to see if it is reasonably probable the jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant in their absence.” (Ibid.) Rosa relies on Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at page 845 , in arguing that “the number of ‘legal errors raises the st | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
green
1 sentence2015(People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 363-364.) 33 Reversal based on cumulative error is required only if a high number of instances of error occurring at trial creating a strong possibility that “the aggregate prejudicial effect of such errors was greater than the sum of the prejudice of each error standing alone.” (People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 845 (Hill).) For instance, in Hill at pages 844 through 847, the court concluded that the cumulative impact of constant and outrageous misconduct by the prosecutor and several legal errors occurring at trial “created a | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.