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18 California opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Coffey v. Shiomotogreen2 sentences2024(Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1206, fn. 8 [“ ‘[t]est results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule’ ”]; County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1448 [finding that laboratory’s paternity test results were admissible under the business records exception due to testimony establishing chain of custody, despite the fact that the technicians who received and tested the samples did not testify and were not available for cross-examination 2024(Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1206, fn. 8 [“ ‘[t]est results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule’ ”]; County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1448 [finding that laboratory’s paternity test results were admissible under the business records exception due to testimony establishing chain of custody, despite the fact that the technicians who received and tested the samples did not testify and were not available for cross-examination | 4 | 4 |
Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1995Code, § 11513; see Daniels, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 538 .)” (Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 , fn. omitted.) For several reasons, we choose not to follow Imachi insofar as it suggests that the public employee records exception applies only if the person making the record has personal knowledge of the recorded facts. 1992(Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1375 ; see Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 .) By contrast, because the officer in Imachi did not personally perform the blood test, the sworn statement that he had seen and was accurately reporting the results of that test “could not attest to the accuracy of the test results themselves or the propriety of procedures employed in obtaining them.” ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 .) We noted, however, that “[t]he actual writ | 2 | 3 |
Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1995Citing Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 1364 , and Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 72 , the court in Imachi stated: “The conclusion of these cases that the officer’s statement falls within the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule was premised on the fact that the officer’s report was based on firsthand observations. [Citations.]” (Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 *642 Cal.App.4th at pp. 815-816.) Although this statement is accurate, neither Snelgrove nor Fisk suggests that sworn reports qualify as publ 1992(Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1375 ; see Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 .) By contrast, because the officer in Imachi did not personally perform the blood test, the sworn statement that he had seen and was accurately reporting the results of that test “could not attest to the accuracy of the test results themselves or the propriety of procedures employed in obtaining them.” ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 .) We noted, however, that “[t]he actual writ | 2 | 3 |
County of Sonoma v. GRANT W.green2 sentences2024(Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1206, fn. 8 [“ ‘[t]est results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule’ ”]; County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1448 [finding that laboratory’s paternity test results were admissible under the business records exception due to testimony establishing chain of custody, despite the fact that the technicians who received and tested the samples did not testify and were not available for cross-examination 2024(Coffey v. Shiomoto (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1198, 1206, fn. 8 [“ ‘[t]est results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule’ ”]; County of Sonoma v. Grant W. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1439, 1448 [finding that laboratory’s paternity test results were admissible under the business records exception due to testimony establishing chain of custody, despite the fact that the technicians who received and tested the samples did not testify and were not available for cross-examination | 2 | 2 |
Lake v. Reedgreen2 sentences2009But it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over a hearsay objection in a civil action." ( Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 987 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ] ( Molenda ).) Thus, to support the DMV's finding that Miyamoto was driving with a blood-alcohol content in excess of 0.08 percent, the Lab Report must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. (3) "In Lake , the California Supreme Court held that despite their hearsay nature, blood and urine test reports prepared by government forensic laboratories are admissi 2009“In Lake , the California Supreme Court held that despite their hearsay nature, blood and urine test reports prepared by government forensic laboratories are admissible in DMV administrative review hearings as official records under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, provided they meet the requirements of Evidence Code section 1280, which sets forth the exception.” ( Molenda, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at pp. 987-988, citing Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 467 .) Section 1280 provides: “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmiss | 1 | 4 |
Daniels v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1995Code, § 11513; see Daniels, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 538 .)” (Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 817 , fn. omitted.) For several reasons, we choose not to follow Imachi insofar as it suggests that the public employee records exception applies only if the person making the record has personal knowledge of the recorded facts. 1987The court in Daniels , he notes, declined to address whether admissibility under the public employee records exception would “justify sole reliance on the officer’s report in an implied consent hearing . . . .” ( Daniels, supra, 33 Cal.3d 532, 541 .) This issue was thoroughly considered and resolved in Burkhart and again in Mackler . | 1 | 2 |
Santos v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1995“An officer’s statement reporting firsthand observations—objective symptoms of intoxication, circumstances of a driver’s refusal to submit to a chemical test, or results of a personally administered breath test—falls within the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.]” (Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 546 .) Under the exception, a writing recording an act, condition or event is admissible if the writing was: (1) made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee; (2) at or near the time of the act, condition or event; and (3) 1994These statements, therefore, may form the sole basis for suspension of a driver’s license only if made from firsthand observation. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 388-389.) In sum, an “officer’s statement reporting firsthand observations . . . falls within the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. [Citations.]” (Santos v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 537, 546 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 10 ]; Evid. | 1 | 2 |
Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2013(Petricka v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1348 (Petricka).) Although the DS 367 statement and forensic report are hearsay, they are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, provided they meet the foundational requirements of Evidence Code section 1280,2 which sets forth the exception. | 1 | 1 |
Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2009But it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over a hearsay objection in a civil action." ( Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 987 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ] ( Molenda ).) Thus, to support the DMV's finding that Miyamoto was driving with a blood-alcohol content in excess of 0.08 percent, the Lab Report must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. (3) "In Lake , the California Supreme Court held that despite their hearsay nature, blood and urine test reports prepared by government forensic laboratories are admissi 2009But it shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless it would be admissible over a hearsay objection in a civil action." ( Molenda v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 974, 987 [ 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 792 ] ( Molenda ).) Thus, to support the DMV's finding that Miyamoto was driving with a blood-alcohol content in excess of 0.08 percent, the Lab Report must fall within an exception to the hearsay rule. (3) "In Lake , the California Supreme Court held that despite their hearsay nature, blood and urine test reports prepared by government forensic laboratories are admissi | 1 | 1 |
Concord Communities v. City of Concordgreen2 sentences2009Since the court did not adhere to the legal principles that govern the admissibility of this evidence, we conclude that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the Lab Report. ( Concord Communities v. City of Concord, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417; Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 .) Because the Lab Report was admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, it was sufficient in itself to support the DMV's finding that Miyamoto was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 2009(Concord Communities v. City of Concord, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417; Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 .) Because the Lab Report was admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, it was sufficient in itself to support the DMV’s finding that Miyamoto was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 percent. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2009Since we are presented with records from an electronic database, the critical date for the purpose of the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule is the date that the test results were first recorded in the laboratory's electronic database, which was March 23, 2007. ( Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 "to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout"].) *1220 The appellate cour 2009(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 “to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout”].) The appellate court examined the admissibility of forensic lab reports in DMV proceedings under section 1280 in Glatman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 700 and Molenda, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 974 . | 1 | 1 |
McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences2002(Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 143; McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 ].) Test *65 results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. 2002(Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 143; McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 ].) Test *65 results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
Davenport v. Department of Motor Vehiclesgreen1 sentence2002(Davenport, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 143; McKinney v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 519, 525 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 18 ].) Test *65 results from authorized laboratories, performed by public employees within the scope of their duties, are admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Dunlapgreen2 sentences1995(County of Sonoma v. Grant W., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1450-1451.) The two exceptions are essentially the same, except that the former applies to business records instead of official *640 records and “ ‘requires a witness to testify as to the identity of the record and its mode of preparation in every instance. . . .’ ” (People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1477 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 ].) Given this similarity, decisions analyzing the business records exception are applicable to our analysis in this case. 4 As the court explained in Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 C 1995(County of Sonoma v. Grant W., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1450-1451.) The two exceptions are essentially the same, except that the former applies to business records instead of official *640 records and “ ‘requires a witness to testify as to the identity of the record and its mode of preparation in every instance. . . .’ ” (People v. Dunlap (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1477 [ 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 204 ].) Given this similarity, decisions analyzing the business records exception are applicable to our analysis in this case. 4 As the court explained in Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 C | 1 | 1 |
People v. Abelsongreen2 sentences1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. 1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
Poag v. Winstongreen2 sentences1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. 1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
Rader Co. v. Stonegreen2 sentences1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. 1994(Cf. Poag v. Winston (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1161, 1179 [ 241 Cal.Rptr. 330 ]; Rader Co. v. Stone (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 10, 23 [ 223 Cal.Rptr. 806 ]; People v. Abelson (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d Supp. 16, 19 [ 164 Cal.Rptr. 369 ].) Consequently, it would make no legal difference if the statement of certification were located elsewhere on the local form. 4 Even if this were the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether the report would fit into the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1995Citing Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d 1364 , and Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d 72 , the court in Imachi stated: “The conclusion of these cases that the officer’s statement falls within the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule was premised on the fact that the officer’s report was based on firsthand observations. [Citations.]” (Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 *642 Cal.App.4th at pp. 815-816.) Although this statement is accurate, neither Snelgrove nor Fisk suggests that sworn reports qualify as publ 1992(Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 815; Snelgrove v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1375 ; see Fisk v. Department of Motor Vehicles, supra, 127 Cal.App.3d at p. 77 .) By contrast, because the officer in Imachi did not personally perform the blood test, the sworn statement that he had seen and was accurately reporting the results of that test “could not attest to the accuracy of the test results themselves or the propriety of procedures employed in obtaining them.” ( 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 816 .) We noted, however, that “[t]he actual writ | 3 | 1992–1995 |
Nichols v. McCoy
green
2 sentences2024Nichols v. McCoy (1952) 38 Cal.2d 447 , 448‒449 [blood sample confirming elevated alcohol levels was properly admitted under the business records exception where coroner testified to the procedures followed in taking blood samples although embalmer had no personal knowledge of the decedent’s identity].) Stelmach, however, does not argue in her opening brief that the DNA report was inadmissible as a business or public employee record. 2024Nichols v. McCoy (1952) 38 Cal.2d 447 , 448‒449 [blood sample confirming elevated alcohol levels was properly admitted under the business records exception where coroner testified to the procedures followed in taking blood samples although embalmer had no personal knowledge of the decedent’s identity].) Stelmach, however, does not argue in her opening brief that the DNA report was inadmissible as a business or public employee record. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Furman v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences2013(Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 467 ; Shea v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1059 ; Furman v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 416, 421 ; Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles 1 This statement is typically referred to as the officer’s DS 367 statement, a designation we shall use here. 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Evidence Code, except where otherwise noted. 4 (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 809, 815 .) Section 1280 requires that the “writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee,” it was “made at or near the 2009(Lake, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 467.) This is true even when the forensic reports are not certified under penalty of perjury. 2 (16 Cal.4th at p. 467.) Evidence Code section 1280 provides; “Evidence of a writing made as a record of an act, condition, or event is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule when offered in any civil or criminal proceeding to prove the act, condition, or event if all of the following applies: [f] (a) The writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee, [f] (b) The writing was made at or near the time of the act, condition, or event. [f] (c) The | 2 | 2009–2013 |
Shannon v. Gourley
green
1 sentence2015After first noting that section 23152, subdivision (b) makes it a rebuttable presumption that a person was driving with a BAC of 0.08 percent or higher if so tested at that level or higher within three hours of driving (see discussion, post), the trial court denied the writ, 8 Evidence Code section 664 provides in part: ―It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.‖ Applied in this context, ―Evidence Code section 664 creates a rebuttable presumption that blood-alcohol test results recorded on official forms were obtained by following the regulations and guidelines of [Cal. C | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Burg v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2015In determining whether the trial court‘s decision was supported by substantial evidence, the appellate court opined that ―[t]he issue boils down to whether non-chemical-test circumstantial evidence can prove that Coffey‘s BAC at the time of driving was consistent with her BAC at the time of her chemical tests.‖ Relying on this court‘s opinion in Burg v. Municipal Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 257 , the appellate court held in the affirmative. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Shea v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2013(Lake v. Reed, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 467 ; Shea v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1059 ; Furman v. Department of Motor Vehicles (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 416, 421 ; Imachi v. Department of Motor Vehicles 1 This statement is typically referred to as the officer’s DS 367 statement, a designation we shall use here. 2 All subsequent statutory references are to the Evidence Code, except where otherwise noted. 4 (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 809, 815 .) Section 1280 requires that the “writing was made by and within the scope of duty of a public employee,” it was “made at or near the | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Board
green
2 sentences2009Since the court did not adhere to the legal principles that govern the admissibility of this evidence, we conclude that the court abused its discretion when it excluded the Lab Report. ( Concord Communities v. City of Concord, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417; Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 .) Because the Lab Report was admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, it was sufficient in itself to support the DMV's finding that Miyamoto was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 2009(Concord Communities v. City of Concord, supra, 91 Cal.App.4th at p. 1417; Department of Parks & Recreation v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at p. 831 .) Because the Lab Report was admissible under the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule, it was sufficient in itself to support the DMV’s finding that Miyamoto was driving a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.08 percent. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
GLATMAN v. Valverde
green
2 sentences2009Since we are presented with records from an electronic database, the critical date for the purpose of the public employee records exception to the hearsay rule is the date that the test results were first recorded in the laboratory's electronic database, which was March 23, 2007. ( Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 "to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout"].) *1220 The appellate cour 2009(Martinez, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 126 [in applying the timeliness requirement from § 1280 “to computer printouts from a database, we consider the length of time between the act, condition, or event and the date of its recording, not the date of its eventual retrieval by computer printout”].) The appellate court examined the admissibility of forensic lab reports in DMV proceedings under section 1280 in Glatman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th 700 and Molenda, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 974 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
McNary v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
1 sentence2007(McNary, supra, 45 Cal.App.4th at p. 695 .) Therefore, those observations could be considered as competent evidence establishing that the licensee was driving the vehicle. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Baeske
green
1 sentence1995After making the statement that Fisk quotes, Baeske found the public employee records exception inapplicable because the neighbor, “the source of the information, was not a public employee with any duty either to observe facts correctly or to report her observations accurately to the police department.” (People v. Baeske, supra, 58 Cal.App.3d at p. 781 .) The court’s decision implies that the report would have been admissible had the source of the information been a public employee with such a duty. 7 Quoting Imachi , the court explained that “ ‘. . . the requisite indicia of trustworthiness w | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles
green
2 sentences1995Nor do we find Gananian’s citation to Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 384 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ] persuasive. 1995Nor do we find Gananian’s citation to Burge v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 384 [ 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 5 ] persuasive. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.