trustee claim in California

2024Indeed, it is well settled that a probate court has the authority to remove a trustee sua sponte (§ 15642, subd. (a); Schwartz, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 ) where it is shown that hostility or antagonism between the trustee and the beneficiary “impairs the proper administration of the trust.” (Estate of Gilmaker (1962) 57 Cal.2d 627, 632-633 ; see Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 288 [“Hostility, antagonism and inevitable future conflict can justify an order of removal of the trustee when those factors impair the proper administration of the trust”].) Thus, it logically follow

2020They cite the well-established principle that a “‘court will not ordinarily remove a trustee named by the settlor upon a ground existing at the time of his appointment and known to the settlor and in spite of which the settlor appointed him, although the court would not have appointed him trustee.’” (In re Brown’s Estate (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 480, 486 , quoting Restatement of the Law on Trusts, section 107.) However, “[h]ostility between the beneficiary and the trustee is a ground for removal of the trustee when the hostility impairs the proper administration of the trust.” (Estate of Gilmaker

2024Indeed, it is well settled that a probate court has the authority to remove a trustee sua sponte (§ 15642, subd. (a); Schwartz, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 427 ) where it is shown that hostility or antagonism between the trustee and the beneficiary “impairs the proper administration of the trust.” (Estate of Gilmaker (1962) 57 Cal.2d 627, 632-633 ; see Copley v. Copley (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 248, 288 [“Hostility, antagonism and inevitable future conflict can justify an order of removal of the trustee when those factors impair the proper administration of the trust”].) Thus, it logically follow

2020They cite the well-established principle that a “‘court will not ordinarily remove a trustee named by the settlor upon a ground existing at the time of his appointment and known to the settlor and in spite of which the settlor appointed him, although the court would not have appointed him trustee.’” (In re Brown’s Estate (1937) 22 Cal.App.2d 480, 486 , quoting Restatement of the Law on Trusts, section 107.) However, “[h]ostility between the beneficiary and the trustee is a ground for removal of the trustee when the hostility impairs the proper administration of the trust.” (Estate of Gilmaker

2022(Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 111, 114 [“The statutory scheme’s ‘evident purpose’ is to carry out the decedent’s intent and to prevent looting of estates.”].) “The probate court may apply general equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief.” (Id. at p. 114.) “ ‘It will not be questioned that justice and sound policy require that the estates of decedents be distributed to persons rightfully entitled thereto and that every concern and endeavor of a probate court should be to the accomplishment of that purpose.’ ” (Estate of Kraus, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1

2019Rather, "[t]he statutory scheme's purpose is to effect a conveyance or transfer of property belonging to a decedent or a trust or another person under specified circumstances, to grant any appropriate relief to carry out the decedent's [or settlor's] intent, and to prevent looting of ... estates. [Citations.] It provides the probate court with a *171 mechanism to determine rights in property belonging to a decedent or to someone else. [Citation.]" ( Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103 , 117-118, 108 Cal.Rptr.3d 760 .) David, as trustee, is claiming entitlement to personal property that

2022Code,] § 7050, subd. (b); see, e.g., Estate of Baglione (1966) 65 Cal.2d 192, 196-197 .)” Furthermore, Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(3) permits an interested person to petition the court for an appropriate order in situations where (1) “the trustee is in possession of, or holds title to, real or personal property, and the property, or some interest, is claimed to belong to another”; or (2) “the trustee has a claim to real or personal property, title or possession of which is held by another.” In other words, under this statute, the probate court is empowered to resolve competing cl

2022(Estate of Kraus (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 103, 111, 114 [“The statutory scheme’s ‘evident purpose’ is to carry out the decedent’s intent and to prevent looting of estates.”].) “The probate court may apply general equitable principles in fashioning remedies and granting relief.” (Id. at p. 114.) “ ‘It will not be questioned that justice and sound policy require that the estates of decedents be distributed to persons rightfully entitled thereto and that every concern and endeavor of a probate court should be to the accomplishment of that purpose.’ ” (Estate of Kraus, supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1

2021(See Carter v. Cohen (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1038, 1053 [“we will affirm the [fee] award on any basis properly supported by the record”].) Trustee’s protestations that he did not know of the agreement are unavailing: the trial court found otherwise, and Trustee has not shown this finding lacked substantial evidence.

2021(See Harris, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at p. 536 [“The Trust instrument here, as amended, provides: ‘Except for the Trustee’s willful misconduct or gross negligence . . . , the Trustee shall be indemnified and held harmless . . . by the trust estate . . . .’ ”].) 12 As Plaintiffs argue, there is substantial evidence supporting an implied finding that Trustee’s defense of Plaintiffs’ complaint was not reasonable because he was aware of the binding oral agreement.

2015(See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 407-410, 413 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ] [improper for Court of Appeal to look to postjudgment evidence outside of record on appeal and not considered by trial court].) 12 “In all proceedings governed by this code, an appeal may be taken from the making of, or the refusal to make, any of the following orders: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) Directing or allowing payment of a debt, claim, or cost.” (Prob.

2015(See In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 407-410, 413 [ 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 683 , 73 P.3d 541 ] [improper for Court of Appeal to look to postjudgment evidence outside of record on appeal and not considered by trial court].) 12 “In all proceedings governed by this code, an appeal may be taken from the making of, or the refusal to make, any of the following orders: [¶] . . . [¶] (d) Directing or allowing payment of a debt, claim, or cost.” (Prob.

2004(Cf. Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1760, 1773 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 ] [leave to amend properly denied where proposed amendment fails to state a cause of action].) 17 The application requested that the two summary judgment motions be heard “on the Wednesday prior to trial of this action.” Since trial was set for August 25, 2003, we infer that the application sought a continuance of the hearing on Trustee’s motion to August 20, 2003. 18 In reality, although it was not a continuance granted under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), we note that the hearing on Trust

2004(Cf. Soderberg v. McKinney (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1760, 1773 [ 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 635 ] [leave to amend properly denied where proposed amendment fails to state a cause of action].) 17 The application requested that the two summary judgment motions be heard “on the Wednesday prior to trial of this action.” Since trial was set for August 25, 2003, we infer that the application sought a continuance of the hearing on Trustee’s motion to August 20, 2003. 18 In reality, although it was not a continuance granted under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (h), we note that the hearing on Trust

1997Code, § 911; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ].) Consequently, whether a trustee can claim the attorney-client privilege, and thereby prevent discovery of confidential communications it has had with an attorney, depends upon statute.

1997Code, § 911; Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 373 [ 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 330 , 853 P.2d 496 ].) Consequently, whether a trustee can claim the attorney-client privilege, and thereby prevent discovery of confidential communications it has had with an attorney, depends upon statute.

1995Notice of amendment to the trustee should be a requirement, since the modification will surely affect his duties.” (10A Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees (2d ed. rev. 1983) ch. 47, § 993, p. 239, fns. omitted; see also In re Trust of Kaufmann (1975) 460 Pa. 24 [ 331 A.2d 209, 211 ]; Northwestern University v. McLoraine (1982) 108 Ill.App.3d 310 [ 64 Ill.Dec. 50 , 438 N.E.2d 1369, 1373 ]; Phelps v. State Street Trust Co. (1953) 330 Mass. 511 [ 115 N.E.2d 382, 383 ].) By including paragraph 4(b) in the Trust, Irvine provided for the exclusive means by which she could amend the Trust.

1995Notice of amendment to the trustee should be a requirement, since the modification will surely affect his duties.” (10A Bogert, The Law of Trusts & Trustees (2d ed. rev. 1983) ch. 47, § 993, p. 239, fns. omitted; see also In re Trust of Kaufmann (1975) 460 Pa. 24 [ 331 A.2d 209, 211 ]; Northwestern University v. McLoraine (1982) 108 Ill.App.3d 310 [ 64 Ill.Dec. 50 , 438 N.E.2d 1369, 1373 ]; Phelps v. State Street Trust Co. (1953) 330 Mass. 511 [ 115 N.E.2d 382, 383 ].) By including paragraph 4(b) in the Trust, Irvine provided for the exclusive means by which she could amend the Trust.

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8

1964In so holding, the court pointed out (p. 828 [5]) that the probate court’s authority to permit the trustee to deviate from terms of the trust upon a proper showing of changed conditions was assumed in Estate of Keet (1940) supra, 15 Cal.2d 328, 334 [4], and assumed, arguendo, in Estate of Van Deusen (1947) supra, 30 Cal.2d 285, 292-293 [3b, 6], (See also Estate of Loring (1946) supra, 29 Cal.2d 423, 433 [11] ; Keyston v. Keyston (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 550 [ 215 P.2d 754 ].) Further, said the court (pp. 828-829 [6-8] of 207 Cal.App.2d), “In our view, the broad jurisdiction of probate courts over

1964In so holding, the court pointed out (p. 828 [5]) that the probate court’s authority to permit the trustee to deviate from terms of the trust upon a proper showing of changed conditions was assumed in Estate of Keet (1940) supra, 15 Cal.2d 328, 334 [4], and assumed, arguendo, in Estate of Van Deusen (1947) supra, 30 Cal.2d 285, 292-293 [3b, 6], (See also Estate of Loring (1946) supra, 29 Cal.2d 423, 433 [11] ; Keyston v. Keyston (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 550 [ 215 P.2d 754 ].) Further, said the court (pp. 828-829 [6-8] of 207 Cal.App.2d), “In our view, the broad jurisdiction of probate courts over

1964In so holding, the court pointed out (p. 828 [5]) that the probate court’s authority to permit the trustee to deviate from terms of the trust upon a proper showing of changed conditions was assumed in Estate of Keet (1940) supra, 15 Cal.2d 328, 334 [4], and assumed, arguendo, in Estate of Van Deusen (1947) supra, 30 Cal.2d 285, 292-293 [3b, 6], (See also Estate of Loring (1946) supra, 29 Cal.2d 423, 433 [11] ; Keyston v. Keyston (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 550 [ 215 P.2d 754 ].) Further, said the court (pp. 828-829 [6-8] of 207 Cal.App.2d), “In our view, the broad jurisdiction of probate courts over

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8

1964Having jurisdiction . . . under section 1120 ... the court could ‘bring to its aid the full equitable and legal powers with which as a superior court it is invested.’ ” {Estate of Charters (1956) supra, 46 Cal.2d 227, 236 [5-6].) To surcharge a trustee on the hearing of her account, as “an implied power stemming from the power to settle a trustee’s account and determine what trust property he has in his hands ... and ... to determine all issues necessarily incidental thereto.” {Estate of Sensei (1956) 144 Cal.App.2d 429, 437 [14-15] [ 301 P.2d 105 ]; see also Estate of McLellan (1936) supra, 8