wide range factors in California

2024(Dumschat, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 463 ; see also Santos, supra, at p. 421 [quoting Ohio, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 280-281, “[t]he due process the inmate sought ‘would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations’ ”].) Dilbert fares no better under the California Constitution.

2018(See Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard (1998) 523 U.S. 272 , 280-281, 118 S.Ct. 1244 , 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (plur. opn.) [clemency is granted "as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations."].) Indeed, "in most states, 'the only oversight of clemency rest[s] with voters who elect the Governors.' " (Moylan & Carter, Clemency in California Capital Cases (2009) 14 Berkeley J. of Crim.

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .’””]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ] [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with *486 the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ] [requires demonstrated “ ‘commitm

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .” ’ ”]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 , disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532,

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .’””]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ] [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with *486 the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ] [requires demonstrated “ ‘commitm

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .” ’ ”]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 , disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532,

2017On toe contrary, presumed father status is based on the familial relationship between the man and child, rather than any biological connection.” (In re J.L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4to 1010, 1018 [ 72 Cal.Rptr.3d 27 ], superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Alexander P. (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 475 , 486 [ 209 Cal.Rptr.3d 130 ].) As relevant to toe present case, Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) applies where toe parent “receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.” While the juvenile court may consider a wide range of fa

2017On the contrary, presumed father status is based on the familial relationship between the man and child, rather than any biological connection.” (In re J.L. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1010 , 1018, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 4 Cal.App.5th 475, 486 .) As relevant to the present case, Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) applies where the parent “receives the child into his or her home and openly holds out the child as his or her natural child.” While the juvenile court may consider a wide range of factors in making a presumed parent determination, as appropriate to the

2017(Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 384-385 [ 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ].) In considering a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding regarding presumed father status, we apply the substantial evidence test, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of toe trial court’s ruling, and refraining from any reweighing of toe evidence.

2017(Martinez v. Vaziri (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 373, 384-385 [ 200 Cal.Rptr.3d 884 ].) In considering a challenge to a juvenile court’s finding regarding presumed father status, we apply the substantial evidence test, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving conflicts in the evidence in favor of toe trial court’s ruling, and refraining from any reweighing of toe evidence.

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384-385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .’””]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [ 148 Cal.Rptr.3d 349 ] [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with *486 the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 [ 96 Cal.Rptr.3d 26 ] [requires demonstrated “ ‘commitm

2016(E.g., Martinez, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 384–385 [“ ‘ “[T]he premise behind the category of presumed [parent] is that an individual . . . has demonstrated a commitment to the child and the child’s welfare . . . .” ’ ”]; In re D.M. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 541, 553 [presumed parent must be “ ‘someone who has demonstrated an abiding commitment to the child and the child’s well-being’ ” and has “ ‘entered into a familial relationship with the child’ ”]; Charisma R. v. Kristina S. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 361, 377 , disapproved on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 532,

2016(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 776 [ 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 836 ], italics omitted (R.M.).) It is not enough to demonstrate “only a caretaking role and/or romantic involvement with a child’s parent.” (Id. at p. 111.) Rather, the presumed parent must demonstrate “ ‘a full commitment to his [or her] paternal responsibilities— emotional, financial, and otherwise.’ ” (Jerry P, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 801-802, fn. omitted.) While the juvenile court may consider a wide range of factors in making a presumed parent determination, as appropriate to the circumstances (see, e.g., In re T.R. (200

2016(R.M. v. T.A. (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 776 , italics omitted (R.M.).) It is not enough to demonstrate “only a caretaking role and/or romantic involvement with a child’s parent.” (Id. at p. 777.) Rather, the presumed parent must demonstrate “ ‘a full commitment to his [or her] paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.’ ” (Jerry P., supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 801–802, fn. omitted.) While the juvenile court may consider a wide range of factors in making a presumed parent determination, as appropriate to the circumstances (see, e.g., In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202

2024(Dumschat, supra, 452 U.S. at p. 463 ; see also Santos, supra, at p. 421 [quoting Ohio, supra, 523 U.S. at pp. 280-281, “[t]he due process the inmate sought ‘would be inconsistent with the heart of executive clemency, which is to grant clemency as a matter of grace, thus allowing the executive to consider a wide range of factors not comprehended by earlier judicial proceedings and sentencing determinations’ ”].) Dilbert fares no better under the California Constitution.

2024Procedural due process under the California Constitution, “extends potentially to any statutorily conferred benefit, whether or not it can be properly construed as a liberty or property interest.” (Conejo Wellness Center, Inc. v. City of Agoura Hills (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1534, 1562 .) But, “it still requires the deprivation of some statutorily conferred benefit before it is implicated.” (Ibid.) California’s “[e]xecutive clemency is an ad hoc ‘act of grace’ that may be granted for any reason without reference to any standards.” (Santos, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 419 .) Dilbert has pointed

2013Defendant may not “transform ... a factual claim into a legal one by asserting the record’s deficiency as a legal error.” (People v. Forshay (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 686, 689-690 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 116 ].) By “failing to object on the basis of his [ability] to pay,” defendant forfeits both his claim of factual error and the dependent claim challenging “the adequacy of the record on that point.” (Id. at p. 690; see People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ] [analyzing Health & Saf.

2013Defendant may not “transform ... a factual claim into a legal one by asserting the record’s deficiency as a legal error.” (People v. Forshay (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 686, 689-690 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 116 ].) By “failing to object on the basis of his [ability] to pay,” defendant forfeits both his claim of factual error and the dependent claim challenging “the adequacy of the record on that point.” (Id. at p. 690; see People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ] [analyzing Health & Saf.

2013Defendant may not “transform ... a factual claim into a legal one by asserting the record’s deficiency as a legal error.” (People v. Forshay (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 686, 689-690 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 116 ].) By “failing to object on the basis of his [ability] to pay,” defendant forfeits both his claim of factual error and the dependent claim challenging “the adequacy of the record on that point.” (Id. at p. 690; see People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ] [analyzing Health & Saf.

2013Defendant may not “transform ... a factual claim into a legal one by asserting the record’s deficiency as a legal error.” (People v. Forshay (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 686, 689-690 [ 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 116 ].) By “failing to object on the basis of his [ability] to pay,” defendant forfeits both his claim of factual error and the dependent claim challenging “the adequacy of the record on that point.” (Id. at p. 690; see People v. Martinez (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1511, 1517 [ 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 492 ] [analyzing Health & Saf.

2007Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ].) A wide range of factors are relevant, as we have explained: “ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider *31 “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delaye

2007Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ].) A wide range of factors are relevant, as we have explained: “ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider *31 “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delaye

2007Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ].) A wide range of factors are relevant, as we have explained: “ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider *31 “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delaye

2007Agnes Medical Center v. PacifiCare of California (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1187, 1195 [ 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 517 , 82 P.3d 727 ].) A wide range of factors are relevant, as we have explained: “ ‘In determining waiver, a court can consider *31 “(1) whether the party’s actions are inconsistent with the right to arbitrate; (2) whether ‘the litigation machinery has been substantially invoked’ and the parties ‘were well into preparation of a lawsuit’ before the party notified the opposing party of an intent to arbitrate; (3) whether a party either requested arbitration enforcement close to the trial date or delaye

2005(See Crandell v. Fox (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 760, 764-765 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 426 ].) The Department considers a wide range of factors in the exemption evaluation process.

2005(See Crandell v. Fox (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 760, 764-765 [ 150 Cal.Rptr. 426 ].) The Department considers a wide range of factors in the exemption evaluation process.

1990(Williams v. New York, supra, 337 U.S. at p.250 [93 L.Ed. at pp. 1343-1344].) “Once guilt has been determined, evidence which would be inadmissible on the issue of guilt may nevertheless be received as bearing on the punishment to be imposed.” (People v. Peterson (1973) 9 Cal.3d 717, 725 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 835 , 511 P.2d 1187 ].) The trial judge may consider a wide range of factors in deciding upon the proper sentence.

1990(Williams v. New York, supra, 337 U.S. at p.250 [93 L.Ed. at pp. 1343-1344].) “Once guilt has been determined, evidence which would be inadmissible on the issue of guilt may nevertheless be received as bearing on the punishment to be imposed.” (People v. Peterson (1973) 9 Cal.3d 717, 725 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 835 , 511 P.2d 1187 ].) The trial judge may consider a wide range of factors in deciding upon the proper sentence.

1978Under these circumstances we must assume that the trial court considered the wide range of factors that other courts have identified as relevant to the cost allocation decision (see Cartt v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal. App.3d 960, 974, fn. 21 ; Berland v. Mack (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 48 F.R.D. 121, 131-132 ; Lamb v. United Security Life Company (S.D.Iowa 1972) 59 F.R.D. 25, 38-43 ), [10] and, in light of such factors, exercised its discretion in favor of requiring defendant to bear the cost of notice. [11] Defendant appears to argue, however, that despite the fact that it was afforded full notice a

1978Under these circumstances we must assume that the trial court considered the wide range of factors that other courts have identified as relevant to the cost allocation decision (see Cartt v. Superior Court, supra, 50 Cal.App.3d 960, 974, fn. 21 ; Berland v. Mack (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 48 F.R.D. 121, 131-132 ; Lamb v. United Security Life Company (S.D.Iowa 1972) 59 F.R.D. 25, 38-43 ), 10 and, in light of such factors, exercised its discretion in favor of requiring defendant to bear the cost of notice. 11 Defendant appears to argue, however, that despite the fact that it was afforded full notice and a