wide range inquiry in Ohio

2003Rich v. Quinn (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 102 , 104 , citing Spidel v. Warrick (1948), 83 Ohio App. 332 .

1983Spidel v. Warrick (1948), 83 Ohio App. 332 [ 38 O.O. 400 ]; see, also, Phillips, supra. As we noted above, circumstantial evidence is generally required to prove undue influence and a full presentation of the facts is to be encouraged.

2022This is long recognized, and therefore, “undue influence [is] generally determined upon circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from a full presentation of facts which may be inconclusive when taken separately, and a wide range of inquiry is, therefore, permitted.” McNeil v. McNeil, 50 Ohio Law Abs. 487 , 76 N.E.2d 621 (2d Dist.1947).

2022This is long recognized, and therefore, “undue influence [is] generally determined upon circumstantial evidence and inferences drawn from a full presentation of facts which may be inconclusive when taken separately, and a wide range of inquiry is, therefore, permitted.” McNeil v. McNeil, 50 Ohio Law Abs. 487 , 76 N.E.2d 621 (2d Dist.1947).

2022The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “previous declarations are always admissible for the purpose of illustrating the mental capacity of the testator and his susceptibility to extraneous influence, and also to show his feelings, intentions, and relations to his kindred and friends * * *.” Van Demark v. Tompkins, 121 Ohio St. 129, 136 , 167 N.E. 370 (1929).

2022The Ohio Supreme Court has held that “previous declarations are always admissible for the purpose of illustrating the mental capacity of the testator and his susceptibility to extraneous influence, and also to show his feelings, intentions, and relations to his kindred and friends * * *.” Van Demark v. Tompkins, 121 Ohio St. 129, 136 , 167 N.E. 370 (1929).

2013The court should consider a wide range of factors, such as “reductions in sales territory, poor performance evaluations, criticism in front of coemployees, [and] inquiries about retirement intentions * * *.” Id. {¶35} Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Handford, we conclude that Buy Rite’s actions in this case would not make a reasonable person believe that Handford’s termination was imminent.

2011The two prerequisites which must be met to warrant the application of the rule are: “(1) that the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury, or at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury, under the exclusive management and control of the defendant; and (2) that the injury occurred under such circumstances that Case No. 2007-08937 -8- ENTRY in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed.” Id., quoting Hake v. Wiedemann Brewing Co. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 65 , 66- 67. {¶22} Dr. Farber testified that, in hi

2011The two prerequisites which must be met to warrant the application of the rule are: “(1) that the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of the injury, or at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury, under the exclusive management and control of the defendant; and (2) that the injury occurred under such circumstances that Case No. 2007-08937 -8- ENTRY in the ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care had been observed.” Id., quoting Hake v. Wiedemann Brewing Co. (1970), 23 Ohio St.2d 65 , 66- 67. {¶22} Dr. Farber testified that, in hi

2003Rich v. Quinn (1983), 13 Ohio App.3d 102 , 104 , citing Spidel v. Warrick (1948), 83 Ohio App. 332 .

1988As we said in Williams v. Illinois , ‘[ajfter having taken into consideration the wide range of factors underlying the exercise of his sentencing function, nothing we now hold precludes a judge from imposing on an indigent, as on any defendant, the maximum penalty prescribed by law.’ 399 U.S., at 243 .