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18 Delaware opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Delaware courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Marine v. Stategreen2 sentences2021Mar. 31, 2014). 7 Harper, 2014 WL 1303012, at *5 (citing Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Del. 1993)). 5 convicted of the crimes charged.”8 Furthermore, “[a] real probability must exist that a reasonable jury could convict on the totality of the evidence assuming that the evidence adduced at the reverse amenability hearing stands unrebutted by the defendant at trial.”9 Here, the State has made out its prima facia case as to some of the charges set forth. 2020C. § 1011(b). * Harper, 2014 WL 1303012 , at *5 (citing Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1185 (Del. 1993)). 3 convicted of the crimes charged.” Furthermore, “[a] real probability must exist that a reasonable jury could convict on the totality of the evidence assuming that the evidence adduced at the reverse amenability hearing stands unrebutted by the defendant at trial.’® Since Defendant is over the age of sixteen and also charged for Possession of a l‘irearm During Commission of a Felony, 11 Del. | 9 | 10 |
Marine v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1211 (Del. 1992) (“[W]e construe the ‘nature of the present offense’ provision of section 939 as requiring that [the] Superior Court consider whether the State can establish a prima facie case against the defendant.”); see also State v. Mayhall, 659 A.2d 790, 791 (Del. Super. 1995) (explaining that a prima facie case in a reverse amenability hearing means “something more than whether some credible evidence exists tending to prove each element of the offense charged”), aff’d sub nom. 2018See Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 249 (Del. 1994) (quoting Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Del. 1993); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1209 (Del. 1992)). the juvenile files a motion to transfer the adult charges, this Court must hold a reverse amenability hearing and weigh the four factors set forth in 10 Del. | 6 | 8 |
Hughes v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Hughes v. State, 653 A.2d 241, 249 (Del. 1994) (quoting Marine v. State, 624 A.2d 1181, 1184 (Del. 1993); Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1209 (Del. 1992)). the juvenile files a motion to transfer the adult charges, this Court must hold a reverse amenability hearing and weigh the four factors set forth in 10 Del. 2017A reverse amenability hearing was held on December 22, 2016. 2 State v. Anderson, 697 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 1997) (quoting Hughes v. Stale, 653 A.2d 241, 248 (Del. 1994)). which the classification is made.”3 Delaware law is clear that, by enacting ll Del. | 6 | 7 |
State v. Mayhallgreen2 sentences2023See Marine v. State, 607 A.2d 1185, 1211 (Del. 1992) (“[W]e construe the ‘nature of the present offense’ provision of section 939 as requiring that [the] Superior Court consider whether the State can establish a prima facie case against the defendant.”); see also State v. Mayhall, 659 A.2d 790, 791 (Del. Super. 1995) (explaining that a prima facie case in a reverse amenability hearing means “something more than whether some credible evidence exists tending to prove each element of the offense charged”), aff’d sub nom. 2018Though there may prove to be fruitful grounds for the cross-examination of certain witnesses, at this point, there remains “[a] real probability . . . that a reasonable jury could convict [Defendant] on the totality of the evidence assuming that the evidence adduced at the reverse amenability hearing stands unrebutted” at trial.12 This Court finds that there remains a fair likelihood 10 Smre v. Mayhall, 659 A.2d 790, 792 (Del. super. 1995). ll Id 12 lai that Defendant will be convicted of the charged offenses.13 Thus, the State has met its burden of demonstrating a prima facie case against Def | 4 | 4 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences2020C. § 1447A(e) (2001) (stating that an individual over the age of 15 who is charged with PFDCF “shall be tried as an adult, notwithstanding any contrary provisions or statutes governing the Family Court or any other state law”); State v. Anderson, 697 A.2d 379, 383 (Del. 1996) (holding that a juvenile charged with PDCF under § 1447A(e) was not entitled to a reverse amenability hearing on the PFDCF charge and had to be tried on that charge as an adult in the Superior Court). 7 10 Del. 2017A reverse amenability hearing was held on December 22, 2016. 2 State v. Anderson, 697 A.2d 379, 382 (Del. 1997) (quoting Hughes v. Stale, 653 A.2d 241, 248 (Del. 1994)). which the classification is made.”3 Delaware law is clear that, by enacting ll Del. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Andersongreen2 sentences1995State v. Anderson, Del.Super., 385 A.2d 738, 741 (1978). 1992In State v. Anderson, Del.Super., 385 A.2d 738 (1978), the court transferred the several juvenile defendants to Family Court following a reverse amenability hearing. | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Delaware. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Roy v. State
neutral
1 sentence2025His first, filed on April 29, 2008, raised issues related to transferring his case to the Family Court via a reverse amenability hearing. 7 It was denied on January 22, 2009.8 The denial was affirmed on appeal on July 15, 2009.9 1 D.I. 122 2 D.I. 123. 3 D.I. 2. 4 D.I. 28. 5 D.I. 29. 6 Roy v. State, 2008 WL 802282 (Del. 2008). 7 D.I. 37. 8 D.I. 46. 9 Roy v. State, 2009 WL 2045205 (Del. 2009). 2 Roy’s second PCR motion was filed on May 2, 2013.10 That PCR motion raised five grounds for relief: 1) counsel misled Roy into accepting a plea deal; 2) counsel failed to inform Roy of the lesser include | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Holder v. State
green
1 sentence2023Holder v. State, 692 A.2d 882 (Del. 1997). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
In Re Steigler
green
1 sentence1995In its prior decision captioned In re Steigler, Del.Supr., 250 A.2d 379 (1969) the Supreme Court noted that at a proof positive hearing the Superior Court is to “avoid even the appearance of a determination of ultimate guilt or innocence” and that the applicable standard is whether the State has “a fair likelihood of convicting the accused.” When the Superior Court reconsidered the Marine case on remand it concluded that the term “prima facie case” as used in the context of a reverse amenability hearing meant something more than whether some credible evidence exists tending to prove each eleme | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1992In his appeal, Marine raises four claims of error: (1) That his incriminating oral statement made at his home during police questioning about his involvement in Amanda’s death and his later taped confession at the police station were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and therefore erroneously admitted at trial; (2) That Superior Court was without jurisdiction under 10 Del.C. § 921(2) to sentence him to the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree; (3) That to otherwise construe the Dela 1992In his appeal, Marine raises four claims of error: (1) That his incriminating oral statement made at his home during police questioning about his involvement in Amanda’s death and his later taped confession at the police station were taken in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and therefore erroneously admitted at trial; (2) That Superior Court was without jurisdiction under 10 Del.C. § 921(2) to sentence him to the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree; (3) That to otherwise construe the Dela | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.