misrepresentation defense in Illinois

2003Marionjoy, 180 Ill.

2003Marionjoy, 180 Ill.

2003Citing Beck v. Capitol Life Insurance Co., 48 Ill.App.3d 937 , 6 Ill.Dec. 641 , 363 N.E.2d 170 (1977), among other authorities, Nicholas argues that Pekin, rather than Amanda, is responsible for the misrepresentation, and Pekin should be estopped from asserting the misrepresentation as a defense.

2003App. 3d 937 , 363 N.E.2d 170 (1977), among other authorities, Nicholas argues that Pekin, rather than Amanda, is responsible for the misrepresentation, and Pekin should be estopped from asserting the misrepresentation as a defense.

2016The appellate court found that the provision was a remedy in addition to common-law fraud and was not limited to preexisting facts because it “concerns the marketing and sale of condominiums, which may occur before construction is complete.” 2014 IL App (1st) 130764, ¶ 117 .

2015The appellate court found that the provision was a remedy in addition to common-law fraud and was not limited to preexisting facts because it “concerns the marketing and sale of condominiums, which may occur before construction is complete.” 2014 IL App (1st) 130764, ¶ 117 .

2023People v. Enis, 194 Ill. 2d 361, 377 (2000); Pulliam, 206 Ill. 2d at 249 . ¶ 40 Second, any claim that counsel failed to comply with Rule 604(d) also fails.

2006The plaintiff in 2314 Lincoln Park West had argued that “an architect supplies information to be used by others” and, therefore, the malpractice claim fell within the misrepresentation exception to the Moorman rule. 2314 Lincoln Park West, 136 Ill. 2d at 313 .

2006In rejecting this claim, we held that “while it may be the case that an architect does in fact supply information relied on by others, we do not believe that the character of that function should be overstated.” 2314 Lincoln Park West, 136 Ill. 2d at 313 .

1991This court has discussed the law concerning the voluntariness of a plea, stating as follows: “[A] guilty plea is not voluntary and intelligent if it is entered on the basis of a misapprehension of law or fact or a misrepresentation by defense counsel, the State’s Attorney, or someone else in authority. [Citation.] Where any of these circumstances are found to exist, the plea may be withdrawn; however, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating any alleged misunderstanding or misrepresentation. [Citations.] A misapprehension as to sentencing alternatives may render the guilty plea involunt

1984App. 3d 354, 356 , 420 N.E.2d 1166 .) It is well established that a guilty plea is not voluntary and intelligent if it is entered on the basis of a misapprehension of law or fact or a misrepresentation by defense counsel, the State’s Attorney, or someone else in authority.

1984(People v. Turner (1982), 111 Ill.

1982(People v. Benedetto (1981), 102 Ill.

1980What would be equitable when the defendant is guilty of fraud is not necessarily equitable when he made no misrepresentations at all; what is due care on the part of the plaintiff may be quite different when the plaintiff relied on a misrepresentation than when the plaintiff was merely mistaken.” (Diedrich v. Northern Illinois Publishing Co. (1976), 39 Ill.

1979(Breese) 302 , it was stated without reference to authority that fraud is fatal to a contract, but not every false statement amounts to fraud; in McConnell v. Wilcox (1837), 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 344 , rev'd on other grounds, 38 U.S. 498 , the court noted that actual fraud is not presumed, and that the defendant’s knowledge of a statement’s falsity must be shown, citing a United States Supreme Court decision; and in Kirkland v. Lott (1839), 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 13 , it was held, without citation of authority, that in a defense to an action brought by payees of a note, it was fatal not to assert that th

1979(Breese) 302 , it was stated without reference to authority that fraud is fatal to a contract, but not every false statement amounts to fraud; in McConnell v. Wilcox (1837), 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 344 , rev'd on other grounds, 38 U.S. 498 , the court noted that actual fraud is not presumed, and that the defendant’s knowledge of a statement’s falsity must be shown, citing a United States Supreme Court decision; and in Kirkland v. Lott (1839), 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 13 , it was held, without citation of authority, that in a defense to an action brought by payees of a note, it was fatal not to assert that th

1979(Breese) 302 , it was stated without reference to authority that fraud is fatal to a contract, but not every false statement amounts to fraud; in McConnell v. Wilcox (1837), 2 Ill. (1 Scam.) 344 , rev'd on other grounds, 38 U.S. 498 , the court noted that actual fraud is not presumed, and that the defendant’s knowledge of a statement’s falsity must be shown, citing a United States Supreme Court decision; and in Kirkland v. Lott (1839), 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 13 , it was held, without citation of authority, that in a defense to an action brought by payees of a note, it was fatal not to assert that th

1979In the first decision dealing with what was recognized as an action on the case for deceit, Weatherford v. Fishback (1841), 4 Ill. (3 Scam.) 170 , the court made two points of enduring significance.

1979Primary reliance was placed on Pasley rather than Weatherford, when the court determined that benefit to the maker of the misrepresentation was not a requirement of the tort action for deceit in Endsley v. Johns (1887), 120 Ill. 469 ; and in N.C.

1979Antle & Bro. v. Sexton (1891), 137 Ill. 410 , although the court expressly recognized the case before it as an action on the case to recover damages from fraud and deceit, it applied principles from cases dealing not only with that tort, but also with actions in assumpsit and even for rescission, the latter relying in turn partially on Pomeroy’s Equity Jurisprudence.