misrepresentation claim in Massachusetts

2001Golber v. BayBank Valley Trust Co., 46 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 257 (1999).

2001See Golber v. BayBank Valley Trust Co., 46 Mass.App.Ct. 256, 257 (1999) (justifiable reliance on a false statement of fact is a necessary element of a misrepresentation claim).

2025To recover on a claim asserting fraudulent misrepresentation, a plaintiff must show "a false statement of a material fact made to induce the plaintiff to act, together with reliance on the false statement by the plaintiff to the plaintiff's detriment." Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 77 (1991).

2001We have outlined the elements of proof for misrepresentation in Zimmerman v. Kent, 31 Mass. App. Ct. 72, 77-79 (1991), and there is no need for us to repeat them.

2017See Hawthorne's, Inc. v. Warrenton Realty, Inc., 414 Mass. 200 , 210 n.6 (1993) (appellate court may affirm judgment on grounds different from those advanced by judge).

2016The detailed facts of McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc., supra at 706-709, are summarized in Masingill, supra at 541-542 , and we need not repeat them here. 8 The plaintiffs make no attempt to distinguish the applicability of issue preclusion to their G.

2016Inc., the Supreme Judicial Court characterized it as “the only recent case where this court has upheld a misrepresentation claim in the face of a written contract.” Masingill v. EMC Corp., 449 Mass. 532, 541 (2007).

2012To recover in an action for deceit, “the plaintiff must prove ‘that the defendant [or its agent], made a false representation of a material fact with knowledge of its falsity for the purpose of inducing the plaintiff to act thereon, and that the plaintiff relied upon the representation as true and acted upon it to [its] damage.’ ” International Totalizing Sys. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 29 Mass.App.Ct. 424, 431 (1990), quoting Danca v. Taunton Sav.

2011“As to the c. 93A claim, ... it is absorbed in and vanishes with the misrepresentation claim.” Fernandes v. Rodrigue, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 926, 928 (1995).

2009See Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 112 (1982) (where all claims arose out of same chain of events, prevailing party is entitled to fees for successful and unsuccessful claims alike).

2009McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 38 Mass.App.Ct. 573, 575 (1995) (“A claim for misrepresentation requires that a plaintiff show a false statement of material fact made to induce the plaintiff to act and reliance on the false statement by the plaintiff to his detriment”).

2007Schwartz and EMC appeal from the judge’s denial of their motion for judgment n.o.v. on the misrepresentation claim against Schwartz. 22 Our review of a defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. asks “whether, ‘anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972), quoting Kelly v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302 (1943).

2007Schwartz and EMC appeal from the judge’s denial of their motion for judgment n.o.v. on the misrepresentation claim against Schwartz. 22 Our review of a defendant’s motion for judgment n.o.v. asks “whether, ‘anywhere in the evidence, from whatever source derived, any combination of circumstances could be found from which a reasonable inference could be drawn in favor of the plaintiff.’ ” Raunela v. Hertz Corp., 361 Mass. 341, 343 (1972), quoting Kelly v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 315 Mass. 301, 302 (1943).

2005“Loches is not mere delay, [however,] but delay that works disadvantage to another.” Calkins v. Wire Hardware Co., 267 Mass. 52, 69 (1929).

2005See G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 422 Mass. 158, 166 (1996), quoting Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Mgmt., Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 49 (1990).

2005See G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 422 Mass. 158, 166 (1996), quoting Srebnick v. Lo-Law Transit Mgmt., Inc., 29 Mass. App. Ct. 45, 49 (1990).

2005See, e.g., Kilroy v. Barron, supra. The sole issue on the misrepresentation claim is whether, as the plaintiffs assert, the judge erred in applying the measure of damages.

1999Assuming that these omissions qualified as false statements under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 551 (1977), 7 see Wolf v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 41 Mass. App. Ct. 474, 476 (1996), Townsends still had the burden of proving the other elements of a misrepresentation claim against Karchakian.

1998See Quirk, 379 Mass. at 765 ; Loche, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 304 (construing substantially similar language within an investment contract and determining that because the plaintiffs claims of fraud, conversion and misrepresentation “were of a nature closely involved ... in a continuing investment relationship!,] [t]hey . . . were sufficiently connected with that investment relationship to be regarded as subject to the arbitration provision”) (footnote omitted); see also Genesco, Inc. v. T.

1998See Quirk, 379 Mass. at 765 ; Loche, 26 Mass.App.Ct. at 304 (construing substantially similar language within an investment contract and determining that because the plaintiffs claims of fraud, conversion and misrepresentation “were of a nature closely involved ... in a continuing investment relationship!,] [t]hey . . . were sufficiently connected with that investment relationship to be regarded as subject to the arbitration provision”) (footnote omitted); see also Genesco, Inc. v. T.

1994Without any amplification, he ruled that “VMark’s representations [regarding universe’s capabilities] were neither intentional nor negligent, and its conduct did not ‘attain a level of rascality that [would constitute a c. 93A violation]. . . .” This conclusory observation clashes discordantly with the judge’s detailed factual findings. 8 Those unchallenged subsidiary facts demonstrate that VMark did make material misstatements during its negotiations with EMC, which relied on them to its detriment. 9 The judge found, on undisputed evidence (much of it from VMark’s own witnesses) that prior to

1991Chatham Furnace Co., supra at 406 (one who takes it upon himself to *82 present as fact matter which is ascertainable as false may be liable for misrepresentation, even if he believes his statement to be true); Acushnet, 26 Mass. App. Ct. at 605. (knowledge of falsity not required where accurate facts reasonably available to speaker).