zone of danger test in Illinois

2018The court then applied the zone-of-danger rule and determined that “[t]here are no allegations in the complaint from which it can be said that the defendants’ alleged negligence in any way endangered the parents of the impaired child” or “that the parents have or will suffer any physical injury or illness resulting from the emotional distress allegedly caused by defendants’ negligence.” Id.

2018Accordingly, the court held that the parents in Siemieniec “have no cause of action for the emotional distress negligently inflicted by the defendants.” Id. at 262-63 . ¶ 17 In similar fashion, and perhaps more to the point, our appellate court reluctantly applied the zone-of-danger rule to bar the recovery of emotional distress damages in a case involving the cause of action at issue in the case before us, tortious interference with the right to possess a corpse.

2021Clark noted that “where the claim of emotional distress is freestanding and not anchored to any other tort against the plaintiff, courts have applied special restrictions such as the zone-of-danger rule because of concerns regarding the possibility of fraudulent claim or frivolous litigation.” Id. ¶ 106 (citing Rickey, 98 Ill. 2d at 555 ).

2018In Clark v. Children’s Memorial Hospital, 2011 IL 108656 , the question again arose whether parents in a wrongful birth case may recover damages for their resulting emotional distress.

2018Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC, 2016 IL 120041, ¶ 42 . ¶ 16 By 1983, then, the law in Illinois was that, in order to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), a direct victim of the defendant’s negligence must allege and prove a contemporaneous physical injury or impact, whereas a bystander must allege and prove that he or she falls within the zone-of-danger rule.

2017Schweihs v. Chase Home Finance, LLC , 2016 IL 120041 , ¶ 42, 412 Ill.Dec. 882 , 77 N.E.3d 50 . ¶ 16 By 1983, then, the law in Illinois was that, in order to recover damages for the negligent infliction of emotional distress (NIED), a direct victim of the defendant's negligence must allege and prove a contemporaneous physical injury or impact, whereas a bystander must allege and prove that he or she falls within the zone-of-danger rule.

1999The Gottshall Court therefore held that, considering the issue “ ‘in the appropriate historical context,’ ” it was “reasonable to conclude that Congress intended the scope of the duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress under FELA to be coextensive with that established under the zone of danger test.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555 , 129 L.

1999The Gottshall Court therefore held that, considering the issue “ ‘in the appropriate historical context,’ ” it was “reasonable to conclude that Congress intended the scope of the duty to avoid inflicting emotional distress under FELA to be coextensive with that established under the zone of danger test.” Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555 , 129 L.

2018In Courtney, 149 Ill.

2017In Courtney, 149 Ill.App.3d at 397 , 102 Ill.Dec. 810 , 500 N.E.2d 703 , the refrigeration unit in the defendant's morgue malfunctioned, causing the body of the plaintiff's deceased husband to decompose.

2011People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 520 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005); Colon, 225 Ill.2d at 146 , 310 Ill.Dec. 396 , 866 N.E.2d 207 . ¶ 104 With these principles in mind, we address plaintiffs' contention that Siemieniec's application of the zone-of-danger rule in a wrongful-birth case is error. ¶ 105 As previously noted, the zone-of-danger rule was designed for a different type of case, where the plaintiff's theory of liability is the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

2011People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill.2d 481, 520 , 298 Ill.Dec. 169 , 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005); Colon, 225 Ill.2d at 146 , 310 Ill.Dec. 396 , 866 N.E.2d 207 . ¶ 104 With these principles in mind, we address plaintiffs' contention that Siemieniec's application of the zone-of-danger rule in a wrongful-birth case is error. ¶ 105 As previously noted, the zone-of-danger rule was designed for a different type of case, where the plaintiff's theory of liability is the negligent infliction of emotional distress.

2017In Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital , 2011 IL 108656 , 353 Ill.Dec. 254 , 955 N.E.2d 1065 , the question again arose whether parents in a wrongful birth case may recover damages for their resulting emotional distress.

2017In Clark v. Children's Memorial Hospital , 2011 IL 108656 , 353 Ill.Dec. 254 , 955 N.E.2d 1065 , the question again arose whether parents in a wrongful birth case may recover damages for their resulting emotional distress.

1990To support their contention, the Seefs rely on Corgan v. Muehling (1988), 167 Ill.

1990(Corgan, 167 Ill.

1988In the following passage, the court explained its refusal to employ the zone of danger test: “The constant theme from Braun [Braun v. Craven (1898) 175 Ill. 401 , 51 N.E. 657 ] through Rickey and its progeny is that Illinois courts will compensate genuine mental suffering by applying a rule which also sifts out frivolous claims. *** The requirements of the Rickey zone of danger rule, fashioned for a bystander case, cannot be applied here without contortions.” McAdams, 638 F. Supp. at 1178 .

1988(Lewis, 139 Ill.

1988In the following passage, the court explained its refusal to employ the zone of danger test: “The constant theme from Braun [Braun v. Craven (1898) 175 Ill. 401 , 51 N.E. 657 ] through Rickey and its progeny is that Illinois courts will compensate genuine mental suffering by applying a rule which also sifts out frivolous claims. *** The requirements of the Rickey zone of danger rule, fashioned for a bystander case, cannot be applied here without contortions.” McAdams, 638 F. Supp. at 1178 .