zone of danger rule in New York

2000Ctr. ( 130 Misc 2d 999, 1007 ), the “disposition not to apply the zone-of-danger rule” in the context of a claim to recover for emotional distress as a result of injury to a baby during childbirth is reflected in Howard v Lecher ( 42 NY2d 109 ).

1986The disposition not to apply the zone-of-danger rule in such a context is reflected in Howard v Lecher (supra).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

1984Center Hosp., 54 NY2d 277 ; Vaccaro v Squibb Corp., 52 NY2d 809 ; Becker v Schwartz, 46 NY2d 401 ; Howard v Lecher, 42 NY2d 109 ).

2021The Court noted that section 313 of the Second Restatement and several states had adopted the zone-of-danger rule, although it acknowledged that Dillon viewed that rule as a “rather arbitrary limiting rule which has the unpalatable consequence that a mother who also fears for herself may recover while, if she does not or has no such similar opportunity, she may not recover” (id. at 616, citing Dillon, 68 Cal 2d at 747, 441 P2d at 924-925 ).

2021The Court noted that section 313 of the Second Restatement and several states had adopted the zone-of-danger rule, although it acknowledged that Dillon viewed that rule as a “rather arbitrary limiting rule which has the unpalatable consequence that a mother who also fears for herself may recover while, if she does not or has no such similar opportunity, she may not recover” (id. at 616, citing Dillon, 68 Cal 2d at 747, 441 P2d at 924-925 ).

1989While in both cases the vehicle that struck the husband had impact with the wife, the court (supra, at 231, n 9) specifically declined to require impact as a prerequisite, noting that in Battalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237 [1961]) it "abolished the impact requirement in negligent infliction of emotional distress cases.” In Bovsun (supra, at 231 ) the court made no reference to the No-Fault Law, but stated: "We are not suggesting that any trifling distress would be sufficient to support recovery of damages under the zone-of-danger rule.

1984We previously disposed of these arguments in Batalla v State of New York ( 10 NY2d 237, 240-242 ): ‘Although fraud, extra litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities, it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction.

2021Here, we simply conclude that a grandchild is within our understanding of what is meant by “immediate family.” That is, given the recognition by this Court and the legislature that the relationship of grandparent and grandchild enjoys a “special status” among familiar relationships (Suarez, 26 NY3d at 448 ; see L 2003, ch 657 § 1), inclusion of grandparents in the common-law term “immediate family” under these circumstances is more than warranted.

2019Specifically addressing the "immediate family" requirement, this Court has stated that "[t]he Court of Appeals has exercised its prerogative to balance the competing interests and announce the public policy of this state to limit liability to the class of persons identified as immediate family' in Bovsun " ( Jun Chi Guan v Tuscan Dairy Farms , 24 AD3d at 726 ).

2003Where endangerment of physical safety is pleaded, the physical danger supporting a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim involves direct and immediate jeopardy, not a danger later arising as a consequence of a defendant’s action (see, as to fear for self, Peters v Rome City School Dist., 298 AD2d 864 , 866 [4th Dept 2002] [child’s conditions of confinement supported finding safety was endangered or fear for safety existed]; see, as to fear for another, DeAguiar v County of Suffolk, 289 AD2d 280, 281 [2d Dept 2001] [plaintiff, 50 to 60 yards away from a relative’s motorcycle accident

2000Ctr. ( 130 Misc 2d 999, 1007 ), the “disposition not to apply the zone-of-danger rule” in the context of a claim to recover for emotional distress as a result of injury to a baby during childbirth is reflected in Howard v Lecher ( 42 NY2d 109 ).

1993Supreme Court concluded that a plaintiff who is in the zone of danger and who suffers emotional injury from witnessing the death or injury of someone with whom he or she has an " 'intimate familial relationship’ ” ( 154 Misc 2d 844, 847 ) can recover damages under the zone of danger exception enunciated in Bovsun v Sanperi (supra).

1993Ctr., 58 NY2d 1053, 1055 ).

1986In one sense, Bovsun (supra) adopted an even more lenient standard for when recovery may be had for emotional injury than had Endresz (supra) since under Bovsun you need only be in the zone of danger without actually suffering injury.

1986Finally, the allegations in the complaint do not state a valid cause of action for either intentional infliction of emotional harm or prima facie tort (see, Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553 ; ATI, Inc. v Ruder & Finn, 42 NY2d 454 ).

1986Finally, the allegations in the complaint do not state a valid cause of action for either intentional infliction of emotional harm or prima facie tort (see, Fischer v Maloney, 43 NY2d 553 ; ATI, Inc. v Ruder & Finn, 42 NY2d 454 ).

1984“Punitive damages and damages for wounded feelings, though similar, are not the same” (Gostkowski v Roman Catholic Church, 262 NY 320, 324 , supra; see, also, Pickle v Page, 252 NY, at p 475 ), and moral culpability has nothing to do with the policy considerations which formed the basis of Tobin’s denial of recovery for emotional disturbance (“foreseeability of the injury, proliferation of claims, fraudulent claims, inconsistency of the zone of danger rule, unlimited liability, unduly burdensome liability, and the difficulty of circumscribing the area of liability” [ 24 NY2d, at p 615 ]) and,

1984The zone-of-danger rule has been repeatedly criticized in other jurisdictions as hopelessly artificial (Dillon v Legg, 68 Cal 2d 728, 733); harsh and artificial (Barnhill v Davis, 300 NW2d 104, 107 [Iowa]); lacking “strong logical support” because it inadequately measures foreseeability of plaintiff’s mental distress (Dziokonski v Babineau, 375 Mass 555, 564); representing “an unnecessarily narrow and rigid limit on liability” (Culbert v Sampson’s Supermarkets, 444 A2d 433, 436 [Me]); “based upon a fact now deemed irrelevant” in light of the abandonment of the impact rule (Toms v McConnell, 45

1984With respect to claims under the Workers’ Compensation Law, we have rejected the underlying rationale of Tobin (Matter of Wolfe v Sibley, Lindsay & Curr Co., 36 NY2d 505 ; see Lafferty v Manhasset Med.