9 Alabama opinions name it 2 courts 1998–2012 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
AALAR, Ltd., Inc. v. Francisgreen2 sentences2012However, in AALAR, this Court explained that the test this Court had been applying with regard to claims for emotional-distress damages, including the test applied in Taylor , was “consistent with the ‘zone of danger’ test discussed in [Consolidated Rail Corp. v.] Gottshall, [ 512 U.S. 532 (1994) ].” 716 So.2d at 1147 . 2003See AALAR, Ltd., Inc., 716 So.2d at 1147 ; White Consol. | 2 | 3 |
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshallgreen2 sentences2012In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stated that “the zone of danger test limits recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.” 512 U.S. at 547-48 . 2012In Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 , 114 S.Ct. 2396 , 129 L.Ed.2d 427 (1994), the United States Supreme Court stated that “the zone of danger test limits recovery for emotional injury to those plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent conduct, or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.” 512 U.S. at 547-48 . | 1 | 3 |
Wolfe v. Isbellgreen2 sentences2012We reject that argument, however, because it is incompatible with this Court’s holding in Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 330-31 , 280 So.2d 758, 761 (1973), in which we said “that from the moment of conception, the fetus or embryo is not a part of the mother, but rather has a separate existence within the body of the mother.” 6 Because Hamilton conceded that she was “not entitled to zone of danger damages” and her argument suggesting that Taylor created an exception to the zone-of-danger test is misplaced, and because, in response to the defendants’ summary- judgment motions, she presented no 2012We reject that argument, however, because it is incompatible with this Court’s holding in Wolfe v. Isbell, 291 Ala. 327, 330-31 , 280 So.2d 758, 761 (1973), in which we said “that from the moment of conception, the fetus or embryo is not a part of the mother, but rather has a separate existence within the body of the mother.” 6 Because Hamilton conceded that she was “not entitled to zone of danger damages” and her argument suggesting that Taylor created an exception to the zone-of-danger test is misplaced, and because, in response to the defendants’ summary- judgment motions, she presented no | 1 | 1 |
Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrickgreen2 sentences2011See Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick, 868 So.2d 429, 438-40 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (stating that emotional-distress damages are generally not recoverable on a breach-of-contract claim and listing specific exceptions to that general rule); and Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 69, 70 (Ala.2001) (stating that “it would violate the purpose for which the zone-of-danger rule [there specifically referring to the second part of the test articulated in AALAR ] was created to apply that rule in a breach-of-contract case” and also stating that the rule does not apply to breach-of-warranty cases 2011See Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick, 868 So.2d 429, 438-40 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (stating that emotional-distress damages are generally not recoverable on a breach-of-contract claim and listing specific exceptions to that general rule); and Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 69, 70 (Ala.2001) (stating that “it would violate the purpose for which the zone-of-danger rule [there specifically referring to the second part of the test articulated in AALAR ] was created to apply that rule in a breach-of-contract case” and also stating that the rule does not apply to breach-of-warranty cases | 1 | 1 |
Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2011See Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick, 868 So.2d 429, 438-40 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (stating that emotional-distress damages are generally not recoverable on a breach-of-contract claim and listing specific exceptions to that general rule); and Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 69, 70 (Ala.2001) (stating that “it would violate the purpose for which the zone-of-danger rule [there specifically referring to the second part of the test articulated in AALAR ] was created to apply that rule in a breach-of-contract case” and also stating that the rule does not apply to breach-of-warranty cases 2011See Morris Concrete, Inc. v. Warrick, 868 So.2d 429, 438-40 (Ala.Civ.App.2003) (stating that emotional-distress damages are generally not recoverable on a breach-of-contract claim and listing specific exceptions to that general rule); and Bowers v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 827 So.2d 63, 69, 70 (Ala.2001) (stating that “it would violate the purpose for which the zone-of-danger rule [there specifically referring to the second part of the test articulated in AALAR ] was created to apply that rule in a breach-of-contract case” and also stating that the rule does not apply to breach-of-warranty cases | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
White Consol. Industries, Inc. v. Wilkerson
green
2 sentences2003This Court, even though the case was an AEMLD case and not a traditional negligence case, applied the zone-of-danger test, holding that, because `at the time of the fire [the plaintiff homeowners] were away from home and at their places of employment,' they were not within the zone of danger. 737 So.2d at 449 . 1999This Court, even though the case was an AEMLD case and not a traditional negligence case, applied the zone-of-danger test, holding that, because "at the time of the fire [the plaintiff homeowners] were away from home and at their places of employment," they were not within the zone of danger. 737 So.2d at 449 . | 3 | 1999–2003 |
Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, Inc.
green
1 sentence2012The defendants noted that, during her deposition, Hamilton testified that she had not been “concerned for [her] life.” 5 In her response to the defendants’ summary-judgment motions, Hamilton stated that she “[did] not dispute that she never feared for her own life and is therefore not entitled to zone of danger damages.” However, Hamilton claimed that she is “entitled to mental anguish damages” under this Court’s decision in Taylor v. Baptist Medical Center, supra. Hamilton argued that Taylor “carve[d] out a specific exception” to the zone-of-danger test for cases in which a mother has suffere | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Ex Parte Grand Manor, Inc.
green
1 sentence2001In Ex parte Grand Manor, Inc., 778 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000), the supreme court discussed damages for mental anguish in a negligent-manufacture claim against a mobile-home manufacturer. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
City of Mobile v. Jackson
green
1 sentence2000The plaintiffs in Jackson alleged $19,000 in property damage resulting from flooding of their homes caused by the city's negligence in designing its drainage system. 474 So.2d at 644 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences1998"The third prominent limiting test is the 'relative bystander' test, which was first enunciated in Dillon v. Legg , 68 Cal.2d 728 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 ], 441 P.2d 912 (1968). 1998"The third prominent limiting test is the 'relative bystander' test, which was first enunciated in Dillon v. Legg , 68 Cal.2d 728 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 ], 441 P.2d 912 (1968). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.