14 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1988–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Williams v. Bakergreen2 sentences2015In Williams , however, we modified that doctrine, “adopting] the zone of danger rule which allows recovery for mental distress as long as the plaintiff was in the zone of physical danger and as a result feared for his or her own safety because of defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 1073 . 2015In Williams , we adopted the zone-of-danger rule, allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress because we “recognize[d] that ‘a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit.’ ” Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 811 (quoting Williams, 572 A.2d at 1067 ). | 6 | 10 |
Jones v. Howard University, Inc.green2 sentences2004“In applying the zone of danger rule we recognize that its logic requires that the plaintiffs presence in the zone of danger be contemporaneous with her fear for her own safety.” Jones *827 v. Howard Univ., 589 A.2d 419, 423 (D.C.1991). 1994For instance, in Jones v. Howard University, 589 A.2d 419 (D.C.1991), we held that a plaintiff could maintain an action for negligently inflicted emotional distress in the absence of any physical injuries or physical manifestations, so long as the claimed emotional distress was both serious and verifiable. | 1 | 2 |
Asuncion v. Columbia Hospital for Womengreen1 sentence1991See Asuncion, supra, 514 A.2d at 1188 ; Coughlin v. George Washington Univ. | 1 | 1 |
Waube v. Warringtongreen2 sentences1990See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479 , 86 A.2d 879 (1952). . 1990See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479 , 86 A.2d 879 (1952). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hedgepeth v. Whitman Walker Clinic
green
2 sentences2015In Williams , we adopted the zone-of-danger rule, allowing plaintiffs to recover damages for emotional distress because we “recognize[d] that ‘a near miss may be as frightening as a direct hit.’ ” Hedgepeth, 22 A.3d at 811 (quoting Williams, 572 A.2d at 1067 ). 2014More recently, in Hedgepeth, supra, 22 A.3d at 804 , we adopted a limited rule to supplement the zone of danger requirement set forth in Williams for instances where a party is not in danger of physical injury, but there are compelling policy reasons to permit recovery. | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Gottshall
green
2 sentences1994(Emphasis added.) “[A]n emotional injury constitutes ‘injury’ resulting from the employer’s ‘negligence’ for purposes of FELA only if it would be compensable under the terms of the zone of danger test.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2410 . 1994(Emphasis added.) “[A]n emotional injury constitutes ‘injury’ resulting from the employer’s ‘negligence’ for purposes of FELA only if it would be compensable under the terms of the zone of danger test.” Id. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2410 . | 2 | 1994–2011 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences2011The Court chose the “zone of danger” test from three possibilities: (1) the physical impact test; (2) the zone of danger test; and (3) the “relative bystander” test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d at 920 . 2011The Court chose the “zone of danger” test from three possibilities: (1) the physical impact test; (2) the zone of danger test; and (3) the “relative bystander” test as articulated by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d at 920 . | 2 | 1990–2011 |
Bovsun v. Sanperi
green
2 sentences2011Id. at 1073 (quoting Bovsun, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 , 461 N.E.2d at 848 ). 2011Id. at 1073 (quoting Bovsun, 473 N.Y.S.2d 357 , 461 N.E.2d at 848 ). | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp.
green
2 sentences2005But we took pains to add that the driver's negligence "was not an intentional act," id. at 1291 , reflecting our awareness of how very different "the intervening act of another" was in Carlson, id. at 1290 , from the unforeseeable criminal actions of third parties in Potts, Bailey, and Clement . [8] Another way of viewing it, the court said, was that no evidence had been offered "tending to show to what degree [the plaintiffs'] risk of injury was enhanced by the presence of negligently marketed and distributed guns, as opposed to the risk presented by all guns in society." Hamilton, 727 N.Y.S. 2005But we took pains to add that the driver's negligence "was not an intentional act," id. at 1291 , reflecting our awareness of how very different "the intervening act of another" was in Carlson, id. at 1290 , from the unforeseeable criminal actions of third parties in Potts, Bailey, and Clement . [8] Another way of viewing it, the court said, was that no evidence had been offered "tending to show to what degree [the plaintiffs'] risk of injury was enhanced by the presence of negligently marketed and distributed guns, as opposed to the risk presented by all guns in society." Hamilton, 727 N.Y.S. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
District of Columbia v. Carlson
green
2 sentences2005But we took pains to add that the driver's negligence "was not an intentional act," id. at 1291 , reflecting our awareness of how very different "the intervening act of another" was in Carlson, id. at 1290 , from the unforeseeable criminal actions of third parties in Potts, Bailey, and Clement . [8] Another way of viewing it, the court said, was that no evidence had been offered "tending to show to what degree [the plaintiffs'] risk of injury was enhanced by the presence of negligently marketed and distributed guns, as opposed to the risk presented by all guns in society." Hamilton, 727 N.Y.S. 2005But we took pains to add that the driver's negligence "was not an intentional act," id. at 1291 , reflecting our awareness of how very different "the intervening act of another" was in Carlson, id. at 1290 , from the unforeseeable criminal actions of third parties in Potts, Bailey, and Clement . [8] Another way of viewing it, the court said, was that no evidence had been offered "tending to show to what degree [the plaintiffs'] risk of injury was enhanced by the presence of negligently marketed and distributed guns, as opposed to the risk presented by all guns in society." Hamilton, 727 N.Y.S. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Courtney v. St. Joseph Hospital
green
2 sentences1994Id. at-, 102 Ill.Dec. at 812 , 500 N.E.2d at 705 . 1994Id. at-, 102 Ill.Dec. at 812 , 500 N.E.2d at 705 . | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Resavage v. Davies
green
2 sentences1990See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479 , 86 A.2d 879 (1952). . 1990See Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 603 , 258 N.W. 497 (1935); Resavage v. Davies, 199 Md. 479 , 86 A.2d 879 (1952). . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Cook v. Maier
green
2 sentences1988We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary (Cook v. Maier (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 , 92 P.2d 434 .) The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger of impact. 1988We have, indeed, held that impact is not necessary (Cook v. Maier (1939) 33 Cal.App.2d 581, 584 , 92 P.2d 434 .) The zone-of-danger concept must, then, inevitably collapse because the only reason for the requirement of presence in that zone lies in the fact that one within it will fear the danger of impact. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.