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18 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Rosivito Hoskinsgreen2 sentences2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence 2009Our Supreme Court has adopted four factors to consider when determining whether a knowing and intelligent waiver occurred: "(1) the extent of the court's inquiry into the defendant's decision, (2) other evidence in the record that establishes whether the defendant understood the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, (8) the background and experience of the defendant, and (4) the context of the defendant's decision to proceed pro se." Id. at 1127-28 (quoting United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001). | 4 | 4 |
Poynter v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Furthermore, when making its determination, the trial court should be mindful that "the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right." Id. 2009Furthermore, when making its determination, the trial court should be mindful that "the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right." Id. | 2 | 9 |
Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. FIELDSgreen2 sentences2003"The Law indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, and corrective action should only be taken when the verdiet or verdicts are 'inconsistent because [of] a logical or legal impossibility.!" Tincher, 762 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 258 , 259 N.E.2d 651, 668 (1970). 2003"The Law indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, and corrective action should only be taken when the verdiet or verdicts are 'inconsistent because [of] a logical or legal impossibility.!" Tincher, 762 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 258 , 259 N.E.2d 651, 668 (1970). | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Lucky Iroreregreen1 sentence2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence | 1 | 1 |
Osborne v. Stategreen1 sentence2003Therefore, the law on this point requires that the advisement to a defendant seeking self-representation be such that he is made "aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is *794 doing and his choice is made with eyes open.'" Osborne v. State, 754 N.E.2d 916, 920-21 (Ind.2001) (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Kavanaugh v. Stategreen2 sentences2002Moreover, mistrial is "an extreme remedy invoked only when no other measure can rectify the perilous situation." Kavanaugh v. State, 695 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). 2002Moreover, mistrial is "an extreme remedy invoked only when no other measure can rectify the perilous situation." Kavanaugh v. State, 695 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Johnson v. Zerbst
green
2 sentences2012While I do not condone Hawkins's failure to timely contact the trial court to say that he would be late for his November 7 trial, given these flimsy facts, there is no indication that Hawkins was trying to *770 "game" the system, and the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right, Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , I do not believe that the record supports the conclusion that Hawkins knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. [1] I would reverse the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. 2012While I do not condone Hawkins's failure to timely contact the trial court to say that he would be late for his November 7 trial, given these flimsy facts, there is no indication that Hawkins was trying to *770 "game" the system, and the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right, Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464 , 58 S.Ct. 1019 , I do not believe that the record supports the conclusion that Hawkins knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. [1] I would reverse the trial court and remand the case for a new trial. | 5 | 2001–2019 |
Tincher v. Davidson
green
2 sentences2017Elliott v. Roach , 409 N.E.2d 661 , 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (footnote omitted). [32] Cross-Appellants' argument is, essentially, that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts that must be reconciled. 2 Specifically, Cross-Appellants point to the jury's verdicts of breach of fiduciary duty and theft in favor of GABI and against West as proof that the allegations in the Letter are all "true." "The Law indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, and corrective action should only be taken when the verdict or verdicts are 'inconsistent because [of] a logical or 2003"The Law indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, and corrective action should only be taken when the verdiet or verdicts are 'inconsistent because [of] a logical or legal impossibility.!" Tincher, 762 N.E.2d at 1226 (quoting Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc. v. Fields, 254 Ind. 219, 258 , 259 N.E.2d 651, 668 (1970). | 2 | 2003–2017 |
Elliott v. Roach
green
1 sentence2017Elliott v. Roach , 409 N.E.2d 661 , 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (footnote omitted). [32] Cross-Appellants' argument is, essentially, that the jury rendered inconsistent verdicts that must be reconciled. 2 Specifically, Cross-Appellants point to the jury's verdicts of breach of fiduciary duty and theft in favor of GABI and against West as proof that the allegations in the Letter are all "true." "The Law indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, and corrective action should only be taken when the verdict or verdicts are 'inconsistent because [of] a logical or | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Leonard v. State
green
2 sentences2015The Court noted “[t]his determination must be made with the awareness that the law indulges every reasonable presumption against a waiver of this fundamental right.” Id. 2015The Court then observed that several courts have held that a verbal waiver of the right to counsel may not be necessary and that “so long as the ... court has given a defendant sufficient opportunity to retain the assistance of ... counsel, defendant’s actions which have the effect of depriving himself of ... counsel will establish a knowing and intentional choice.” Id. (citing United States v. Hoskins, 243 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir.2001) (finding the defendant’s conduct to be sufficient to imply waiver and that the trial court’s inquiry was sufficient and provided explicit warning of consequence | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Henson v. State
green
1 sentence2013Henson, 798 N.E.2d at 544 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.