18 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Huffgreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., *434 United States v. Huff , 782 F.3d 1221 , 1226 (C.A. 10, 2015) ("Upon seeing the uncased weapon [in plain view from outside the vehicle], the officers had the requisite probable cause both to conduct a search of the vehicle and to initiate an arrest based upon this weapons violation."), State v. Hunter , 62 So.3d 340 , 344 (La. 2017See, e.g., United States v Huff, 782 F3d 1221, 1226 (CA 10, 2015) (“Upon seeing [in plain view while standing outside the vehicle] the uncased weapon, the officers had the requisite probable cause both to conduct a search of the vehicle and to initiate an arrest based upon this weapons violation.”), State v Hunter, 62 So3d 340, 344 (La App, 2011) (“Upon making a valid traffic stop, the police officers were lawfully in a position to observe in plain view the clear plastic bag containing cocaine. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Huntergreen1 sentence2017See, e.g., *434 United States v. Huff , 782 F.3d 1221 , 1226 (C.A. 10, 2015) ("Upon seeing the uncased weapon [in plain view from outside the vehicle], the officers had the requisite probable cause both to conduct a search of the vehicle and to initiate an arrest based upon this weapons violation."), State v. Hunter , 62 So.3d 340 , 344 (La. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Barajasgreen2 sentences1993Recently, this Court in People v Barajas, 198 Mich App 551, 556 ; 499 NW2d 396 *675 (1993), construed the term "mixture” for purposes of a controlled substance violation and held that the weight of the controlled substance and filler material cannot be aggregated to punish a defendant more severely unless both are mixed together to form a homogeneous or reasonably uniform mass. 1993Recently, this Court in People v Barajas, 198 Mich App 551, 556 ; 499 NW2d 396 *675 (1993), construed the term "mixture” for purposes of a controlled substance violation and held that the weight of the controlled substance and filler material cannot be aggregated to punish a defendant more severely unless both are mixed together to form a homogeneous or reasonably uniform mass. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Sundlinggreen2 sentences1988See discussion in People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277, 289-292 ; 395 NW2d 308 (1986). 5 The hearing judge stated that he did not think that the suppression of evidence in a criminal case was binding on the court in a civil action. 6 The Supreme Court then noted: *91 This Court in Boyd v United States [ 116 US 616, 638 ; 6 S Ct 524 ; 29 L Ed 746 (1886)] rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. 1988See discussion in People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277, 289-292 ; 395 NW2d 308 (1986). 5 The hearing judge stated that he did not think that the suppression of evidence in a criminal case was binding on the court in a civil action. 6 The Supreme Court then noted: *91 This Court in Boyd v United States [ 116 US 616, 638 ; 6 S Ct 524 ; 29 L Ed 746 (1886)] rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Meshell
green
2 sentences2015MCL 333.7401c provides, in relevant part: (1) A person shall not do any of the following: (a) Own, possess, or use a vehicle, building, structure, place, or area that he or she knows or has reason to know is to be used as a location to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of section 7401 or a counterfeit substance or a controlled substance analogue in violation of section 7402. * * * (2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable as follows: (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) to (f), by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more th 2015MCL 333.7401c provides, in relevant part: (1) A person shall not do any of the following: (a) Own, possess, or use a vehicle, building, structure, place, or area that he or she knows or has reason to know is to be used as a location to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of section 7401 or a counterfeit substance or a controlled substance analogue in violation of section 7402. * * * (2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony punishable as follows: (a) Except as provided in subdivisions (b) to (f), by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more th | 5 | 2015–2018 |
People v. Plunkett
green
2 sentences2019As we said in Duffield, in the case of murder or manslaughter venue is proper at common law where the mortal wound is given, which would indicate that venue would be 8 750.317a as a “penalty enhancement” in reliance on this Court’s statement in Plunkett, 485 Mich at 60 , that MCL 750.317a “provides an additional punishment for persons who ‘deliver[]’ a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 when that substance is subsequently consumed by ‘any . . . person’ and it causes that person’s death.” The Court of Appeals read too much into our characterization of MCL 750.317a as providing “a 2019The Court of Appeals characterized MCL 750.317a as a “penalty enhancement” in reliance on this Court’s statement in [People v] Plunkett, 485 Mich [50, 60; 780 NW2d 280 (2010)], that MCL 750.317a “provides an additional punishment for persons who ‘deliver[]’ a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401 when that substance is subsequently consumed by ‘any. . . person’ and it causes that person’s death.” The Court of Appeals read too much into our characterization of MCL 750.317a as providing “an additional punishment.” It is only an “additional punishment” because MCL 333.7401 itself crim | 4 | 2017–2019 |
People v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2017People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83 ; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). 2017People v Johnson, 293 Mich App 79, 83 ; 808 NW2d 815 (2011). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
Blockburger v. United States
green
2 sentences2016MCL 333.7401c prohibits a variety of conduct, including the conduct for which Hunt was convicted: (1) A person shall not do any of the following: 1 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). -2- (a) Own, possess, or use a vehicle, building, structure, place, or area that he or she knows or has reason to know is to be used as a location to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of [MCL 333.7401] or a counterfeit substance or a controlled substance analogue in violation of [MCL 333.7402]. (b) Own or possess any chemical or any laboratory equipment that h 2016MCL 333.7401c prohibits a variety of conduct, including the conduct for which Hunt was convicted: (1) A person shall not do any of the following: 1 Blockburger v United States, 284 US 299 ; 52 S Ct 180 ; 76 L Ed 306 (1932). -2- (a) Own, possess, or use a vehicle, building, structure, place, or area that he or she knows or has reason to know is to be used as a location to manufacture a controlled substance in violation of [MCL 333.7401] or a counterfeit substance or a controlled substance analogue in violation of [MCL 333.7402]. (b) Own or possess any chemical or any laboratory equipment that h | 2 | 2015–2016 |
People of Michigan v. Romon Berry McBurrows
green
1 sentence2019The Court of Appeals in People v McBurrows, 322 Mich App 404, 413 ; 913 3 The Legislature amended MCL 257.617 after the release of Conklin but the amendments had no impact on this Court’s reasoning. -5- NW2d 342 (2017) (emphases omitted), held that the offense of delivering a controlled substance causing death, MCL 750.317a, was “properly understood as providing a penalty enhancement when a defendant’s criminal act—the delivery of a controlled substance in violation of MCL 333.7401—has the result or effect of causing a death to any other individual.” The Supreme Court found this characterizati | 1 | 2019–2019 |
People v. Noble
green
2 sentences2015People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660 ; 608 NW2d 123 (1999) (observing that “prosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to admit evidence”). -2- An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that the attorney originally appointed be replaced. 2015People v Noble, 238 Mich App 647, 660 ; 608 NW2d 123 (1999) (observing that “prosecutorial misconduct cannot be predicated on good-faith efforts to admit evidence”). -2- An indigent defendant is guaranteed the right to counsel; however, he is not entitled to have the attorney of his choice appointed simply by requesting that the attorney originally appointed be replaced. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Hunten
green
1 sentence1998Hunten, supra at 168 , 320 N.W.2d 68 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Mamon
green
2 sentences1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. 1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Cline
green
2 sentences1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. 1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People v. Kent
green
2 sentences1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. 1993As the majority correctly notes, People v Cline, 190 Mich App 1 ; 475 NW2d 362 (1991), People v Mamon, 190 Mich App 124 ; 475 NW2d 378 (1991), and People v Kent, 194 Mich App 206 ; 486 NW2d 110 (1992), did not address the precise question raised in this matter: whether "another felony” should be interpreted to refer to a controlled substance violation that is punishable by a different subsection of the same statute and that arises out of the same criminal transaction. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Boyd v. United States
red
2 sentences1988See discussion in People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277, 289-292 ; 395 NW2d 308 (1986). 5 The hearing judge stated that he did not think that the suppression of evidence in a criminal case was binding on the court in a civil action. 6 The Supreme Court then noted: *91 This Court in Boyd v United States [ 116 US 616, 638 ; 6 S Ct 524 ; 29 L Ed 746 (1886)] rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. 1988See discussion in People v Sundling, 153 Mich App 277, 289-292 ; 395 NW2d 308 (1986). 5 The hearing judge stated that he did not think that the suppression of evidence in a criminal case was binding on the court in a civil action. 6 The Supreme Court then noted: *91 This Court in Boyd v United States [ 116 US 616, 638 ; 6 S Ct 524 ; 29 L Ed 746 (1886)] rejected any argument that the technical character of a forfeiture as an in rem proceeding against the goods had any effect on the right of the owner of the goods to assert as a defense violations of his constitutional rights. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Illinois v. Gates
green
2 sentences1988Reversed and remanded. 1 21 USC 881(a)(6) provides: The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (6) All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph 1988Reversed and remanded. 1 21 USC 881(a)(6) provides: The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (6) All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph | 1 | 1988–1988 |
United States v. Leon
green
2 sentences1988Reversed and remanded. 1 21 USC 881(a)(6) provides: The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (6) All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph 1988Reversed and remanded. 1 21 USC 881(a)(6) provides: The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist in them: (6) All monies, negotiable instruments, securities, or other things of value furnished or intended to be furnished by any person in exchange for a controlled substance in violation of this subchapter, all proceeds traceable to such an exchange, and all monies, negotiable instruments and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any violation of this subchapter, except that no property shall be forfeited under this paragraph | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.