18 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1901–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Wilsongreen1 sentence2006Defendant was not entitled to have the jury instructed in the manner set forth in Instruction No. X. “[Bjefore any party is entitled to an instruction, there must be evidence to support its submission, and absent that evidentiary basis, it is not error to refuse the submission of an instruction.” State v. Wilson, 105 S.W.3d 576, 586 (Mo.App.2003). | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Missouri Department of Revenuegreen1 sentence1994Kelley v. Missouri Dept. of Revenue, 827 S.W.2d 767, 768 (Mo.App.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Stafford v. McCarthygreen1 sentence1994Louis v. Stubley, 154 S.W.2d 407 , 410 (Mo.App.1941) (“In any case good pleading requires that the parties be specifically named and the allegations be sufficient to advise the defendant and the court of what the claim is and who the defendant is”) and Stafford v. McCarthy, 825 S.W.2d 650, 658 (Mo.App.1992) (“The prayer is no[t] part of the petition and may be disregarded in determining what relief, if any, is authorized by the petition.”) The trial court’s order naming the Director as a party does not make him a party. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Burnsgreen1 sentence1984As Somerville, P.J., astutely distinguished in State v. Bums, 671 S.W.2d 306, 311-312 [8, 9] (Mo.App.1984), there is a material difference between that of which defendant here complains and the infrequently encountered rule of “destructive testimony” or “destructive contradictions.” As made clear in the reported opinion, the rule anent “destructive testimony” or “destructive contradictions” applies only to the respective elements of a witness’s testimony at trial — not to contradictions between trial testimony and pretrial statements made during preliminary out-of-court investigations. | 1 | 1 |
Bloom v. Missouri Board for Architects, Professional Engineers & Land Surveyorsgreen1 sentence1984Defendants contend that “the language of the statute does not require the published notice to contain ‘township’ and ‘range’ or abbreviations therefore (sic), but merely indicates that letters ‘may’ be used to denote the township and range.” True enough it is, as defendants assert, that use of the word “may,” as opposed to “shall,” generally means that the statute in question is permissive and not mandatory [Bloom v. Missouri Board for Architects, P.E. and L.S., 474 S.W.2d 861, 864 [1] (Mo.App.1971)], but that which § 140.180-1 “permits” is the use of the specified abbreviations in place of th | 1 | 1 |
Lolordo v. Lacygreen2 sentences1959Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097 , 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 [3-7] ; Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583 , 242 S.W.2d 549, 555, 556 ; Hall v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 285 S.W.2d 60, 64 [2, 3]. 1959Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097 , 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 [3-7] ; Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583 , 242 S.W.2d 549, 555, 556 ; Hall v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 285 S.W.2d 60, 64 [2, 3]. | 1 | 1 |
Missouri Cafeteria, Inc. v. McVeygreen2 sentences1959Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097 , 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 [3-7] ; Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583 , 242 S.W.2d 549, 555, 556 ; Hall v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 285 S.W.2d 60, 64 [2, 3]. 1959Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097 , 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 [3-7] ; Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583 , 242 S.W.2d 549, 555, 556 ; Hall v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 285 S.W.2d 60, 64 [2, 3]. | 1 | 1 |
Hall v. Brookshiregreen1 sentence1959Lolordo v. Lacy, 337 Mo. 1097 , 88 S.W.2d 353, 355 [3-7] ; Missouri Cafeteria v. McVey, 362 Mo. 583 , 242 S.W.2d 549, 555, 556 ; Hall v. Brookshire, Mo.App., 285 S.W.2d 60, 64 [2, 3]. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lincoln Credit Co. v. Peach
green
1 sentence1992Lincoln Credit v. Peach, 636 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. banc 1982), outlines the ramifications of art. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Sanger v. Yellow Cab Company, Inc.
green
1 sentence1992However, Sanger concludes, 486 S.W.2d at 481 -482: “What defendant was interested in was a release of liability from plaintiff and it cannot be said that defendant would not have entered into the release had its representative actually known of plaintiff’s injuries. * * * * * * The injured party is not required to make a settlement, and the general rule of freedom of contract includes the freedom to make a bad bargain.” Under Sanger there was no mutual mistake here to nullify the agreement. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp.
green
1 sentence1985As explained in State v. Haymon, 616 S.W.2d 305 [4] (Mo. banc 1981) the court ruled: “What defendant overlooks is that the memorandum, as discussed earlier, was a nullity with respect to accomplishing any change in the charge. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Rossi v. Davis
green
2 sentences1966Rossi v. Davis et al., 345 Mo. 362 , 133 S.W.2d 363 , loc. cit. 373, 125 A.L.R. 1111 , and cases there cited. 1966Rossi v. Davis et al., 345 Mo. 362 , 133 S.W.2d 363 , loc. cit. 373, 125 A.L.R. 1111 , and cases there cited. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Norwood v. Norwood
green
2 sentences1966What defendant refers to as the doctrine of estoppel by verdict and judgment is aptly stated in Norwood v. Norwood, 353 Mo. 548 , 183 S.W.2d 118, 1 . c. 122-123: “Generally, in order to have estoppel by a former judgment (res adjudi-cata), there must be: (1) Identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made. 1966What defendant refers to as the doctrine of estoppel by verdict and judgment is aptly stated in Norwood v. Norwood, 353 Mo. 548 , 183 S.W.2d 118, 1 . c. 122-123: “Generally, in order to have estoppel by a former judgment (res adjudi-cata), there must be: (1) Identity of the thing sued for; (2) identity of the cause of action; (3) identity of the persons and parties to the action; and (4) identity of the quality of the person for or against whom the claim is made. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Smith v. Kansas City
neutral
2 sentences1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. 1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Reed v. Peck, Guitar & Watson
green
2 sentences1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. 1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Moss v. Mindlin's, Inc.
green
1 sentence1963Neither could that contention be sustained for, as pointed out in Moss v. Mindlin’s, Inc., supra, 301 S.W. 2d at 769 , the rule in this state is that a permanent injury is a separate element of damage aside from pecuniary loss (see Meierotto v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 32 , 201 S. W.2d 161 ) and, quoting from the Moss case at the citation given above, “ * * * impairment of earning capacity, past or future, is not necessarily included in, nor does it necessarily result from, a permanent injury.” What defendant does contend, as stated in her motion for new trial and in her brief, is that this instructi | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Sperry v. Hurd
green
2 sentences1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. 1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Meierotto v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1963Neither could that contention be sustained for, as pointed out in Moss v. Mindlin’s, Inc., supra, 301 S.W. 2d at 769 , the rule in this state is that a permanent injury is a separate element of damage aside from pecuniary loss (see Meierotto v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 32 , 201 S. W.2d 161 ) and, quoting from the Moss case at the citation given above, “ * * * impairment of earning capacity, past or future, is not necessarily included in, nor does it necessarily result from, a permanent injury.” What defendant does contend, as stated in her motion for new trial and in her brief, is that this instructi 1963Neither could that contention be sustained for, as pointed out in Moss v. Mindlin’s, Inc., supra, 301 S.W. 2d at 769 , the rule in this state is that a permanent injury is a separate element of damage aside from pecuniary loss (see Meierotto v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 32 , 201 S. W.2d 161 ) and, quoting from the Moss case at the citation given above, “ * * * impairment of earning capacity, past or future, is not necessarily included in, nor does it necessarily result from, a permanent injury.” What defendant does contend, as stated in her motion for new trial and in her brief, is that this instructi | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Tegeler v. Kansas City
neutral
2 sentences1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. 1963Young v. Home Telephone Co., Mo.App., 201 S.W. 635 ; Sperry v. Hurd, 267 Mo. 628 , 185 S.W. 170 ; Tegler et ux. v. Kansas City, 95 Mo.App. 162 , 68 S.W. 953 ; Reed v. Peck et al., 163 Mo. 333 , 63 S.W. 734 ; Smith v. Kansas City, 128 Mo. 23 , 30 S.W. 314 .” What defendants contend is that there was insufficient evidence on either standard to support the amount awarded Kahmann. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Wellman
green
1 sentence1954What defendant now says in his assignments of error is that this latter statement referred back to the previous one about the eyes of Kirkwood being on the panel and emphasized the fact that defendant was charged with other crimes to prejudice the minds of the jury, citing State v. Wellman, 253 Mo. 302, 161 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Lasson.
green
2 sentences1954S.W. 795; State v. Lasson, 292 Mo. 155 , 238 S.W. 101 ; State v. Leonard, Mo.Sup., 182 S.W.2d 548 . 1954S.W. 795; State v. Lasson, 292 Mo. 155 , 238 S.W. 101 ; State v. Leonard, Mo.Sup., 182 S.W.2d 548 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Cunningham v. Moody
neutral
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Caldwell v. McKenna
green
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
In Re Estate of Prunty
green
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Wahl v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. 1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Wahl v. Cunningham
green
2 sentences1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. 1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried
neutral
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
State-Planters' Bank & Trust Co. v. First Nat. Bank of Victoria
green
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Chase Nat. Bank of New York v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland
neutral
1 sentence1936Clearly that is a contract of indemnity. [Wahl v. Cunningham, 320 Mo. 57 , 64, 6 S.W.2d 576 , Id., 332 Mo. 21 , 56 S.W.2d 1052 ; Chase National Bank v. Fidelity Deposit Co., 79 F.2d 84 ; State-Planters' Bank Trust Co. v. First National Bank, 76 F.2d 527 ; Niagara Share Corp. v. Fried, 61 F.2d 740 ; Green v. Newmark (Cal.), 28 P. 395 ; Caldwell v. McKenna (Idaho), 33 P.2d 366 ; In re Prunty's Estate (Iowa), 207 N.W. 785 ; Commonwealth ex rel. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co.
green
1 sentence1935Both the assignment of error and the point made are too indefinite to present any matter for review. [Thorpe v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, 89 Mo. 650 , 2 S.W. 3 ; Hamilton v. Crowe, 175 Mo. 634 , 75 S.W. 389 ; Hume v. Hale, 146 Mo. App. 659 , 125 S.W. 871 .] The fifth and final assignment of error made is that the court erred in giving an instruction for plaintiff for a directed verdict. | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hamilton v. Crowe green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Wahlig v. Krenning-Schlapp Grocer Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Shroyer v. Missouri Livestock Commission Co. green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Duggan v. Toombs-Fay Sash & Door Co. neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hume v. Hale neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Baker v. Lane neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Sconce v. Long Bell Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Taylor v. Larkin neutral | 1 | 1910–1910 |
| Gage v. Trawick neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| State v. Murphy neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| Clarke v. Inhabitants of the Town of Brookfield neutral | 1 | 1901–1901 |
| O'Brien v. Wagner neutral | 1 | 1901–1901 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.