What defendant in New York

2004The Court held (at 402) that “it is not enough for the district judge to find that ‘the defendant (is) oriented to time and place and (has) some recollection of events,’ but that the ‘test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” The Dusky test for capacity has been adopted as the standard in New York (People v Mendez, 1 NY3d 15, 19 [2003]; People v Francabandera, 33 NY2d 429 [1974]). 8 The following six facto

2004The Court held (at 402) that "it is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defendant (is) oriented to time and place and (has) some recollection of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' " The Dusky test for capacity has been adopted as the standard in New York ( People v Mendez , 1 NY3d 15, 19 [2003]; People v Francabandera , 33 NY2d 429 [1974]). [FN8] The following six

2009“The mere fact that the defendant ] collected the proceeds and the plaintiff may be unaware of the exact amount to which it is entitled does not make the defendant [a] fiduciar[y]” (National Comm. on Observance of Mother’s Day v Kirby, Block & Co., 17 AD2d 390, 391 [1962] [citation omitted]; see Waldman v Englishtown Sportswear, 92 AD2d 833, 835-836 [1983]; Sinkwich v Drew & Co., 2 AD2d 788, 789 [1956]; Freeman v Miller, 157 App Div 715, 719 [1913]).

1984What defendants received was the proceeds from the sales of their own goods, a part of which proceeds, when ascertained, they would owe to plaintiff * * * As the complaint shows no ground for equitable relief, a motion to dismiss on that ground before answer should have been granted”. (17 AD2d, at pp 391-392.) The National Committee case was cited with approval in Waldman v Englishtown Sportswear ( 92 AD2d 833, 835 ).

2024Such speculation cannot be the basis for defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( see People v Walker , 227 AD3d at 1131-1133).

2020To sanction defendant's position, this Court would in essence be giving carte blanche to employers to create business models that can be used as a subterfuge to discriminate against disabled employees and circumvent the HRLs ( Phillips , 66 AD3d at 177 [employer simply cannot abrogate the requirements of the HRLs by carving out a category of employees who are not subject to an interactive process]).

2019Park Assoc. v Crescent Park Assoc. , 159 AD2d 460, 462 [1990]; New York State Higher Educ.

2016“The identical pleading may be factually sufficient in one context but not the other.” (See People v Mendoza at 428; see also People v Ochjaroen, 34 Misc 3d 1240[A] , 2012 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2012].) Likewise, the defense’s reliance on Ramirez-Portoreal is misplaced. 1 In Ramirez-Portoreal , the Court held, “Once defendant has established standing, it becomes the People’s burden to demonstrate that defendant’s action in discarding the property searched, if that is the fact, was a voluntary and intentional act constituting a waiver of the legitimate expectation of privacy

2016“The identical pleading may be factually sufficient in one context but not the other.” (See People v Mendoza at 428; see also People v Ochjaroen, 34 Misc 3d 1240[A] , 2012 NY Slip Op 50487[U] [Crim Ct, Kings County 2012].) Likewise, the defense’s reliance on Ramirez-Portoreal is misplaced. 1 In Ramirez-Portoreal , the Court held, “Once defendant has established standing, it becomes the People’s burden to demonstrate that defendant’s action in discarding the property searched, if that is the fact, was a voluntary and intentional act constituting a waiver of the legitimate expectation of privacy

2013Indeed, we previously deferred to the DOL’s reading of Labor Law § 196-d, the very statute at the heart of this case (see Samiento, 10 NY3d at 79 [agreeing with the DOL that a charge that is not voluntary may nevertheless be a “charge purported to be a gratuity” within the meaning of the first sentence of section 196-d such that the employer may not pocket it]).

2013Because the first certified question, as framed by the Second Circuit, centers on the term “agent” rather than the phrase “similar employee,” the DOL suggests that we slightly reformulate it to ask: “What factors determine whether an employee is eligible or ineligible to receive distributions from an employer-mandated tip-splitting arrangement?” We accept the DOL’s reframed first question and now turn to the task of answering it. 2 We have recognized that the DOL’s “interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference” (Samiento, 10 NY3d at 79 ; see also Matter of

2013Because the first certified question, as framed by the Second Circuit, centers on the term “agent” rather than the phrase “similar employee,” the DOL suggests that we slightly reformulate it to ask: “What factors determine whether an employee is eligible or ineligible to receive distributions from an employer-mandated tip-splitting arrangement?” We accept the DOL’s reframed first question and now turn to the task of answering it. 2 We have recognized that the DOL’s “interpretation of a statute it is charged with enforcing is entitled to deference” (Samiento, 10 NY3d at 79 ; see also Matter of

2012Co. of Am., 94 NY2d 330, 350 [1999]).

2011She merely noted that State universities were large and intimidating.” (222 AD2d at 584.) What defendant fails to note, however, is that these two cases, as well as Halligan v Wesdorp ( 264 AD2d at 467 [father’s obligation to pay for child’s attendance at Marist College held not to exceed the “the tuition and related expenses he would have incurred had (the child) attended SUNY at New Paltz”]) were not decided using a Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (7) analysis of “the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and in the best interests of the child, and as justice require

2011She merely noted that State universities were large and intimidating.” (222 AD2d at 584.) What defendant fails to note, however, is that these two cases, as well as Halligan v Wesdorp ( 264 AD2d at 467 [father’s obligation to pay for child’s attendance at Marist College held not to exceed the “the tuition and related expenses he would have incurred had (the child) attended SUNY at New Paltz”]) were not decided using a Domestic Relations Law § 240 (1-b) (c) (7) analysis of “the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and in the best interests of the child, and as justice require

2009“The mere fact that the defendant ] collected the proceeds and the plaintiff may be unaware of the exact amount to which it is entitled does not make the defendant [a] fiduciar[y]” (National Comm. on Observance of Mother’s Day v Kirby, Block & Co., 17 AD2d 390, 391 [1962] [citation omitted]; see Waldman v Englishtown Sportswear, 92 AD2d 833, 835-836 [1983]; Sinkwich v Drew & Co., 2 AD2d 788, 789 [1956]; Freeman v Miller, 157 App Div 715, 719 [1913]).

2009“The mere fact that the defendant ] collected the proceeds and the plaintiff may be unaware of the exact amount to which it is entitled does not make the defendant [a] fiduciar[y]” (National Comm. on Observance of Mother’s Day v Kirby, Block & Co., 17 AD2d 390, 391 [1962] [citation omitted]; see Waldman v Englishtown Sportswear, 92 AD2d 833, 835-836 [1983]; Sinkwich v Drew & Co., 2 AD2d 788, 789 [1956]; Freeman v Miller, 157 App Div 715, 719 [1913]).

2009“The mere fact that the defendant ] collected the proceeds and the plaintiff may be unaware of the exact amount to which it is entitled does not make the defendant [a] fiduciar[y]” (National Comm. on Observance of Mother’s Day v Kirby, Block & Co., 17 AD2d 390, 391 [1962] [citation omitted]; see Waldman v Englishtown Sportswear, 92 AD2d 833, 835-836 [1983]; Sinkwich v Drew & Co., 2 AD2d 788, 789 [1956]; Freeman v Miller, 157 App Div 715, 719 [1913]).

2005“While evidence tending to show that another party might have committed the crime would be admissible, before such testimony can be received there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances as tend clearly to point out someone besides the prisoner as the guilty party” (see Greenfield v People, 85 NY 75, 89 [1881]).

2005"While evidence tending to show that another party might have committed the crime would be admissible, before such testimony can be received there must be such proof of connection with it, such a train of facts or circumstances as tend clearly to point out someone besides the prisoner as the guilty party" ( see Greenfield v People, 85 NY 75, 89 [1881]).

2005What defendant misapprehends is that evidence of current industry practice is only “admissible to explain the meaning of terms used in any particular trade, when their meaning is material to construe the contract” (Smith v Clews, 114 NY 190, 193 [1889]).

2005For example, in Zurakov v Register.Com, Inc. ( 304 AD2d 176, 179 [2003]), a case relied upon by defendant, the question confronting this Court was the meaning to be attributed to the term “registration” as it applied to an Internet domain name.

2002Bank & Trust Co., 78 NY2d 1066, 1068 [1991]; see Bank of N.Y. v Magri, 226 AD2d 412 [2d Dept 1996]; Matter of Leonard v Brescia Lbr.

1999Thus, the provisions of UDCA article 3 are inapplicable inasmuch as the District Court, Nassau County, lacks the authority to transfer venue outside the County to the Civil Court of the City of New York (see, Personnel Career Servs, v Pizza Huts, 149 Misc 2d 729 ; see also, Fountainhead Caterers v Peck, 42 Misc 2d 330 ).